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ABSTRACT 
Inhibitory control mechanisms and their role in task switching: 
A multi-methodological approach  
by 
Corinne Allen 
Executive control allows us to ignore distraction and switch between tasks in a 
flexible, yet organized fashion. While a hallmark of controlled behavior, distinctions 
among executive control processes are not thoroughly agreed upon. The present work 
explored the organization of two of these executive control processes, inhibition and 
shifting, and their relationship to each other. There were two primary goals. The first goal 
was to investigate the distinction among inhibitory control processes, as “inhibition” has 
oftentimes been considered a unitary construct. For example, there is evidence that 
response-distractor inhibition, which involves resolving interference from dominant 
responses or distractors in the external environment, is different from resistance to 
proactive interference (PI), which involves overcoming interference from previously 
relevant representations in memory. Using aging, neuropsychology, and individual 
differences methodologies, I investigated the unity and diversity of inhibitory control 
mechanisms. The healthy aging and neuropsychological evidence supported a distinction 
between response-distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference. However, 
when controlling for processing speed, the individual differences work suggested a need 
for further specification, as only a subset of these tasks emerged in the single factor 
model that provided the best fit to the data. The second goal was to explore how 
inhibitory control processes interact with task switching, as some theoretical accounts of 
 
task switching have suggested that switch costs result from the need to overcome 
interference from the previously relevant task. Inconsistent with these theories, I found 
little relation between inhibitory control and measures of global and local task switching, 
and instead, working memory served as the best predictor of these shifting measures. In 
contrast, inhibitory control was related to the backward inhibition abilities of older adults. 
These findings are discussed within a theory of working memory that accounts for the 
patterns of results found across the different methodologies. 
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Inhibitory control mechanisms and their role in task switching: 
A multi-methodological approach 
Chapter 1: Brief Introduction 
Among other functions, executive control allows us to ignore irrelevant 
information, arguably through inhibitory processes, and to switch between tasks in a 
flexible, yet organized fashion. My dissertation explored the organization of two of these 
executive control processes, as well as their relationship with each other. Within this 
work, there were two primary goals. The first goal was to investigate interference 
resolution processes, exploring whether inhibition is best described as a single process or 
multiple distinct processes. The second goal was to explore how inhibitory control 
processes interact with task switching. I approached these questions with multiple 
different – yet complementary – methodologies, including aging (Chapters 4 and 5), 
individual differences (Chapter 6), and neuropsychology (Chapter 7).  
 Before getting into the theoretical background and experimental data, however, I 
first discuss the importance of executive control, from both a conceptual and everyday 
point of view. Take your current activities as an example. As you sit there, reading this 
dissertation, there are many other tasks you could be doing, things you could be thinking 
about, and distractors in the environment that you need to ignore in order to maintain 
focus. In other words, we are plagued by internal and external conflict, yet we 
nonetheless manage to focus on a single task while ignoring others. This suggests that we 
are generally fairly good at interference resolution, enabling us to take part in goal-
directed behavior. Nonetheless, we can flexibly switch between tasks when needed – 
such as switching to respond to a student who walks into your office or to answer a 
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ringing telephone. That is, while we can effectively manage interference, we can also 
determine when interfering stimuli are relevant and should be allocated attention. When 
needed, we can reorient our goals in order to achieve another goal.  
 Let’s take the real-world example of switching between reading a manuscript (or 
dissertation) and answering the phone. The switch in tasks may seem easy and seamless, 
but evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that switching between tasks incurs a 
cost. Individuals are slower and more error prone after a task switch, relative to a task 
repetition. Additionally, inflexibility is a hallmark sign of frontal lobe damage (e.g., 
Milner, 1963, 1964), as many patients with frontal lobe damage are impaired in switching 
between tasks. Furthermore, Meiran (2010) has argued that cognitive flexibility plays a 
critical role in social interactions, cooperative behavior, and emotional regulation. Thus, 
understanding our ability to flexibility switch between tasks is not only essential to 
understanding flexible, regulated behavior, but may also have implications for treating 
patients with frontal lobe damage, social interactions, and emotional regulation.  
 Importantly for the present work, cognitive control abilities such as interference 
resolution, working memory resources, and switching flexibly between tasks are 
theoretically intertwined. That is, in order to preferentially perform one task over another, 
we must select that task in the face of competition from other possible tasks. Thus, the 
goal of the present work is to explore the mechanisms involved in interference resolution, 
as well as their interaction with cognitive flexibility.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
 The overall goal of this work was to examine the executive control mechanisms 
involved in inhibition and shifting. This chapter provides an overview of relevant 
theories, with specific study goals being identified at the end of the chapter. Generally 
speaking, the studies reported herein investigated how inhibition and shifting processes 
can be dissociated, how they relate to each other, and executive control models that 
account for these relationships.  
Task Switching and Switch Costs 
Our ability to behave in a cognitively flexible manner is moderated by executive 
control. Specifically, cognitive flexibility necessitates shifting our focus of attention 
between different tasks, an aspect of executive function that is known as task switching 
(e.g., Jersild, 1927; Miyake et al., 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 
1976). Task switching behavior is typically measured in a shifting paradigm (e.g., Jersild, 
1927), in which subjects change between two or more cognitive tasks in an organized, 
goal-oriented fashion. In standard shifting paradigms, subjects are asked to complete both 
single and mixed task blocks. In single task blocks, or pure blocks, subjects perform a 
single task throughout the duration of the block; in contrast, mixed task blocks require 
subjects to switch between two or more tasks. In mixed blocks, task changes can occur 
randomly, with changes externally cued by a word, symbol, or spatial location. 
Alternatively, task changes can be predictable, as with the alternating runs paradigm 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) in which the task changes after N runs (e.g., task1, task1, task2, 
task2); given task predictability, cues are not necessary (but are sometimes used) as 
subjects can keep track of the relevant task using subvocal rehearsal (e.g., Baddeley, 
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Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Bryck & Mayr, 2005). Regardless of cue manipulations or the 
manner in which tasks change, switching incurs a cost: individuals are slower and more 
error prone when task changes are required, relative to when continuing with a single task 
 The cost of changing tasks is known as the switch cost, and researchers distinguish 
between several types (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). Global switch costs are measured as the difference between mixed and pure blocks 
(e.g., Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976). As described 
above, mixed blocks require the performance of multiple tasks within a single block, 
while pure blocks only require performance of a single task. Such global switch costs are 
thought to measure the cost of updating, manipulating, and maintaining multiple tasks in 
working memory (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995), as multiple tasks need to be available in mixed blocks, relative to pure blocks.  
 Local switch costs, in contrast, are measured as the performance difference between 
switch and non-switch (or repeat) trials within a mixed block (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
For example, mixed blocks may be composed of multiple runs of a single task, followed 
by multiple runs of a different task, e.g., task1, task1, task2, task2, task1. Local switch costs 
are computed by subtracting mean performance on repeat trials (not underlined) from 
mean performance on switch trials (underlined). Given they measure the processes 
involved in initiating and executing a task change, local costs are hypothesized to be a 
purer measure of task switching (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). More specifically, this cost is hypothesized to reflect disengagement of 
the currently relevant task (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000) and retrieval of the task 
information from long-term memory (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000).  
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 Multiple lines of evidence support the idea that global and local switch costs reflect 
separate processes. Aging studies have found that older adults show exaggerated switch 
costs on measures of global, but not local, shifting (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; 
Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; cf. Kray, Li, & Lindenberger, 2002; Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2000a). Kray and Lindenberger (2000), for example, used a predictable, implicitly 
cued switching paradigm to investigate age differences in global and local switch costs. 
Age differences were found in global switch costs, such that middle-aged and older adults 
showed greater global switch costs than young adults. In contrast, age effects were either 
minimal or not observed in local switch costs. Similarly, Mayr (2001) replicated these 
effects in an unpredictable, explicitly cued shifting paradigm. Mayr concluded that older 
adults have difficulty selecting among relevant tasks in mixed blocks. Further supporting 
the separation of global and local costs as distinct executive processes, Kray and 
Lindenberger found that these switch costs were better represented by two latent 
switching factors in a confirmatory factor analysis, as opposed to a single-factor model. 
Additionally, global and local switch costs are differentially affected by articulatory 
suppression (i.e., repeating irrelevant verbal information while performing a task to 
disrupt inner rehearsal; e.g., Allen, 2010; Baddeley et al., 2001; Bryck & Mayr, 2005; 
Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Saeki & Saito, 2004; cf. Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 
2004).  
Models of Task Switching  
 Models of task switching assume that the intention to perform a given task is 
accompanied by the adoption of a “task set” (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 
1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976), or attentional mechanisms 
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that are used to guide behavior. According to Kiesel et al. (2010), task sets are “mental 
representations that enable the person to act in accordance to task requirements”. Task 
sets are thought to consist of multiple internal control templates, including the task goal, 
possible task-relevant responses, and stimulus-response (S-R) mappings. Task goal 
representations enable attention to be drawn to specific stimulus features; for example, in 
the context of a “shape” task, the goal would be “respond to object shape” (but not color 
or size). Task-relevant responses include representations of what responses can be made 
to particular stimuli, such as knowing that the possible shapes are square and circle. And, 
S-R mappings represent the motor-action plans associated with particular responses – that 
a square target requires one to press the left button. Critically, task sets should be 
instantiated at trial onset, maintained through the trial, and changed or updated whenever 
a new task becomes relevant; at the point of a task switch, task sets must be reconfigured. 
 Models of task switching propose the involvement of two distinct stages in task 
set reconfiguration, what Rogers and Monsell (1995) called endogenous and exogenous 
reconfiguration. As discussed below, endogenous reconfiguration can occur prior to 
target onset once one knows the task to performed, whereas exogenous reconfiguration 
cannot occur until after the target has been presented. However, theories differ in their 
assumptions about the processes that occur during these two stages. 
 Evidence for the processes involved in the endogenous component of task set 
reconfiguration comes from manipulations of preparation time, or the amount of time 
available to prepare for the upcoming target. In cued shifting, this is the cue-stimulus 
interval (CSI), the interval between cue and target onset; in predictable paradigms, this is 
the response-stimulus interval (RSI), the interval between the response to the previous 
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trial and onset of the next trial’s target. In both cases, longer preparation intervals result 
in significantly reduced switch costs, indicating that some form of advance preparation 
for the upcoming task takes place. Although accounts differ on the exact factors involved, 
such advance preparation is thought to involve updating the currently relevant task set 
into working memory (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003; Meiran, 
2000; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001). Whether or not retrieval of the task set occurs 
for both switch and repeat trials is a matter of debate. Rogers and Monsell (1995), for 
example, propose that endogenous reconfiguration is unique to switch trials. In contrast, 
Mayr and Kliegl (2000, 2003; see also Altmann & Gray, 2008) propose that task set 
information is retrieved on both switch and repeat trials, but that this retrieval process 
takes longer when a different task was performed on the previous trial. On such switch 
trials, the retrieval path needs to be changed (or, similarly, retrieval time is faster on non-
switch trials because of having just performed the same task).  
 Evidence for the exogenous component of task set reconfiguration comes from 
“residual” switch costs. Despite the fact that switch costs can be reduced with advanced 
preparation, switch costs are not eliminated (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; but see 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007). That is, even when given 
ample time to prepare for the upcoming task, switch costs remain. As a result, task 
switching theories have proposed an exogenous component to task set reconfiguration 
that cannot be implemented until target onset. Again, theories differ in their exact 
specifications of exogenous reconfiguration; however, two general classes of theories 
emerge. The first class emphasizes response processes such as activating or loading S-R 
rules into WM and applying these rules to the target (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Meiran, 
  8 
2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001). The second class emphasizes the need to overcome 
interference from previously executed tasks (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Mayr & Keele, 
2000; but see De Jong, 2000, for an alternative to both of these accounts). Of course, both 
could play a role with the interference arising when attempting to replace prior S-R 
mappings with the ones relevant to the current task. Given the relevance of interference 
accounts to the goals of the present body of work, the interference accounts will be 
reviewed in more detail, followed by a brief discussion of other evidence indicating a role 
for interference resolution in task switching.   
Interference-Based Accounts of Switch Costs 
One of the most influential interference-based accounts of switch costs was 
proposed by Allport and colleagues (1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999), and attributes switch 
costs to “task set inertia”. Allport and colleagues proposed that switch costs result from 
proactive interference from recently activated task sets. This account assumes a 
combination of continued priming from the previously, highly activated task, and prior 
suppression of the currently relevant task – that is, a combination of positive and negative 
priming. They hypothesize that previously relevant tasks receive a high level of 
activation in order to allow selection for action; shifting, however, requires that the 
cognitive system overcome that high activation in order to instantiate the newly relevant 
task set. To this end, inhibition is called upon as a mechanism for suppressing the 
previously relevant task set, allowing the new task set to take over. Switch costs, then, 
result from task set inertia – the continued activation of previously relevant task sets, 
which needs to be overcome in task switch situations.  
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Empirical evidence for the contribution of proactive interference to switch costs 
comes from findings of asymmetrical switch costs, found when one task is more 
dominant than another (Allport et al., 1994; see Meuter & Allport, 1999, for similar 
findings in language switching). Allport and colleagues imbedded a Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935) in their shifting paradigm; subjects had to switch between color naming (while 
ignoring the written word) and word naming (while ignoring the stimulus’ ink color). 
Because word reading is a more automatic process, word reading is the easier, more 
dominant task with a stronger baseline activation. In contrast, color naming is the more 
difficult task, arguably with a weaker baseline activation. When switching between these 
tasks, switch costs were larger when switching to the dominant task of word reading, 
relative to switching to the less dominant (more difficult) task of color naming. Allport 
and colleagues explained these asymmetrical switch costs by proposing that persisting 
activation (of the no longer relevant task) needs to be suppressed. Because the baseline 
activation of the dominant (word reading) task is higher, more inhibition needs to be 
applied to this task in order to successfully activate the color naming task. In order to 
switch back to the dominant word reading task, one needs to overcome the inhibition they 
had previously applied to this task; and, this need to overcome persisting inhibition is a 
time consuming process. Switch costs, then, result in part from the temporal persistence 
of this strong inhibition. In contrast, the lower baseline activation of the less dominant 
task means less inhibition is required for overriding it. Because less inhibition is needed 
to suppress this task, there is less persisting inhibition to be overcome when switching 
back to this task in future trials (i.e., smaller switch costs).  
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To summarize, Allport and others (1994; Meuter & Allport, 1999) have explained 
asymmetrical switch costs in terms of the need for inhibition in overcoming interference 
from previously relevant tasks, and differing levels of persisting inhibition. However, as 
Koch et al. (2010) explain, explanations of asymmetrical switch costs do not 
unequivocally require inhibition, as asymmetrical switch costs can be explained by 
positive priming alone (Yeung & Monsell, 2003; see Koch et al., 2010 for a discussion). 
Specifically, positive priming accounts maintain that weaker tasks require “stronger 
control biases” (Yeung & Monsell, 2003, p. 468), or larger boosts in activation to 
overcome the greater baseline activation of the more dominant task. In contrast, because 
more dominant tasks have higher baseline activation levels, less priming is needed. This 
proportionally stronger priming for weaker tasks makes it more difficult to overcome this 
task’s activation when switching back to the strong task, resulting in asymmetrical switch 
costs. Thus, while asymmetrical switch costs support the need for interference resolution 
in task switching, they cannot conclusively confirm a role for inhibition. According to 
Healey, Campbell, Hasher, and Ossher (2010), “one way to adjudicate between inhibitory 
and noninhibitory accounts…is to search for convincing evidence from different 
paradigms” (p. 5).  
Using a modified shifting paradigm, Mayr and Keele (2000) have found a 
compelling marker of inhibition in task switching. Mayr and Keele use a shifting 
paradigm with three tasks (tasks A, B, and C), as opposed to the more traditional method 
of using two tasks (tasks A and B only). The logic is as follows: if task sets are inhibited 
once abandoned, it should be more difficult to switch back to a recently inhibited task 
(ABA, N-2 repetition), as opposed to a less recently inhibited task (CBA; N-2 switch). In 
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the previous example, the underlined task represents the trial of interest. In both 
conditions, subjects are switching back to task A; however, what varies is the recency 
with which task A was previously performed. Mayr and Keele found significant N-2 
repetition costs across a variety of experiments, providing support for the notion that 
inhibition is involved in shifting away from a recently abandoned task set (see also Gade 
& Koch, 2005, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008). N-2 
repetition costs are evidence of a process that has been called both “backward inhibition” 
and “task-set inhibition”.  
To gain a more thorough understanding of this backward inhibition effect, we will 
take a detailed look at the logic (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). Below, I use A1 to refer to 
the first instance of task A and A2 to refer to the second instance of task A within the 
ABA sequence. In the ABA task sequence, performance of task A1 requires activation of 
the relevant task set. Subsequent successful performance of task B requires that this task 
gain a higher level of activation than task A1. As previously discussed, one mechanism 
for overcoming the previous task’s activation is inhibition, with a switch from task A1 to 
task B resulting in inhibition of task A1 (so called backward inhibition). Similarly, a 
switch from task B to task A2 requires not only that task B be inhibited, but also that the 
cognitive system overcome the inhibition that was previously applied to task A1. In the 
CBA sequence, in contrast, task C must be inhibited to allow for successful performance 
of task B, and task B must be inhibited to allow for the successful performance of task A. 
However, because task A was less recently inhibited (i.e., at some point prior to Task C), 
there is less inhibition to overcome when switching to this task. Importantly, this N-2 
repetition cost is incompatible with activation-only (Mayr & Keele, 2000) or episodic 
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retrieval (Mayr, 2002) theories of task repetition, as both of these theories would predict 
facilitation of the N-2 repetition condition, relative to the N-2 switch. As a consequence, 
Mayr and Keele have suggested that backward inhibition allows for selection among 
competing task sets, functioning to reduce the activation of the now-irrelevant task and 
therefore facilitate selection of the newly-relevant task. However, a side effect of this 
interference resolution mechanism is the need to overcome inhibition persistence when 
the inhibited task becomes once again relevant, thus resulting in at least part of the 
residual switch cost. 
 Bringing this discussion back to models of task switching, the above evidence 
suggests that at least some component of exogenous reconfiguration – or equivalently, 
some component of residual switch costs – is the need to overcome interference from 
previously executed tasks via backward inhibition. Such an explanation clearly implicates 
a role for inhibitory processes in task switching. Before discussing the nature of these 
inhibitory mechanisms, we will first review other evidence of interference in task 
switching, as a large body of work supports the notion that switching involves resolving 
interference between tasks.  
Other Evidence for Interference in Task Switching 
Other effects also implicate a need for interference resolution in task switching. 
Switch costs are only found when task sets overlap. For example, Jersild (1927; see also 
Spector & Biederman, 1976) found that switch costs were reversed or eliminated when 
task stimuli unambiguously indicated which task should be performed on a given trial 
(e.g., Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976); in other words, switch costs are only 
present when two tasks must be performed on the same stimulus set. When subjects 
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alternated between adding and subtracting 3 from a list of numbers, switch costs were 
found. In contrast, no switch costs were found when subjects alternated between number 
and word stimuli, on which subjects subtracted three from the numbers and produced an 
antonym to the words (Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976; see also Allport et al., 
1994). This difference has been taken as evidence that targets can serve as an 
unintentional retrieval cue for the irrelevant task set (Spector & Biederman, 1976).  
Additional interference effects in task switching were illustrated in a set of elegant 
experiments by Rogers and Monsell (1995). First, subjects performed better on congruent 
trials, where the relevant and irrelevant target features (shape, size) were mapped to the 
same button (i.e., both are mapped to the left button), relative to incongruent trials where 
the relevant and irrelevant target features were mapped to different buttons. According to 
Kiesel and colleagues (2010), these findings suggest that bivalent targets activate 
responses for both currently relevant and currently irrelevant tasks. Second, subjects 
performed better when the irrelevant target attribute had no associated S-R mapping (a 
neutral, or univalent target). That is, performance was worse in response to bivalent 
targets, relative to univalent targets. Given univalent stimuli do not allow for the 
activation of an irrelevant S-R mapping, this effect suggests interference from irrelevant 
tasks, regardless of overlapping S-R mappings. That is, the difference in performance 
between these stimulus conditions was accounted for by the competition afforded by the 
bivalent stimuli: bivalent stimuli are associated with both the relevant and the competing 
(irrelevant) task, resulting in interference. Third, subjects performed better on neutral 
trials, relative to congruent trials. This suggests that the presence of any irrelevant target 
feature that has an irrelevant task S-R mapping (whether congruent or incongruent) 
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affects performance; as in the bivalent condition, the irrelevant stimulus attribute is 
assumed to activate the irrelevant task set, causing interference with stimulus processing. 
Rogers and Monsell discussed these effects in terms of exogenous task cueing effects, 
representing the “degree to which an irrelevant attribute associated with a now-
inappropriate task makes that task harder to suppress, irrespective of its particular 
response value” (p. 212). As noted by Rogers and Monsell, these effects interact with, but 
do not fully account for, switch costs. 
 Additionally, mixing costs (e.g., Rubin & Meiran, 2005) can also be taken as 
evidence for task interference. Specifically, mixing costs are measured by the difference 
between repeat trials (in mixed blocks) and pure block performance. These two trial types 
are theoretically similar insofar as only one task must be performed. However, these two 
trial types are not statistically equivalent, as performance is worse on repeat trials. The 
additional time needed on repeat trials in mixed blocks (relative to pure task trials in pure 
blocks), has been attributed to the need to manage the competition between multiple task 
sets (Rubin & Meiran, 2005). While a review of mixing costs is beyond the scope of the 
present research, as the present work does not address this measure of shifting, mixing 
costs can be taken as evidence that interference plays a strong role in task switching 
ability.  
Nature of the Inhibitory Mechanisms in Task Switching 
While Mayr and Keele’s (2000) three-task shifting paradigm presented conclusive 
evidence for the role of inhibition in task switching (via N-2 repetition costs, or backward 
inhibition), a large question remained: what, exactly, is being inhibited, and how are 
interference resolution processes implemented in task switching? While a plethora of 
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experimental research has explored the first question, much less experimental work has 
explored the second question. These two issues will be reviewed in turn.  
Backward inhibition: What is being inhibited? To answer the question of what 
is being inhibited by backward inhibition, researchers have used creative variants of the 
three-task shifting paradigm. All in all, results tend converge on the idea that inhibition is 
applied when internal conflict arises; while most have suggested this occurs at the level 
of response selection (e.g., Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Schneider 
& Verbruggen, 2008), others have proposed a more flexible mechanism that depends on 
task design (Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009).  
Gade and Koch (2007) used a shifting paradigm with four tasks. Three of these 
tasks were standard switching tasks, using multivalent (M) stimuli with overlapping 
response sets. The fourth task, however, was a neutral, univalent (U) task with a unique 
stimulus (i.e., the stimulus was in no way similar to the stimuli for the other three tasks); 
critically, the univalent task’s degree of response set overlap with the multivalent stimuli 
was manipulated across experiments. Their logic was as follows: if inhibition of the 
previously relevant task set (N-1) occurs as a function of competition at the response 
level on the current trial (N), removing trial N’s response-level competition should 
eliminate the need for inhibition. For example, if subjects perform three consecutive 
multivalent tasks (MA1MBMA2), successful selection and implementation of task MB 
requires inhibition of MA1 (as discussed above), and returning to task MA2 requires 
overcoming this persisting inhibition, resulting in the N-2 repetition cost. In contrast, if 
there were no competition when switching to task MB, inhibition would not be required. 
This condition was tested using a multivalent-univalent-multivalent triplet (MA1UMA2). 
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In this triplet, the univalent task does not cause interference between tasks N-2 and N-1 
because there is no response set overlap, thus no need to inhibit task MA1 – as a result, 
there should also be no N-2 repetition cost. Gade and Koch found significant N-2 
repetition costs when three consecutive multivalent tasks followed each other 
(MA1MBMA2), but no N-2 repetition cost when the same multivalent task was separated 
by the univalent task (MA1UMA2). The authors concluded that backward inhibition 
resolves competition produced by response set overlap.  
To further test their hypothesis that response set overlap is critical to the 
triggering of backward inhibition, Gade and Koch (2007) manipulated the univalent 
task’s degree of response set overlap. In Experiment 3, the univalent task’s stimulus 
remained unique, but the response set overlapped with the response sets of the 
multivalent tasks. Contrary to the first experiment, when the univalent task had a unique 
response set, the overlapping response set in Experiment 3 produced significant N-2 
repetition costs, even in the multivalent-univalent-multivalent triplet (MA1UMA2). These 
results suggest that overlapping response sets trigger backward inhibition in shifting 
paradigms, as illustrated by the occurrence of N-2 repetition costs; however, given the 
neutral nature of the univalent stimulus, it should be noted that this is the only place in 
which task set competition occurs (i.e., there are no overlapping target features), and 
therefore this account cannot rule out the possibility that backward inhibition would be 
applied to other task set representations at the point at which conflict arises (e.g., 
Houghton et al., 2009).  
Schuch and Koch (2003) further supported a role for response level processes in 
the triggering of backward inhibition in task switching. Schuch and Koch combined a 
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shifting task with the go/no-go paradigm to explore the role of response selection in the 
N-2 repetition cost. No-go trials were unpredictably imbedded as relatively rare events in 
the shifting paradigm, with the no-go signal occurring simultaneously with target onset. 
Because subjects did not know in advance if a trial would be go or no-go and go trials 
were more frequent, they assumed business as usual and prepared for the upcoming task 
during the CSI. However, in no-go trials, a no-go signal informed subjects that 
responding was unnecessary. The authors predicted that if response selection was 
responsible for the N-2 repetition cost through the triggering of inhibition, N-2 repetition 
costs should be found when response selection is required for task B of an ABA triplet 
(go condition), but not when response selection is not required for task B (no-go 
condition). The authors found exactly that: if trial N-1 was a go trial, there was a 
significant N-2 repetition cost; in contrast, if trial N-1 was a no-go trial, there was no N-2 
repetition cost, suggesting no inhibition of task A1.  
Schuch and Koch (2003) also ruled out response execution (independent of 
response selection) as a necessary condition for inhibition. In Experiments 3 and 4, 
Schuch and Koch required subjects to execute both possible responses in no-go trials 
(i.e., both response keys were pressed on these trials), requiring response execution 
independent of response selection. Similar to the previously discussed no-go trials, N-2 
repetition costs were only found in the go condition, when response selection and 
execution were required. N-2 repetition costs were not found in the no-go condition that 
required only response execution. Schuch and Koch conclude that the occurrence of 
backward inhibition depends on response selection, more specifically, at the level of the 
previous category-response mappings. They propose that inhibition supports the 
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“recoding of the meaning of responses in overlapping S-R tasks” (p. 101). When all the 
tasks use overlapping responses, task changes result in response level conflicts such that 
the previously relevant response meanings (e.g., left button = circle, right button = 
square) are no longer relevant, and must be abandoned in favor of the currently relevant 
response meanings (left button = red, right button = blue). This abandonment of 
irrelevant category-response mappings is achieved via backward inhibition.  
 While several lines of research have suggested that backward inhibition plays a 
functional role at the level of response selection, Houghton and colleagues (2009) found 
varying degrees of backward inhibition as a function of cue processing requirements. 
While keeping all other task features the same, the authors manipulated the degree of 
cue-to-target match in an attentional switching paradigm requiring that participants 
identify visual features. Switching was measured via the reallocation of attention to a new 
visual feature (as opposed to a switch in tasks per se). In their study, transparent cues 
provided visual overlap between the cues and targets, allowing direct identification of 
target properties and resulting in direct task set activation. For example, an angled, 
unfilled rectangle served as the cue for angled targets whereas a shaded rectangle served 
as the cue for shaded targets. In contrast, less transparent cues required that the cue first 
be translated into a representation that was more similar to the target (see also Baddeley 
et al., 2001; Bryck & Mayr, 2005 for similar logic concerning cue manipulations). For 
example, an unfilled octagon served as the cue for angled targets whereas an unfilled 
square served as a cue for shaded targets. In these less transparent cue conditions, cue 
meanings had to be retrieved before the relevant visual features could be identified. 
Houghton et al. found larger backward inhibition effects with less transparent cues, 
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arguing that the need to retrieve the cue’s meaning resulted in competition from the 
representations that were already active from the previous trial; this conflict was 
subsequently resolved by backward inhibition. In contrast, transparent cues allowed for 
the immediate identification of the target’s visual features, allowing the relevant feature 
to be directly instantiated into the focus of attention. As pointed out by Houghton et al., 
the notion that backward inhibition is more flexible (in that it can act on any 
representation that induces competition) is in line with Mayr and Keele’s (2000) 
suggestion that backward inhibition is a mechanism for clearing working memory and 
may play a more general role in reducing internal conflict (see also Bao, Li, Chen, & 
Zhang, 2006, for evidence of backward inhibition in a working memory paradigm).  
 In summary, then, several lines of research have suggested that backward inhibition 
plays a functional role at the response selection level, though others have suggested that 
backward inhibition is more flexible. Regardless of the representation to which this 
mechanism is applied, backward inhibition functions to reduce the interference of 
irrelevant task information in order to facilitate selection of the newly relevant task set. 
Thus, while backward inhibition facilitates aspects of task set selection, it also comes 
with a consequence, as persisting inhibition slows task performance when a task is 
repeated at a later time point (ABA), as opposed to when a task is not repeated (CBA) – a 
so-called fingerprint of inhibition (Healey et al., 2010). 
Inhibition in task switching: How is it implemented? Above, we reviewed a 
large body of evidence suggesting that interference resolution mechanisms are important 
in task switching. The notion that inhibition is important to aspects of working memory is 
not new, as several theories have proposed a role for interference resolution in working 
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memory (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Kane, Bleckley, Conway & 
Engle, 2001; Lustig, May & Hasher, 2001; May, Hasher & Kane, 1999; cf. MacLeod, 
Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). For example, Hasher and colleagues have 
proposed that inhibition serves a critical role in memory and attentional processes, 
serving three important functions: restricting access to working memory such that only 
relevant information is accessed; deleting no longer relevant information from the 
contents of working memory (conceptually similar to the above-discussed backward 
inhibition); and withholding strong, automatic responses until they can be evaluated 
(Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). According to Hasher, Zacks, and colleagues, these 
inhibition functions are directed at the contents of working memory.  
 This and other theoretical perspectives (e.g., Harnishfeger, 1995; Kok, 1999; 
Munakata et al., 2011; Nigg, 2000) suggest inhibition is not a unitary construct, but can 
instead by represented by separate inhibitory mechanisms. Psychometric support for the 
non-unitary nature of inhibitory control comes from an individual differences study. 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) used confirmatory factor analysis to examine three types of 
inhibition, similar to those identified by Hasher and colleagues. The first was preponent 
response inhibition, measuring the ability to inhibit dominant or automatic responses, 
which is similar to Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) restraining function. Second, Friedman and 
Miyake measured resistance to distractor interference, conceptualized as the ability to 
resist interference from irrelevant information in the external environment, which is 
similar to Hasher and Zacks’ access function. Lastly, Friedman and Miyake measured the 
resistance to proactive interference, or the ability to resist interference from previously 
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relevant information; May and colleagues (May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999) hypothesize that 
the deletion function of inhibition is important for resisting proactive interference.  
Although three distinct inhibitory mechanisms were hypothesized, confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) results suggested only two inhibition mechanisms (cf. Hedden & 
Yoon, 2006). Specifically, Friedman and Miyake (2004) found a strong relation between 
preponent response inhibition and resistance to distractor interference and proposed this 
relationship resulted from the fact that they both “share the requirement to actively 
maintain task goals in the face of interference” (p. 126). As a result, they combined these 
two types of inhibition into a single construct called “response-distractor inhibition”. In 
contrast, resistance to proactive interference construct (which involves resisting 
interference from irrelevant information residing in memory rather than from the external 
environment) was not related response-distractor interference. Thus, Friedman and 
Miyake proposed a two-factor model of inhibition consisting of response-distractor 
inhibition and resistance to proactive interference, though they recognize there may be 
other types of inhibition that were not investigated in their study.  
What types of inhibition might have Friedman and Miyake (2004) have failed to 
investigate? One possibility is a more automatic form of inhibition that is separate from 
cognitively controlled inhibitory mechanisms (but see Munakata et al., 2011, for an 
alternative perspective). Automatic inhibitory mechanisms may be implemented via 
lateral inhibition of neural representations as a (unintentional but functional) side effect 
of selective attention (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Munakata 
et al., 2011; Nigg, 2000). With this form of inhibition, selective attention acts to bias the 
processing of particular target or task features (conceptually similar to a task set); 
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however, a downstream consequence of this attentional biasing is the lateral inhibition of 
competing representations.  
Bringing the discussion back to task switching, the issue being addressed 
throughout the present research project is the role for inhibition in task switching. 
Although a plethora of research has provided evidence for interference resolution in 
shifting paradigms, little work has experimentally investigated what type of inhibition is 
utilized. Similarly, no experimental work has investigated whether backward inhibition is 
functionally similar to other traditional measures of inhibition, such as response-
distractor inhibition or resistance to proactive interference (though several authors have 
suggested that backward inhibition reflects an automatic form of inhibition such as lateral 
inhibition, e.g., Koch et al., 2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003; 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010). Thus, while purely behavioral studies 
have suggested a role for interference resolution in task switching, as well as the 
existence of a backward inhibition mechanism (Mayr & Keele, 2000), questions remain 
about the nature of this interference resolution mechanism. Given this open question, the 
goals of the present body of work are discussed next.  
Goals of this Work 
While the struggle to gain an understanding of inhibition mechanisms is not new, 
the use of experimental research to answer the question of what types of inhibition are 
involved in task switching is. The present work will investigate the dissociation among 
inhibitory mechanisms and their individual roles in various aspects of task switching 
using several approaches. While some of the background associated with the various 
goals below has not yet been discussed, this background will be addressed in the chapters 
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that follow. The minimal details provided below are simply “teaser” descriptions to 
motivate the individual goals, further elaborated in Chapters 4-7.  
Goal 1: Dissociations among inhibitory mechanisms. The present study sought 
to replicate the dissociation among inhibitory mechanisms using two approaches: the 
effects of aging and individual differences.  
1a) Aging. With respect to aging, some authors (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988) have 
suggested that inhibition deficits are a source of age-related cognitive decline. While a 
preponderance of evidence has suggested that older adults show exaggerated performance 
on various resistance to proactive interference tasks (e.g., Hasher, Chung, May, & Foong, 
2002; Jonides, Marshuetz, Smith, Reuter-Lorenz, & Koeppe, 2000; May et al., 1999; 
McCabe, Robertson, & Smith, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), evidence for age-
related impairments in response-distractor inhibition is less consistent. That is, a number 
of studies have found exaggerated interference effects on response-distractor inhibition 
tasks (e.g., Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Dempster, 1992; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 
1996; West & Baylis, 1998; see Kok, 1999 for a brief discussion), though other work and 
meta-analyses have failed to find differences or suggested these exaggerated interference 
effects are better attributed to general slowing (e.g., Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Madden, 1990; 
Wheatley, Scialfa, Boot, Kramer, & Alexander, 2012; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; 
Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998). Critically, such an age-related impairment in 
resistance to proactive interference without a corresponding impairment in response-
distractor inhibition supports the dissociation between these inhibitory mechanisms, 
suggesting that they can be selectively affected by healthy aging. The research reported in 
Chapter 4 examined the effects of aging on multiple tasks tapping each inhibitory 
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mechanism to determine whether a) consistent evidence for a response-distractor 
inhibition impairment could be found and b) the results of healthy aging supported 
dissociations among inhibitory mechanisms.  
1b) Individual differences. Using an individual differences approach, this work 
sought to replicate the confirmatory factor analysis results of Friedman and Miyake 
(2004), which found separate latent variables for representing response-distractor 
inhibition and resistance to proactive interference. This question is addressed in Chapter 
6. 
Goal 2: Role for inhibitory mechanisms in task switching. The large body of 
work suggesting a role for interference resolution in task switching is mostly theoretical, 
and has not closely examined the possibility that there are multiple components to 
inhibition. To this end, the second goal of this work was to investigate the relationship 
between measures of task switching and inhibition. This goal was approached with three 
approaches: aging, individual differences, and neuropsychology.  
Goal 2a: Aging. Given hypotheses of age-related declines in inhibition (addressed 
in Chapter 4), as well as findings of exaggerated switch costs with age (e.g., Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000, Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; cf. Mayr & Kliegl, 2000), 
Chapter 5 reports an investigation of the possibility that age-related impairments in task 
switching are associated with impaired inhibitory ability. In other words, the research 
addressed the question of whether it possible to find age-related associations between 
deficits in inhibition and shifting, across various measures of each executive function. 
Additionally, backward inhibition was examined from an aging perspective to provide a 
replication of the single aging experiment of Mayr (2001) in a larger sample of subjects; 
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this issue addressed the question of whether all aspects of inhibition are impaired with 
healthy aging (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  
Goal 2b: Individual differences. Using an individual differences approach, the 
research reported in Chapter 6 investigated the relationship between various task 
switching costs (including global switch costs, local costs, and N-2 repetition costs) and 
measures of inhibition – both response distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive 
interference (Friedman & Miyake, 2004) – to determine what type of inhibition 
contributes to shifting performance.  
Goal 2c: Neuropsychology. The research in Chapter 7 investigated the 
relationship between inhibition and task switching from a neuropsychological perspective 
by comparing two patients, one with and one without inhibitory control impairments 
(e.g., Allen, Vuong, & Martin, 2010; Hamilton & Martin, 2005, 2007). In this respect, the 
logic is similar to that of Goal 2a – if there is a direct relationship between inhibitory 
abilities and task switching, as discussed above, we would expect the patient with 
inhibition deficits to show corresponding impairments on measures of task switching.  
 To accomplish all of these goals, this body of work used multiple tasks for 
measuring both response-distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference, 
and included a shifting paradigm that allowed for the calculation of various shifting 
performance measures (global, local, N-2 repetition costs, and congruency effects). The 
inclusion of multiple inhibitory control tasks allowed for the investigation of consistent 
patterns of dissociations in aging (Goal 1a) and neuropsychology (Goal 2c), as well as the 
construction of inhibition latent variables in a confirmatory factor analysis (Goal 1b). 
Importantly, latent variables should provide a purer measurer of the inhibitory control 
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mechanisms by capitalizing on the variance common to each of the individual inhibition 
tasks. Additionally, the latent variable constructs were used to investigate the relationship 
of inhibition with shifting measures, in order to gain a better understanding of the role for 
inhibition in task switching (Goals 2a-2c). 
  27 
Chapter 3: General Method 
 This chapter describes the participants, materials, design, and general procedure 
used for the present study.  
Participants 
Participants were 105 young adults and 62 older adults. The young adult sample 
consisted of individuals between the ages of 18 and 32 (M = 21, SD = 3). Sixty-seven of 
the young adults were from the Rice University community. One young adult failed to 
return for the second session and another’s data were excluded because he was not a 
fluent speaker of English. The remaining 65 Rice young adults (M age = 19.4; M 
education = 13.5 years) received experiment credit towards partial fulfillment of course 
requirements. The other 38 young adults were recruited from the Houston community 
through Craig’s List; only one did not return for the second session. On average, the 
community young adult sample was older (M age = 24; t(45.02) = 9.90, p < .001) and 
more educated (M education = 14.9 years; t(51.71) = 4.11, p = .001) than the Rice 
sample.  
The sample of 62 older adults consisted of members of the Houston community 
who had expressed prior interest in participating in Psychology experiments. For one 
older adult, testing was discontinued and data was excluded because of possible 
dementia, as indicated by a score of less than 25 on the Mini-Mental State Examination 
(MMSE-2; Folstein, Folstein, McHugh, & Fanjiang, 2001). Additionally, the data of 
another older adult was excluded due to an unwillingness to participate in the second 
session. The remaining 60 older adults were between the ages of 64 and 87 (M = 71, SD 
= 5) and had completed an average of 16 years of education (SD = 2.8). The older adults 
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were significantly more educated than the young adults (t(84.67) = 4.87, p < .001). All 
community participants (both young and old) participated in exchange for monetary 
compensation ($10/hour).  
Additionally, two patients with aphasia and short-term memory deficits also 
participated in exchange for monetary compensation. Further patient details are provided 
in Chapter 7. 
Procedure 
All participants were individually tested on a battery of cognitive tasks over 2 
separate two-hour sessions. With a few exceptions, all tasks were administered in the 
fixed order shown in Table 3.1; due to computer availability, some participants received 
the automated operation span either at the end of the second session (as opposed to at the 
beginning) or in a separate session. Prior to any testing, participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire; this was especially important in screening older adults for 
confounding disorders (e.g., TBI, dementia) or histories of neurological trauma or 
impairment that might have affected cognitive functioning. Breaks were provided 
between tasks. Unless otherwise indicated, all computerized tasks were administered on a 
Macintosh computer running PsyScope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & Provost, 1993) 
and responses (response times (RTs); accuracy) were collected with the PsyScope button 
box. As described in Chapter 7, some tasks were modified for patient testing. For 
patients, task order was not consistent with that listed in Table 3.1, as testing was spread 
over 3-4 one-hour sessions based on patient availability and some tasks were split into 
multiple parts. 
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Table 3.1. Task order and description.  
 Measure Typea Methodb 
Session 1    
 Informed consent and 
demographics questionnaire 
Background/screening P 
 Mini-Mental State 
Examination 
Background/screening (older 
adults only) 
P 
 Vocabulary  Background P 
 Task switching: three tasks Shifting C 
 Digit-symbol substitution Background/processing speed P 
 Release from PI Resistance to PI C 
 Picture-word interference R-D inhibition C 
 Recent negatives Resistance to PI C 
Session 2    
 Automated operation span Background/working memory C 
 Backwards digit span Background/working memory P 
 Cued recall, directed forgetting Resistance to PI C 
 Flanker R-D inhibition  C 
 Sternberg recognition task Background/retrieval C 
 Stroop  R-D inhibition C 
 Nonverbal Stroop R-D inhibition C 
 Saccade and anti-saccadec Background/retrieval C 
 Task switching: two tasksc Shifting C 
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a Resistance to PI = resistance to proactive interference; R-D inhibition = response-
distractor inhibition.  
b P = paper and pencil; C = computerized.  
c Time-permitting; while the majority of young adults completed the saccade (N = 99) and 
two-task shifting tasks (N = 94), very few older adults had time to do so (Ns = 13 and 20, 
respectively).  
Materials and Task Descriptions 
 Dependent variables (DV) are described below, and also in the following 
chapters. Generally, however, dependent variables for inhibitory control tasks were either 
difference scores between interference and no-interference conditions, or intrusions made 
during recall. For shifting tasks, DVs were difference scores between the relevant 
conditions (e.g., the difference between mixed and pure blocks for global switch costs). 
All tasks included a sufficient number of examples and/or practice trials for task 
familiarization and learning of stimulus-response mappings. Unless otherwise 
specified/restricted, task stimuli were pseudorandomized with stimulus order being fixed 
across subjects.  
Background Measures 
Background measures were included to assess the basic cognitive abilities of all 
non-brain damaged participants.  
 Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE). The standard version of the MMSE-
2 (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Folstein, Folstein, McHugh, & Fanjiang, 2001) 
was administered to older adults in order to screen for dementia; individuals scoring less 
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than 25 (out of 30) were excluded from further testing. Only one adult was excluded from 
testing; the remaining older adults performed quite well (M = 28.8, SD = 1.1, N = 60).  
 Vocabulary. The WAIS-III vocabulary subtest (Weschler, 1997) was used to 
measure expressive vocabulary. In this subtest, participants provide definitions to words. 
For all participants, testing started at item 11 and was otherwise administered and scored 
according to standard testing instructions. Across the 33 items, definitions received 0, 1, 
or 2 points; the maximum score was 66 points. A research assistant scored all definitions 
using the scoring criteria and template provided by the WAIS. 
Symbol-digit coding. The symbol-digit coding task from the MMSE-2 (Folstein 
et al., 1975, 2001) was included as a measure of processing speed. In this paper and 
pencil task, participants matched numbers to individual symbols, and coded them 
accordingly. The top of the page contained a key, indicating the symbol that 
corresponded to each number, and participants used this key to code as many numbers as 
possible (going in consecutive order) within a 30 second time period. The dependent 
variable was the number of numbers correctly coded.  
Working memory. Working memory was assessed via the automated operation 
span and the backwards digit span. The automated operation span task (Ospan) is a 
measure of working memory capacity shown to have good internal consistency and test-
retest reliability (Turner & Engle, 1989; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). 
Participants first saw a math operation to verify (true/false), followed by a letter to 
remember. Following several math operation-letter pairs, participants saw an array of 
twelve letters with boxes next to them. Participants clicked boxes to indicate the serial 
order in which letters were previously presented. Prior to the experimental trials, 
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participants performed three practice blocks. In the first practice block, participants 
practiced letter retention and serial recall. In the second practice block, only math 
operations were practiced and participants responded as quickly as possible. The 
automated Ospan task uses this practice solution time (plus or minus 2.5 standard 
deviations) to calculate the time allowed for problem solving in the experimental trials; 
during experimental trials, participants were expected to solve the math problems within 
this time limit. In the third practice block, participants practiced the combined tasks of 
math operation and letter retention. For experimental trials, participants completed 3 
trials at each set size, with set size ranging from 3-7 items. The dependent variable was 
the operation span, which is the “sum of all perfectly recalled sets” (Unsworth et al., 
2005, p. 501). This task was presented on a Dell PC running E-Prime (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
In the backwards digit span from the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised 
(WAIS-R; Weschler, 1981), participants heard a series of numbers presented aurally at a 
rate of one number/second. Following list presentation, participants recalled numbers in 
backwards order, starting with the most recently presented item. Participants completed 
two trials at each list length. All testing started at a list length of two items and continued 
until either errors were made on both trials at a given list length or the maximum list 
length (8 items) was completed. The dependent variable was the total number of trials 
correctly recalled.  
Retrieval tasks. Retrieval tasks were included to measure the ability to disengage 
from information in the focus of attention. The Sternberg recognition task was included 
as a measure of memory retrieval.  While the most recently presented list item is thought 
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to remain in the focus of attention, less recently presented items require retrieval (e.g., 
McElree & Dosher, 1989). In contrast, the saccade tasks were used to measure 
disengagement from an attentional distractor (e.g., Basak, Boot, & Kramer, 2008).   
 In the Sternberg recognition task (McElree & Dosher, 1989; Nee & Jonides, 2008), 
participants saw a list of five serially presented words, with each word being presented 
for 500 ms (similar to Nee & Jonides, 2008). A 300 ms mask was presented over the last 
word, and followed by a probe that remained on the screen for 700 ms; participants 
indicated whether the probe word was in the most recently presented list. Half of the 
trials were no trials, and half yes trials. Across the yes trials, each serial position was 
probed equally often. Researchers have hypothesized that the most recent item (serial 
position 5) remains in the focus of attention and does not require retrieval; in contrast, 
earlier list items (serial positions 1-4) do require retrieval (e.g., McElree & Dosher, 
1989). Evidence for this distinction comes from faster RTs to probes matching the final 
serial position relative to RTs to probes matching items in earlier serial positions. The 
retrieval times of the earlier serial positions are invariant as a function of serial position, 
suggesting a direct access retrieval mechanism for these items (McElree &  Dosher, 
1989); specifically, these items are hypothesized to be in a region of direct access that is 
separate from the focus of attention (McElree & Dosher, 1989; Oberauer, 2002), with 
retrieval being used to move an item from the region of direct access into the focus of 
attention. The dependent variable for this task was the performance difference (RT) 
between trials requiring retrieval (i.e., ‘yes’ trials for which the probe matches a word in 
the middle serial positions) and trials requiring no retrieval (i.e., ‘yes’ trials for which the 
probe matches the word in the final serial position, within the focus of attention). The 
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difference between these conditions measures the speed with which one can retrieve 
information outside the focus of attention.  
 In the saccade tasks, participants completed a pro-saccade task followed by an 
anti-saccade task; this task was done as time permitted, and as a consequence, was only 
collected on a subset of participants. In both tasks, participants saw a center fixation 
point. Around this fixation point were four boxes, one-inch in size and spaced 
approximately four inches above, below, and to the left and right of the fixation point. In 
the pro-saccade task, a red box flashed (duration = 175 ms) in one of the four boxes in 
order to attract attention to that box. Immediately following box offset, the target 
appeared for 150 ms, followed by a gray square mask that remained on the screen until a 
button was pressed. Via button press, participants indicated whether the target was a 1, 2, 
or 3. In the anti-saccade task, targets (and masks) appeared in the square opposite from 
the location of the red flash; participants had to suppress the tendency to look at the red 
flash, and instead look at the opposite box. The dependent variable was the RT difference 
between saccade and anti-saccade trials, as this difference measures the speed with which 
one can disengage from an attentional distractor. Despite using similar timings as 
previous work (Hull, Martin, Beier, Lane, and Hamilton, 2008), the first set of older 
adults tested found that the anti-saccade targets were too difficult (i.e., disappeared too 
quickly) to detect. As a result, the testing of older adults on this task was discontinued. 
Therefore, only a subset of young adults successfully completed this task (n = 97).  
Shifting Tasks 
 All participants completed a three-task shifting task; time permitting, participants 
also completed a two-task shifting task. Both versions utilized cued shifting whose 
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targets consisted of a number (one, two; number task) of shapes (circle or diamond; shape 
task) of varying sizes (small (1.5”x1.5”) or large (3”x3”); size task). Trials started with a 
cue, indicating the relevant task for a given trial. Cues read either “Number”, “Shape”, or 
“Size”. The target appeared 200 ms after cue onset. The target was displayed in the center 
of the screen and participants responded to the target based on the relevant cued task. 
Both the cue and target remained on the screen until a button press was made, and the 
response-cue interval was fixed at 200 ms. The dimensions of circle, small, and one were 
mapped to the left response key, while the dimensions diamond, large, and two were 
mapped to the right response key.  
 Three-task shifting. In three-task shifting, participants completed six 
experimental blocks: a number pure block, a shape pure block, a size pure block, and 
three mixed blocks. The order of the pure blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
In the pure task blocks, participants responded to either “Number, “Shape”, or “Size” 
throughout the duration of the block. Each pure block contained 42 trials, with the first 
two trials of each block being excluded as warm-up. In mixed blocks, the relevant task 
depended on the cue presented at the start of the trial, with the relevant task changing 
every trial; each experimental mixed block contained 99 trials, with the first three trials of 
the block excluded as warm-up.  
 Targets were selected pseudo-randomly with the constraint that no exact stimulus 
repetitions were allowed. Additionally, within the mixed blocks, task sequence was also 
constrained by the following: a) all three tasks occurred equally often, b) there were 
neither direct task repetitions nor direct stimulus repetitions, c) each task triad (e.g., size, 
shape, number; shape, size, number; etc.) appeared equally often within a block, and d) 
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there was an equal number of N-2 task switches (CBA) and N-2 task repetitions (ABA). 
Three practice blocks (three single task blocks) preceded the experimental pure blocks, 
and one practice mixed block preceded the experimental mixed blocks. The design of this 
task allowed for the measurement of global switch costs (performance differences 
between mixed and pure blocks) and N-2 repetition costs (performance differences 
between N-2 repeat and N-2 switch trials, within the mixed block).  
 Two-task shifting. In two-task shifting, participants completed three mixed 
blocks, each consisting of only two relevant tasks. In the first block, the two relevant 
tasks were form and size; in the second block, form and number; and in the third block, 
size and number. Each mixed block contained 35 trials, with the first 3 trials of each 
block excluded as warm-up. Unlike three-task shifting, triad frequency was not calculated 
(as there were only two possible tasks/block) and task repetitions were allowed. The 
subset of young adult participants (n = 93) tested on this task completed all blocks in the 
same order. The design of this task allowed for the measurement of local switch costs 
(performance differences between switch and repeat trials).  
Response-Distractor Inhibition Tasks  
 Stroop task. The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was administered in a single block 
consisting of incongruent, congruent, and neutral stimuli. In this task, each trial was 
preceded by a beep, followed by target onset. Participants named the color of the target, 
which was either a word (in the incongruent and congruent trials) or string of asterisks (in 
the neutral condition). The colors to be named included blue, yellow, orange, red, green, 
or purple. On incongruent trials, color words appeared in a color that was different from 
the written word (e.g., blue). On congruent trials, color words appeared in the same color 
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as the written word (e.g., red). On neutral trials, the stimulus was a string of asterisks. 
Trials were presented in a fixed order. A voice key recorded response times and the 
experimenter coded participant responses as correct, incorrect, or voice-key errors. 
Experimental trials (N = 154 trials) were preceded by three practice blocks: the first block 
was for testing and adjusting the microphone’s sensitivity, the second block tested color-
naming ability by presenting all the to-be-named colors as stings of asterisks, and the 
third block consisted of 13 practice trials. The dependent variable is the Stroop effect, 
measured as the difference between incongruent and neutral trials.  
 Nonverbal Stroop task. The nonverbal Stroop task (Hamilton & Martin, 2005) 
was administered in a 4 blocks of 60 trials. Participants pressed a button in response to 
the direction an arrow was pointing (right, left), with arrows appearing on either the left 
side of the screen, the center of the screen, or the right side of the screen. As with the 
Stroop task, the nonverbal Stroop contained incongruent trials (left-pointing arrow on the 
right side of the screen), neutral trials (left-pointing arrow on the center of the screen), 
and congruent trials (left-pointing arrow on the left side of the screen). Trials were 
presented in a fixed order and responses were recorded with the PsyScope button box. A 
single practice block with 12 trials preceded the experimental blocks. The dependent 
variable is the Stroop effect, measured as the difference between incongruent and neutral 
trials.  
 Flanker task. In the Flanker task (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; adapted from 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004) participants responded to a central letter in a sting of letters 
(e.g., KKKHKKK) by pressing one of two buttons. If the central letter was H or K, 
participants pressed the left button; if the central letter was C or S, participants pressed 
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the right button. In the congruent condition, the flanking letters were the same as the 
target letter (e.g., HHHHHHH). In the neutral condition, the flanking letters were letters 
not mapped to a response key (e.g., OOOHOOO). In the incongruent condition, the 
flanking letters were mapped to opposite button as the target letter (e.g., SSSHSSS). 
Trials were presented in a fixed order, and the PsyScope button box recorded participant 
responses. A single 30-trial practice block preceded four 56-trial experimental blocks 
with an equal number of trials/condition. The dependent variable for the Flanker task was 
the difference between incongruent and neutral trials. 
 Picture-word interference task (PWI). In the picture-word interference task 
(e.g., Lupker, 1979; Schriefers, Meyer & Levelt, 2002), participants saw a picture with a 
super-imposed word; participants named the picture while ignoring the super-imposed 
distractor word. Each picture was seen in a semantically related condition (i.e., picture 
and word come from the same category; the interference condition) and in a semantically 
unrelated condition (i.e., picture and word come from different categories; the no 
interference condition). Distractor words did not overlap with items pictured for naming. 
Trials were presented in a fixed order, and the PsyScope button box recorded participant 
RTs; additionally, the experimenter coded participant responses as correct, incorrect, or 
voice-key errors. Prior to beginning the task, participants viewed all of the to-be-named 
pictures in one practice block where they saw each picture with its correct name. Practice 
was followed by two 90-item blocks. The semantic interference effect served as the 
dependent variable, measured as the difference between semantically related and 
semantically unrelated trials. 
Resistance to Proactive Interference Tasks 
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 Recent negatives task. In the recent negatives task probe task (e.g., Monsell, 
1978), participants heard a list of three words followed by a probe word, and indicated 
whether the probe word was in the previous list by pressing yes or no. This task contains 
three trial types. On positive trials, the probe word was presented in the most recently 
presented list (list n), requiring a “yes” response. On recent negative trials, the probe 
word was not presented in the most recent list (list n), but it was presented in the previous 
trial (list n-1); this trial type required a “no” response. On non-recent negative trials, the 
probe word was not presented in any of the most recent lists; this trial type also required a 
“no” response. A 1000 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) separated list items, and a 2000 ms 
ISI separated the final list item from the probe word. The PsyScope button box recorded 
participant responses. Participants first received a single practice block with 10 trials; 
following this, they completed a single experimental block consisting of 96 trials. Half of 
these trials were positive (yes) trials and half were negative (no) trials; additionally, of 
the negative trials, half were recent and half non-recent negative trials. The dependent 
variable was the difference between recent and non-recent negative trials, demonstrating 
a participant’s susceptibility to interference from previously relevant information.  
 Release from proactive interference task. In the release from proactive 
interference (PI) task (a variant of the task used by Peterson & Peterson, 1959; similar to 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004), participants completed ten blocks of lists. In each block, 
participants read aloud four lists of eight items. The first three lists were from the same 
semantic category (using the category norms of Battig & Montague, 1969), and were 
used to build up interference; the fourth list was used as a release from PI trial. Lists were 
constructed of words equal to or less than 10-letters in length, and item frequency was 
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matched across lists within the same block. The words “!!!Get Ready!!!” cued 
participants to the start of a trial. Following this, each list item was presented 
individually, with each item remaining on the screen for 1750 ms; there was a 250 ms ISI 
between words. After the final (eighth) item of each list, participants completed a sixteen 
second filler task that involved counting by letter and number: participants counted up 
from a visually presented letter-number pair (e.g., if they saw H-39, “H-39, I-40, J-
41…”). When cued with a green box and the word “Recall”, participants stopped 
counting and had 20 seconds to recall as many words as possible in any order. An 
experimenter recorded responses, including correct recall, intrusions, new words, and 
omissions. Participants completed two practice lists at the start of the experiment, and 
took a forced 15 s break between all blocks. Similar to Friedman and Miyake, the 
dependent variable was a measure of the buildup of PI, the difference in recall and/or 
intrusions on the first and second list of the same category, averaged across blocks. 
 Cued recall task. In the cued recall task (Tolan & Tehan, 1999; similar to 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004), participants saw a list (or lists) of four words, with each 
word presented one at a time for 2000 ms each. After a filler task, participants saw a 
category cue and were asked to recall the item from the category that was in the most 
recently presented list. Approximately one third of the trials (14/40) consisted of one 
four-item list; the remaining 26 trials consisted of two four-item lists. Of these two list 
trials, half were “control” (no interference) trials in which only the second list contained 
an item from the cued category. The other half of the two-list trials were “lure” 
(interference) trials; in these trials, both lists contained an item that matched the cued 
category (though participants only had to recall the one from the second list). In order to 
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induce more interference, the list-one lure was always a higher frequency category 
member than the list-two target. Blocks commenced with the word “Ready!,” presented 
for 2000 ms. Each list was preceded by a 1000 ms instruction indicating how the 
upcoming list should be read, either “ALOUD” or “SILENT”. At the start of a trial, 
participants did not know whether there would be one or two lists, and prior to recall, 
participants competed an eight second filler task. This filler task consisted of eight 
numbers, presented for 1 second each, to which participants made verbal magnitude 
judgments (greater or less than 50). Thus, one-block trials consisted of the “Ready!” 
signal, followed by a reading instruction (one-block trials were always read ALOUD), 
four sequentially presented words, the filler task, and a category cue. Two-block trials 
consisted of the “Ready!” signal, followed by a reading instruction (the first list was 
always ALOUD), four sequentially presented words, a second reading instruction (the 
second list was always SILENT), four sequentially presented words, the filler task, and a 
category cue. The dependent variable was a measure of interference, measured in several 
possible ways: a) the difference in accuracy between one-block and two-block control 
trials (Friedman & Miyake, 2004); b) the difference in accuracy between two-block 
control and two-block interference trials; and c) the proportion of list one lures recalled 
after two-block interference trials.  
Data Processing 
 For all RT tasks, the following procedures are relevant to all chapters; if any 
additional data processing occurred (e.g., as in Chapter 6), it is described in that chapter. 
RTs from errors or voice key errors were removed. Additionally, all extreme outliers 
(RTs <250 ms and >10,000 ms) were also removed. For the shifting tasks, RTs on trials 
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following errors were removed, as is traditionally done in these paradigms. Log-
transformations were calculated on these RTs. Furthermore, RTs more than 2.5 standard 
deviations beyond an individual participant’s mean, by condition, were also excluded as 
outliers.  
Three participants (1 young, 2 old) were each missing data on one response-
distractor inhibition task. The young adult was missing data on the picture-word 
interference task, and for the two older adults, one was missing data on the flanker task 
and the other on the Stroop task. The picture-word interference and flanker missing data 
points were due to experimenter error; the Stroop missing data point was due to color 
blindness. Additionally, two older adults were missing Ospan data, also due to 
experimenter error. Unless otherwise indicated, these participants’ were excluded 
(pairwise) from analyses.  
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Chapter 4: Aging and Inhibition 
 The large literature on healthy cognitive aging has aimed to elucidate factors that 
influence and/or cause age-related cognitive decline. The present chapter focuses on one 
very influential process-specific account – that of Hasher and Zacks (1988; Hasher, 
Stolzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 1991; Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999) – which proposes that 
age-related cognitive decline results from inhibitory control deficits. Given that inhibition 
is assumed to be an important process in many aspects of cognition, Hasher, Zacks, and 
colleagues posit that age-related cognitive declines are mediated by impairment to this 
single core capacity, resulting in a wide range of associated deficits. In particular, 
inhibition deficits are thought to result in cognitive clutter that causes excessive 
interference and leads to impaired performance. As discussed below, however, not all 
findings are consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Shilling, 
Chetwynd, & Rabbitt, 2002; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 
1998), and instead, some further specifications may be warranted.  
 In particular, even Hasher, Zacks, and colleagues (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Hasher 
et al., 1999; among others, as discussed in Chapter 2) maintain that there is more than one 
type of inhibitory function. For example, Hasher et al. (1999) propose that there are three 
major inhibitory functions that act on working memory: access, deletion, and restraint 
over preponent thoughts and actions. The access function serves to restrict access to 
working memory so that only relevant information is accessed. The deletion function 
serves to remove no longer relevant information from attentional focus, enabling the 
focus of attention to be updated with currently relevant information. And lastly, restraint 
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over preponent thoughts and actions serves to withhold strong, automatic responses (or 
thoughts) until they can be evaluated.  
 Friedman and Miyake (2004) investigated the relationship among inhibitory 
control processes in an individual differences study of young adults, examining three 
types of inhibition that are similar to those identified by Hasher and colleagues. 
Resistance to distractor interference, which is similar to Hasher and Zacks’ access 
function, was measured by the ability to resist interference from irrelevant information in 
the external environment. Second, resistance to proactive interference, which related to 
the deletion function investigated by Hasher and colleagues (May, Hasher, & Kane, 
1999), measured the ability to resist interference from previously relevant information. 
Lastly, preponent response inhibition, conceptually similar to Hasher and Zacks’ (1988) 
restraining function of inhibition, measured the ability to inhibit dominant or automatic 
responses. Even though Friedman and Miyake (2004) had hypothesized three distinct 
types of inhibition, confirmatory factor analyses supported only two types of inhibition, 
as preponent response inhibition and resistance to distractor interference were very 
closely related. Friedman and Miyake (2004) proposed that these two types of inhibition 
“share the requirement to actively maintain task goals in the face of interference” (p. 
126). As a result, they combined these two types of inhibition into a single construct 
called “response-distractor inhibition”. Importantly, the response-distractor inhibition 
construct was unrelated to the resistance to proactive interference construct, which is a 
measure of the ability to resist interference from information in memory. Thus, Friedman 
and Miyake proposed a two-factor model of inhibitory control consisting of response-
distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference (PI). Using this same 
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inhibition dichotomy, the present study investigated whether these two types of inhibition 
show different patterns of decline with age, as age-related dissociations provide strong 
evidence that the processes are separable (Verhaeghen & Basak, 2005).  
There is a preponderance of evidence suggesting that older adults are more 
susceptible to proactive interference than younger adults in a variety of tasks, including 
span tasks (e.g., May et al., 1999; McCabe, Robertson, & Smith, 2005), recent-probe 
tasks (e.g., Jonides et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002), and the build-up of PI 
over lists (e.g., Hasher, Chung, May, & Foong, 2002). Hasher and colleges, for example, 
found that young adults have better working memory spans than older adults, though 
these span differences are substantially reduced – and sometimes eliminated – with task 
manipulations that attenuate PI (May et al., 1999). In line with the notion that older adults 
are more susceptible to PI, Jonides and colleagues (Jonides et al., 2000) found that older 
adults show reduced activation of the left inferior frontal lobe in interference conditions, 
a region hypothesized to be a critically important in PI resolution (Jonides & Nee, 2006).  
In contrast, the evidence for age-related impairments in response-distractor 
inhibition is less consistent. While a number of studies have found exaggerated 
interference effects on individual response-distractor inhibition tasks such as the Stroop 
task (e.g., Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Dempster, 1992; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 
1996; West & Baylis, 1998; see Kok, 1999 for a brief discussion), other researchers have 
failed to find differences or suggested these exaggerated interference effects are better 
attributed to general slowing (e.g., Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Madden, 1990; Wheatley, 
Scialfa, Boot, Kramer, & Alexander, 2012; for meta-analyses on this issue, see 
Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002 and Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998) or other aspects of 
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cognition such as fluid intelligence (Shilling et al., 2002). In fact, Shilling et al. (2002) 
suggested that studies investigating the effects of aging many times fail to make 
appropriate adjustments to account for global slowing. And in fact, several recent aging 
studies using a variety of methods have failed to find age-related response-distractor 
inhibition impairments. In their study using Stroop-like interference tasks, for example, 
Shilling et al. found no evidence for age-related impairments when processing speed was 
adequately accounted for. Such a finding is consistent with Salthouse (1994), who has 
suggested that age-related declines are mediated by processing speed, rather than other 
core capacities such as inhibition. In particular, slowed processing speed can contribute to 
impaired processing in a variety of ways, for example by slowing information encoding 
or activation (Salthouse, 1992; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) or the efficiency of 
processing (Salthouse, 1994). 
 The present study investigated the hypothesis that older adults have a global 
inhibition deficit by examining the two distinct inhibitory control mechanisms of 
resistance to PI and response-distractor inhibition. To do so, the same younger and older 
adults were tested on multiple resistance to PI and response-distractor inhibition tasks to 
determine whether consistent patterns of age-related impairments could be found across 
multiple measures. The use of multiple tasks to assess each type of inhibition seems 
especially important for response-distractor inhibition, where inconsistencies across 
measures have been reported in previous research. Thus, this study will investigate 
whether consistent age effects are found on a “variety of tests of inhibition that share a 
common structure [and] make logically similar demands” (Shilling et al., 2002, p. 607). 
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In the bigger-picture context of this dissertation, the present chapter is relevant to whether 
inhibitory control processes can be dissociated.   
Method 
Participant, task, and data processing details are thoroughly described in the 
method chapter (Chapter 3). The tasks and dependent variables used herein are reviewed 
in Table 4.1. RTs reflect correct responses, and analyses using RTs (in ms) exclude 
extreme outliers (< 250 ms, > 10,000 ms) as well as outliers lying beyond 2.5 standard 
deviations of an individual subject mean, for each condition. Log RTs reflect RTs that 
exclude extreme outliers only. Three subjects (1 young, 2 old) were missing data on one 
response-distractor inhibition task, due to experimenter error in two cases and color 
blindness for the third. These subjects were excluded from the analyses reported below. 
 
Table 4.1. Resistance to proactive interference and response-distractor inhibition task 
conditions and dependent variables. The ‘Conditions’ column shows the conditions 
included in the analyses reported below, and the ‘DVs’ column shows the relevant 
dependent variables. 
  Conditions DVs 
Resistance to PI Tasks 
 Recent negatives  No-PI: Non-recent negative trials 
PI: Recent negative trials 
a. RT & log RT 
b. Errors 
 Cued recall,  
directed 
forgetting 
No-PI: One-block trials (/14) 
PI: Two-block control trials (/13) 
[PI: Two-block interference trials (/13)] 
a. Proportion correct 
b. List 1 intrusions on 2-block  
    interference trials 
 Release from PI  No-PI: List 1 recall 
PI: List 2 recall 
a. Words recalled (/8)  
b. List 1 intrusions during list 2  
    recall (/8 possible) 
Response-distractor Inhibition 
 Flanker task Neutral: OOOKOOO a. RT & log RT 
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Incongruent: CCCKCCC b. Errors 
 Picture-word  
interference  
Neutral: unrelated imposed picture  
Incongruent: related imposed picture  
a. RT & log RT 
b. Errors 
 Nonverbal Stroop  Neutral: left arrow, aligned in center  
Incongruent: left arrow, right aligned 
a. RT & log RT 
b. Errors 
 Stroop  Neutral: ***** 
Incongruent: Blue 
a. RT & log RT 
b. Errors 
 
Background Measures  
 Mini-mental state examination (MMSE). The standard version of the MMSE-2 
(Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Folstein, Folstein, McHugh, & Fanjiang, 2001) 
was used to screen older adults for dementia; one adult scored less than 25 (out of 30) 
and was therefore excluded from further testing. The remaining older adults performed 
quite well (M = 28.8, SD = 1.1, N = 60).  
 Working memory. Two measures of working memory were obtained, including 
an automated version of the Operation Span task (Ospan; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & 
Engle, 2005) and the backwards digit span from the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-
Revised (WAIS-R; Weschler, 1981). Given the high correlation between these two 
measures (r = .47, p < .001), a working memory (WM) span composite was computed by 
averaging the z-scores for each measure, for each subject. Replicating previous research, 
young adults (M = .27, SD = .78) had significantly higher WM scores than older adults 
(M = -.48, SD = .80; F(1, 160) = 33.00, p < .001).  
 Vocabulary. A measure of vocabulary was obtained from all subjects, using the 
vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981). Young (M = 52, SD = 7) and old 
adults (M = 52, SD = 8) did not differ on this measure (F(1, 160) = 0.07, p = .79).  
 Processing speed. Processing speed was measured for all subjects using the 
MMSE-2’s symbol-digit coding test. Replicating previous work demonstrating reductions 
  49 
in processing speed with age (e.g., Salthouse, 1994), older adults (M = 16.3, SD = 3.2) 
completed significantly fewer designs than younger adults (M = 24.8, SD = 5.8; F(1, 160) 
= 168.39, p < .001).  
 Background measures were included to ensure that the older adults were 
comparable in cognitive status to other studies reported in the literature. Typically, 
despite having more years of education and better performance on measures of 
vocabulary, older adults have reduced measures of WM capacity and processing speed. 
The results of the background measures suggest relatively standard patterns of cognitive 
performance between age groups, as typically reported in aging studies.  
Analyses 
 Age effects in each task were investigated with repeated-measures ANOVAs 
including age (young, old) as a between subjects factor and condition (listed in Table 4.1) 
as a within subjects factor. I was mainly interested in interactions between condition and 
age, which would reveal whether interference effects (i.e., the difference between 
interference and control conditions) were larger for older than younger subjects, rather 
than main effects of age. The only exception to this type of analysis was the intrusion 
analyses in the cued recall task, which assessed intrusions of list 1 items during list 2 
interference trial recall; this DV was assessed with a standard ANOVA using age as a 
between-subjects variable. A main effect of condition was expected for all tasks. 
Additionally, given previous findings of age-related slowing in processing speed (e.g., 
Salthouse, 1994), as well as decreases in memory span (e.g., Craik & Jennings, 1992), 
main effects of age were also expected. Significant age x condition interactions were 
taken as evidence for age-related performance differences. Additionally, RT-based tasks 
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were separately analyzed using RT (in ms) and log-transformed RTs to account for the 
reduced processing speed of older adults (as indicated by the symbol-digit coding task), 
as log-transformed data are less sensitive to differences in baseline performance (Ratcliff, 
1993). While the results from RT analyses are mentioned, only the results from log RT 
and error analyses are shown. Error analyses were analyzed with and without a speed 
covariate. This analysis is equivalent to a univariate ANOVA with difference scores 
between conditions as the dependent variable, age as a fixed factor, and speed as a 
covariate. 
Results 
Resistance to PI Tasks  
 Recent negatives. As seen in Figure 4.1 (top), subjects responded more slowly in 
the recent relative to the non-recent negative condition, and across conditions, older 
adults responded more slowly than young adults. Additionally, older adults showed a 
larger interference effect than young adults. These patterns were confirmed statistically. 
Subjects performed significantly worse on recent negative trials (M = 3.07, 8.6%) relative 
to non-recent negative trials (M = 3.03, 2.7%), in both log RTs (log RT: F(1, 160) = 
123.97, MSE = 0.14, p < .001, η2 = .44) and errors (F(1, 160) = 91.72, MSE = 0.32, p < 
.001, η2 = .36). There were main effects of age, as older adults (M = 3.11, 5.8%) were 
slower (F(1, 160) = 38.56, MSE = 0.96, p < .001, η2 = .19) and less accurate (F(1, 160) = 
7.74, MSE = 0.07, p = .006, η2 = .05) than young adults (M = 3.01, 4.3%),. Lastly, the 
condition x age interactions were also significant, as older adults (M = 0.05, 8.8%) 
demonstrated significantly larger interference effects than the young adults (M = 0.03, 
4.1%), in both log RT (F(1, 160) = 9.26, MSE = 0.01, p = .003, η2 = .06) and errors (F(1, 
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160) = 12.35, MSE = 0.04, p = .001, η2 = .07). In errors, this interaction was marginal 
with processing speed included as a covariate (F(1, 159) = 2.68, MSE = 0.009, p = .10, η2 
= .02).  
Cued recall. As seen in Figure 4.1 (middle), subjects recalled fewer items in the 
PI condition, relative to the no-PI condition. Additionally, older adults were less accurate 
overall and appeared to show a larger decline in recall than young adults. These patterns 
were confirmed statistically. There was a main effect of condition as subjects performed 
less accurately on two-block control trials (M = .64) relative to one-block trials (M = .76), 
F(1, 160) = 85.92, MSE = 1.48, p < .001, η2 = .35. There was also a main effect of age, as 
older adults (M = .47) were significantly less accurate than young adults (M = .72), F(1, 
160) = 61.25, MSE = 3.47, p < .001, η2 = .28). Lastly, the condition x age interaction was 
significant, as older adults (M = .21) demonstrated larger interference effects than young 
adults (M = .07), F(1, 160) = 21.75, MSE = 0.37, p < .001, η2 = .12. This interaction 
remained marginal with processing speed included as a covariate, F(1, 159) = 3.35, MSE 
= 0.06, p = .07, η2 = .02. Additionally, during recall on two-block interference trials, 
older adults (M = .39) were significantly more likely than young adults (M = .26) to 
intrude category members from the first irrelevant list, as indicated by a main effect of 
age, F(1, 160) = 18.76, MSE = 0.65, p < .001, η2 = .11, even when controlling for 
processing speed, F(1, 159) = 4.64, MSE = 0.16, p = .03, η2 = .03. 
Release from PI. As seen in Figure 4.1 (bottom), subjects recalled fewer items in 
the PI condition, relative to the no-PI condition. Additionally, older adults recalled fewer 
items overall, and appeared to show a larger decline in recall across conditions than 
young adults. These patterns were confirmed statistically. There was a main effect of 
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condition, as subjects recalled fewer list 2 items (M = 3.6) relative to list 1 items (M = 
4.6), F(1, 160) = 459.13, MSE = 73.91, p < .001, η2 = .74. There was also a main effect 
of age, as older adults (M = 3.3) recalled significantly fewer items than young adults (M 
= 4.5), F(1, 160) = 49.75, MSE = 90.49, p < .001, η2 = .24. The condition x age 
interaction was significant as well; older adults (M = 1.2) demonstrated larger 
interference effects than young adults (M = 0.8), F(1, 160) = 4.04, MSE = 2.26, p < .001, 
η2 =.08. This interaction remained significant when controlling for processing speed, F(1, 
159) = 5.56, MSE = 0.90, p = .02, η2 = .03. Additionally, there was also a condition x age 
interaction in intrusions, F(1, 160) = 117.27, MSE = 3.28, p < .001, η2 = .42. Older adults 
(M = .58) intruded significantly more list 1 items during list 2 recall than younger adults 
(M = .16), even when controlling for processing speed, F(1, 159) = 52.21, MSE = 1.47, p 
< .001, η2 = .25.  
Given the significant WM differences between the young and older adults 
reported in previous research (e.g., Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Wingfield, Stine, Lahar, 
& Aberdeen, 1988), one might ask whether these exaggerated interference effects merely 
reflect reduced WM capacity. To test this, the WM composite (described above) was 
included as a covariate in the repeated measures ANOVAs for each task. All three task 
analyses still resulted in significant condition x age interactions (recent negatives log RT: 
F(1, 157) = 7.93, MSE = 0.01, p = .005, η2 = .05; cued recall: F(1, 157) = 17.96, MSE = 
0.31, p < .001, η2 = .10; release from PI: F(1, 157) = 13.77, MSE = 2.25, p < .001, η2 = 
.08). These results suggest that the older adults’ exaggerated interference effects reflect 
more than just reduced WM capacity.  
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Summary of resistance to PI effects. For all resistance to PI analyses, there were 
significant main effects of condition, with subjects performing worse in the PI condition 
relative to the no-PI condition. These main effects demonstrate successful interference 
manipulations. There were also significant main effects of age, with young adults 
outperforming older adults. Importantly to the goals of the present study, across all 
resistance to PI tasks, older adults showed larger PI effects than younger adults (Figure 
4.1), even after controlling for speed of processing and WM capacity. 
Response-distractor Inhibition Tasks  
As seen in Figure 4.2, subjects responded more slowly in the incongruent relative 
to the neutral conditions across all response-distractor inhibition tasks. Additionally, 
older adults responded more slowly than young adults. With the exception of the Stroop 
task, the interference effects for the two age groups were equivalent, as indicated by 
parallel lines, implying no difference across age groups. In the Stroop tasks, the 
interference effect for older adults appears to be greater than that for young adults. These 
patterns were confirmed statistically, as presented below. 
 Flanker task. Subjects performed significantly worse on incongruent (M = 2.9, 
3.5%) relative to neutral trials (M = 2.8, 2.1%) in both log RT (F(1, 159) = 539.88, MSE 
= 0.15, p < .001, η2 = .77) and errors (F(1, 159) = 16.98, MSE = 0.009, p < .001, η2 = 
.10). Additionally, there were main effects of age in both log RT (F(1, 159) = 48.90, MSE 
= 0.56, p < .003, η2 = .24) and errors (F(1, 159) = 18.45, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, η2 = .10), 
though these effects were in the opposite direction: across conditions, older adults (M = 
2.91, 1.3%) were slower but less error-prone than young adults (M = 2.81, 3.0%). In log 
RTs and errors, older adults (M = .04, 0.3%) demonstrated smaller interference effects 
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than young adults (M = .05, 1.9%). This interaction was marginal in log RTs, F(1, 159) = 
3.30, MSE = 0.001, p = .07, η2 = .02). While this interaction was significant in error rates 
(F(1, 159) = 9.30, MSE = 0.005, p = .003, η2 = .06), overall task error rates were low (M 
= 2.4%) and the interaction did not survive the inclusion of speed as a covariate (F(1, 
158) = 0.57, MSE < 0.001, p = .45, η2 = .004).  
 Picture-word interference task. Subjects were significantly slower on 
incongruent (i.e., semantically related; M = 2.99, 2.3%) relative to neutral trials (i.e., 
semantically unrelated; M = 2.97, 2.2%), F(1, 159) = 234.46, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, η2 = 
.60. However, error rates were equivalent across conditions, F(1, 160) = .74, MSE < 
0.001, p = .39, η2 = .005). Additionally, older adults (M = 3.03, 2.9%) were slower and 
more error prone than young adults (M = 2.96, 1.9%). This main effect was significant 
for log RTs (F(1, 159) = 65.54, MSE = 0.34, p < .001, η2 = .29), but only marginal for 
errors, F(1, 159) = 3.67, MSE = 0.008, p = .06, η2 = .02. Lastly, there was no condition x 
age interaction in log RTs (F(1, 159) = 2.24, MSE < 0.001, p = .14, η2 = .01) or errors 
(F(1, 159) = .03, MSE  < 0.001, p = .85, η2 < .001), as older adults (M = .02, 0.1%%) did 
not demonstrate larger interference effects than younger adults (M = .016, 0.2%%). 
Nonverbal Stroop task. Subjects performed significantly worse on incongruent 
(M = 2.73, 4.3%) relative to neutral trials (M = 2.69, 1.3%) in both log RT (F(1, 160) = 
500.86, MSE = 0.15, p < .001, η2 = .76) and errors (F(1, 160) = 63.74, MSE = 0.06, p < 
.001, η2 = .29). Additionally, older adults (M = 2.81, 1.5%) were slower (F(1, 160) = 
264.13, MSE = 1.85, p < .001, η2 = .62) but less error prone (F(1, 160) = 10.54, MSE = 
0.03, p = .001, η2 = .06) than younger adults (M = 2.66, 2.9%). The condition x age 
interaction was far from significant in log RTs (F(1, 160) = 0.01, MSE < 0.001, p = .92, 
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η2 < .001). This interaction was significant in errors, F(1, 160) = 6.51, MSE = 0.006, p = 
.01, η2 = .04; however, older adults (M = 1.9%) showed a smaller interference effect than 
younger adults (M = 3.6%), though this interaction did not survive the inclusion of speed 
as a covariate, F(1, 159) = 2.60, MSE = 0.002, p = .11, η2 = .02. 
Stroop task. Subjects performed significantly worse on incongruent (M = 2.97, 
5%) relative to neutral trials (M = 2.88, 2%) in both log RT (F(1, 159) = 1187.91, MSE = 
0.70, p < .001, η2 = .88) and errors (F(1, 159) = 85.21, MSE = 0.10, p < .001, η2 = .35). 
Additionally, older adults (M = 3.00, 5.9%) were slower (F(1, 159) = 173.54, MSE = 
1.26, p < .001, η2 = .52) and more error prone (F(1, 159) = 48.28, MSE = 0.17, p < .001, 
η2 = .23) than younger adults (M = 2.88, 1.6%). The condition x age interaction was 
significant in both log RTs (F(1, 159) = 45.39, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, η2 = .22) and errors 
(F(1, 159) = 23.88, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, η2 = .13), with older adults (M = 0.12, 5.5%) 
showing larger interference effects than young adults (M = 0.08, 1.7%). In errors, this 
interaction remained significant even after controlling for processing speed, F(1, 158) = 
4.70, MSE = 0.005, p = .03, η2 = .03. 
 Given the inconsistent effects across tasks, the effect of age across the response-
distractor inhibition tasks was further assessed by investigating whether there was a main 
effect of age on a response-distractor inhibition log RT factor score, computed by taking 
the z-scored average of the four response-distractor inhibition tasks. With all tasks 
included in the composite, there was a main effect of age, F(1, 157) = 8.64, MSE = 2.18, 
p = .004, η2 = .05. However, this effect was driven by the Stroop task; when the 
composite was calculated without the Stroop task, the age effect was far from significant, 
F(1, 158) = 0.06, MSE = 0.02, p = .81, η2 = .00.  
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 Summary of response-distractor inhibition effects. For all response-distractor 
inhibition tasks, there were significant main effects of condition, as subjects performed 
worse in the interference condition; these main effects demonstrate successful task 
manipulations. Additionally, there tended to be main effects of age in both log RTs and 
errors, as older adults tended to be slower and more error prone than young adults. The 
age x condition interactions, on the other hand, varied as a function of the DV used. 
Using standard RTs (in ms), all response-distractor inhibition tasks (except the Flanker 
task) showed significant interactions (all p’s < .007; not shown above) suggesting larger 
interference effects for older adults. When slowed processing speed was adjusted for by 
using log RTs (Figure 4.2) and including speed as a covariate in error analyses, however, 
this interaction only remained significant in the Stroop task. Thus, older adults did not 
demonstrate a consistent pattern of exaggerated interference effects across response-
distractor inhibition tasks once slowed processing speed was controlled.  
General Discussion 
 The present study investigated declines in inhibitory control as a function of age 
using multiple tasks hypothesized to tap two forms of inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004): resistance to proactive interference and response-distractor inhibition. Resistance 
to PI measures the ability to resist memory intrusions from information that was 
previously relevant, but is now irrelevant. In contrast, response-distractor inhibition 
measures the ability to resist interference from stimuli simultaneously present in the 
environment, yet irrelevant to the task at hand. Consistent age-differences were found for 
resistance to PI tasks, but not for response-distractor inhibition tasks. This dissociation is 
consistent with theories that propose these two inhibition constructs tap different 
  57 
processes (Friedman & Miyake, 2004), but suggests only one of these inhibitory 
processes is sensitive to age. These two types of inhibition will be discussed in turn.  
Resistance to Proactive Interference  
 Replicating previous work (e.g., Oberauer, 2001, 2005; May et al., 1999; Zacks & 
Hasher, 1994), there were consistent age-related impairments in resistance to PI tasks, 
suggesting that older adults are more susceptible to interference from previously relevant 
– but now irrelevant – items in memory. These findings have been echoed by 
neuroimaging results. Relative to young adults,  older adults demonstrate reduced left 
inferior frontal gyrus activation (Jonides et al., 2000), a region important for interference 
resolution in PI tasks (Jonides & Nee, 2006). Critically, Hasher and colleagues (May et 
al., 1999; Zacks & Hasher, 1994) have argued that such exaggerated susceptibility to 
interference results in reduced working memory capacities (e.g., May et al., 1999) and 
has consequences for other aspects of cognition (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988).  
 What factor(s) might explain older adults’ increased susceptibility to interference? 
Early accounts (Jonides et al., 2000; Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001; May et al., 1999; 
Oberauer, 2001; Zacks & Hasher, 1994; Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996) 
hypothesized that increased interference effects may be caused by inhibition deficits. This 
account postulates that proactive interference is overcome by inhibiting no longer 
relevant information, in order to focus on newly relevant information (May et al., 1999; 
Zacks & Hasher, 1994); the failed inhibitory mechanism was thought to result in 
difficulty deactivating irrelevant material. As a consequence, more items are activated in 
memory, resulting in less capacity for relevant information (Oberauer, 2001) and/or 
disrupted retrieval (Lustig et al., 2001). However, the results of the present study pose a 
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potential problem for this account: if the inhibition of no-longer-relevant information 
involves the same type of inhibition used in response-distractor inhibition, the results of 
the present study question this interpretation, as there was little evidence for age-related 
impairments in response-distractor inhibition (discussed below). While this account does 
not rule out the involvement of inhibition in resolving proactive interference, it does rule 
out a general failed inhibitory mechanisms as a cause for age-related impairments in 
resisting PI. 
 In contrast to inhibitory accounts, more recent accounts propose that age effects 
on PI tasks are caused by inefficient contextual encoding (Hedden & Park, 2003; Jonides 
et al., 2000; Jonides & Nee, 2006; Li & Lindenberger, 2005; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, 
Mather, & D’Esposito, 2000; Oberauer, 2005), source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993), or recovery of contexts (e.g., Howard, Kahana, & Wingfield, 2006). 
According to Oberauer (2005), for example, older adults have deficits in binding content-
context information, such that they inefficiently build and maintain bindings that 
associate list items with their distinguishing context (whether that context be temporal 
(e.g., presence of an item in list x), visual (e.g., item color), or other). To distinguish 
between the inhibition and binding accounts, Oberauer administered two recognition 
probe tasks. In one, a modified Sternberg task with a directed forgetting component, 
subjects saw two lists simultaneously, with the top list printed in blue and the bottom list 
in red. Prior to the probe, subjects were cued with a colored box that indicated which list 
was the target list, and which could be forgotten; Oberauer argued that this task involved 
both inhibition and binding. Consistent with the exaggerated interference found in the 
present study, older adults showed larger intrusion costs than young adults in response to 
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a probe word that came from the to-be-forgotten list, relative to a never-before-seen 
probe word. Critically, however, the effects found with this task are consistent with both 
inhibition and binding accounts; in fact, Oberauer (2001) initially interpreted similar 
results as an inhibition deficit.  
 To distinguish between the inhibition and binding accounts, Oberauer (2005) 
tested subjects on a task requiring only binding (no inhibition), which he called the ‘local 
recognition task’. In this task, to-be-remembered words were simultaneously presented in 
spatially-separated frames on the screen. At probe, subjects had to indicate whether the 
memory item was presented in the correct frame. Thus, both identify and context 
information were important, requiring binding mechanisms; additionally, there was no 
advantage to inhibiting irrelevant items, as all items had a chance of being probed. 
Similar to the modified Sternberg task discussed above, older adults showed exaggerated 
intrusion costs, measured as the difference between memory items presented in the wrong 
frame and the presentation of never-before-seen items. Thus, given that older adults 
showed impairments not only on a binding plus inhibition task, but also on a binding-
only task, Oberauer concluded that older adults have a deficit in “building and 
maintaining bindings between representations in working memory” (p. 384). 
Additionally, he proposed that similar binding deficits are the source of working memory 
capacity differences in high- and low-span young adults, and found that tasks requiring 
the recollection of bound representations correlated highly with measures of WM 
capacity. With either aging or reduced WM capacity, then, inefficient or weak bindings 
result in discrimination difficulties at test, including the propensity to respond more 
slowly to or incorrectly accept no-longer-relevant representations (Jonides & Nee, 2006). 
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Using this logic, Oberauer presents binding as a unifying account to explain exaggerated 
interference effects in aging populations and young adults with reduced working memory 
capacities; importantly, this account is consistent with other work demonstrating binding 
deficits in older adults (e.g., Howard et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., & D’Esposito, 2000; Li 
& Lindenberger, 2005). However, future research should investigate whether such 
deficits are associated with a difficulties using contextual information at recall (Jonides & 
Nee, 2006), an inefficient building of bindings (Mitchell et al., 2000; Oberauer, 2005), 
poor maintenance of bindings (Oberauer, 2005), or a combination thereof. Additionally, 
Oberauer did not investigate whether decrements on directed forgetting tasks could be 
fully (vs. partially) accounted for by binding deficits, also opening an avenue for future 
research. 
Response-Distractor Inhibition  
In contrast to the resistance to PI tasks, the results for response-distractor 
inhibition tasks suggest little age-related impairment in inhibitory abilities. While there 
was evidence for age-related response-distractor inhibition impairments when standard 
RTs were used, these age effects were mostly eliminated when controlling for processing 
speed. Specifically, when controlling for processing speed, there were no age effects for 
the flanker, picture-word interference, or nonverbal Stroop tasks; only age effects in the 
Stroop task remained. However, it should be noted that although I have used the term 
“response-distractor” inhibition to refer to the tasks included herein, none of these tasks 
assess the inhibition of prepared motor responses, as measured by tasks such as stop 
signal and go/no-go. While Friedman and Miyake (2004) found that these such tasks load 
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on the response-distractor inhibition factor, it remains possible that these types of motor 
inhibition tasks show different effects with age.  
 Given that Stroop is a “gold standard” measure of inhibition, an important 
question concerns the lack of consistent findings between this task and the other 
response-distractor inhibition measures used here. In particular, it is unclear what factors 
drive the Stroop task age deficits in the present study, given meta-analyses have 
suggested such effects can be attributed to no more than slowed processing speed 
(Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998). However, it is of 
note that the Stroop task induced larger interference effects than the other response-
distractor inhibition tasks. This raises the possibility that the use of log-transformed data 
may not have overcome the non-additive effects of age-related slowing, whereas the 
methods used by Verhaeghen and De Meersman (mean standardized difference, Brinley 
analysis) did.  
An alternative explanation for finding age effects in the Stroop task, relative to the 
other response-distractor inhibition tasks, comes from recent accounts of executive 
control. Rather than distinguishing between executive control processes (such as 
response-distractor inhibition, resistance to PI, updating, shifting, etc., as done by e.g., 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000), Nee and colleagues (2012) characterize 
executive processes by content, with separate selection mechanisms for spatial (“where”) 
and identity (“what”) information. This distinction is similar to those drawn between 
dorsal and ventral processing streams in posterior cortices. In the Flanker, PWI, and NV 
Stroop tasks, selection mechanisms can act on spatial location, given the target and 
distractor are not a single, integrated object. While Flanker stimuli are presented as a 
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single object, the target and distractors are not superimposed, and while PWI targets and 
distractors are superimposed, they are not presented as a single object. In contrast to this, 
Stroop targets and distractors are presented as a single, integrated object with 
superimposed features, suggesting selection cannot rely on spatial location. Here, then, 
selection may need to rely on identity information, with this distinction raising the 
possibility that the age effects in the Stroop task are driven by the need to select identity 
information in the face of strong competition. Consistent with this, various studies have 
found Stroop age effects with target and distractor integration, but not when this 
information was separated (e.g., West & Baylis, 1998; West & Bell, 1997; see also 
Connelly & Hasher, 1993 and Tipper, Weaver, & Houghton, 1994, for similar effects in 
negative priming paradigms). Such selection mechanisms may be especially error prone 
in the Stroop task (relative to the other response-distractor inhibition tasks) due to the 
difficultly in maintaining task goals (see also West & Baylis, 1998) in the face of a 
strong, prepotent (but irrelevant) response. Additionally, although only a small proportion 
of trials, the inclusion of congruent trials (the word red written in red ink) may have made 
goal maintenance – and therefore selection mechanisms – even more difficult, as these 
trials reinforce the incorrect goal of word reading (which is counter to the goal of color 
naming). In contrast, the lack of age effects on the other response-distractor inhibition 
tasks may be due to the fact that the distractors are spatially separated, allowing for the 
use of a different selection mechanism, and also making goal maintenance easier. While 
this account does not explain the discrepancy between the age effects found in the present 
study and the failure to find age effects in other studies (e.g., Verhaeghen & Cerella, 
2002; Verhaeghen & De Meersman, 1998), it does propose a possible explanation for the 
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distinction between the findings of age effects in the Stroop task versus no age effects in 
the Flanker, PWI, and NV Stroop tasks.  
While above-described selection account attributes response-distractor 
interference effects to selective attention mechanisms, it does mean there is no role for 
inhibition – but instead suggests inhibition may be a result of selective attention 
mechanisms. Munakata and colleagues (2011; see also Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001), for example, suggest that inhibition in response-distractor 
inhibition-like tasks is better conceived as a downstream consequence of 
selection/biasing mechanisms. Here, task goals are used to bias or select task-relevant 
information; however, in response-distractor inhibition-type tasks, competition results 
from the presence of irrelevant information. While selective attention mechanisms 
function to bias task relevant information, competition is resolved via lateral inhibition of 
task irrelevant processing streams. While such a theory was not and cannot be tested in 
the present study, it raises the possibility that response-distractor inhibition may be better 
conceptualized as depending on selective attention mechanisms.   
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that older adults did not show consistent patterns of 
impairment across all of the response-distractor inhibition tasks (see also Shilling et al., 
2002), which is in stark contrast to the resistance to PI tasks. These findings are in line 
with recent working memory findings suggesting that older adults have no problem 
removing information from the focus of attention, but they make more errors in both 
accessing information that is outside the focus of attention (Verhaeghen & Basak, 2005) 
and rejecting intrusions from irrelevant information that is in an activated state in long-
term memory (Oberauer, 2001, 2005). Moreover, this dissociation questions theories that 
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propose global inhibition deficits with age, while also providing evidence for dissociable 
inhibitory control processes. 
Conclusions 
The proposal of an association between cognitive decline in healthy aging and a 
deficit in inhibition (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) has led to an explosion of research on 
inhibition in aging, and consequences of inhibition deficits on other areas of cognition. 
However, little research has investigated whether older adults show consistent patterns of 
impairments across different types of inhibition tasks (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 
2000), nor across multiple tasks tapping the same inhibition construct, in the same group 
of young and old adults. The results of the present study fail to support the notion of a 
global inhibition deficit with age (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Instead, only partial support 
for the notion of an inhibitory deficit in cognitive aging was found. Older adults show 
little evidence for impairments on tasks that involve resolving interference from stimuli 
appearing simultaneously in the environment, but do show age-related impairments on 
tasks that involve resolving interference from previously relevant (but now irrelevant) 
items in memory. Additionally, this dissociation in aging provides additional behavioral 
evidence that inhibition is best conceptualized as not one process, but separable distinct 
processes.  
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Chapter 4 Figure Captions 
Figure 4.1. Young and older adult performance on resistance to proactive interference 
tasks. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.  
Figure 4.2. Young and older adult performance on response-distractor inhibition tasks. 
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Chapter 5: Aging and Task Switching 
 Cognitive control is important to everyday life, as we balance our desire to focus 
on a single task while putting other responsibilities aside and simultaneously resisting the 
urge to be distracted by more trivial tasks. Realistically, however, we rarely maintain 
focus on a single task, but instead switch between tasks. Despite this being a seemingly 
effortless process, switching incurs a cost, and research has suggested that at least some 
aspects our ability to switch between tasks changes with age. The present study 
investigates how two components of task switching change with age.  
 In task switching paradigms, subjects traditionally complete two types of blocks. 
In single task (or pure) blocks, only a single task is relevant. In mixed task blocks, 
multiple tasks can be relevant throughout the duration of the block, though only a single 
task is relevant on a given trial, as specified by some sort of task cue. In such task 
switching paradigms, performance declines when switching between tasks is required, 
relative to when only a single task is performed. More specifically, this performance 
decline – the switch cost – is associated with executive control inherent to a multiple-task 
situation. The present study will address two costs in these sorts of task switching 
paradigms: global switch costs and N-2 repetition costs (also referred to as backward 
inhibition).  
 Global switch costs are measured as the difference between mixed and pure 
blocks (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976). These 
costs are hypothesized to measure the ability to update, manipulate, and maintain 
multiple tasks in working memory (WM; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001), as 
multiple tasks need to be available in the mixed block whereas only a single task is 
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relevant in pure blocks. According to Mayr (2001), global costs measure the ability to 
update “an internal control setting in the face of actual or potential interference” (p. 97) 
between tasks.  
 The second cost investigated herein is the N-2 repetition cost. This cost is thought 
to measure the application of inhibitory processes (backward inhibition) as a mechanism 
for disengaging from no-longer-relevant tasks at the point of a task switch. To measure 
task disengagement, Mayr and Keele (2000) used a task switching paradigms with three 
tasks (tasks A, B, and C). Critically, they compared trials in which task A was recently 
abandoned – trial sequence ABA – with trials in which task A was less recently 
abandoned – trial sequence CBA. Mayr and Keele found worse performance on N-2 task 
repetition sequences (ABA), relative to N-2 task switch sequences (CBA), and this N-2 
repetition cost has been taken as evidence for the use of backward inhibition for 
disengaging from a no-longer-relevant task in order to switch to a new task (see also 
Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008). That 
is, Mayr and Keele propose that task sets are inhibited once abandoned, therefore making 
it more difficult to switch back to a recently inhibited task (ABA), as opposed to a less 
recently inhibited task (CBA). Such hypothesized mechanisms, then, suggest a critical 
role for inhibition in task switching (Mayr, 2001), with some even suggesting that these 
backward inhibition mechanisms are more general, functioning also to clear the contents 
of WM when switching between WM items (Bao, Li, Chen, & Zhang, 2006). 
 Interestingly, both global and N-2 repetition costs are in some way associated 
with domains of executive control for which the evidence of decline in healthy aging has 
been the subject of controversy. In task switching, a large body of work has demonstrated 
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that older adults show exaggerated global switch costs relative to young adults, even 
when accounting for general slowing and practice effects (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 
2000; Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; Meiran, Gotler, & Perlman, 2001; Reimers 
& Maylor, 2005; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Wasylyshyn, Verhaeghen, & Sliwinski, 
2011). Specifically, these authors have hypothesized that older adults have difficulty 
dealing with multiple task sets in working memory, specifically when the environment 
poses situations of task ambiguity. That is, in mixed blocks, tasks change relatively often, 
stimuli are complex and contain features relevant to multiple tasks, and all task responses 
are typically mapped to the same response modalities (e.g., the same two buttons). As a 
result, Mayr (2001) has hypothesized that older adults have difficulty selecting among 
relevant task sets in mixed blocks, especially under such conditions with difficult 
mappings between stimulus and response. In particular, Mayr hypothesized that age 
effects are exaggerated under conditions of task set ambiguity, such as when the stimulus 
is bivalent, has the potential to activate multiple task sets, and the cue does not explicitly 
indicate which task is relevant on a given trial (e.g., Rogers et al., 1998).  
 In contrast, a smaller number of studies have failed to find age differences in 
global costs (Brinley, 1965; Kray, Li, Lindenberger, 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 
Salthouse, Fristoe, McGuthry, & Hambrick, 1998; Wheatley, Scialfa, Boot, Kramer, & 
Alexander, 2012; Verhaeghen & Basak, 2005; Verhaeghen & Hoyer, 2007). Kray et al. 
(2002) attribute cross-study differences to the degree of task uncertainty, with older 
adults having difficulty in selecting and instantiating a task under conditions of high 
competition between task sets. In their study, for example, on each trial, each of the four 
possible tasks were explicitly cued with a color coded letter that indicated the relevant 
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task, removing much task set selection uncertainty upon target presentation. Under these 
conditions, older adults did not demonstrate global shifting impairments. Thus, Kray et 
al. suggest that whether or not age differences in global shifting are found may be 
modulated by the degree of competition involved in choosing between tasks; age effects 
may only arise when distinct task sets contain overlapping elements and therefore elicit 
competition during task set selection, as task sets are not easily differentiated (see also, 
Mayr, 2001). 
Similarly, while some have hypothesized that older adults show general inhibitory 
decline that has critical consequences for other areas of cognition (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 
1988), others have instead suggested that not all aspects of inhibition decline equally (see 
Chapter 4 for a more thorough discussion of this issue). In particular, the hypothesis of a 
general, all-encompassing inhibition deficit may be too broad, as inhibition may not be a 
unitary construct (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000). Additionally, to my 
knowledge, only one study has investigated whether older adults show impairments in 
backward inhibition (Mayr, 2001), as would be predicted by theories postulating general 
inhibitory decline. Using the backward inhibition paradigm described above, Mayr found 
little evidence for age-related impairments in inhibition, and the evidence he did find was 
not in the direction predicted by theories of inhibition deficits. That is, Mayr reasoned 
that if older adults have inhibition deficits, they should show reduced backward 
inhibition effects: less (or inefficient) inhibition of task A in the N-2 repetition sequence 
(ABA) would result in easier reactivation of this task, when it again becomes relevant – 
and as a result, the difference between ABA and CBA conditions would be reduced or 
eliminated. Critically, Mayr found the opposite pattern of results; older adults showed 
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significantly larger backward inhibition effects than young adults when standard 
response times (RT) were used, though this effect was only marginal with log-
transformed RTs (p = .07). In his study, Mayr compared the backward inhibition of 
young and old adults using a sample of twenty-four subjects per age group. While sizable 
for investigating simple cognitive effects, it may be the case that there was much 
variability in the performance within such a small sample size, especially given that the 
older adults’ RT standard deviations were at least twice as large as those of the young 
adults. Before definitive conclusions about age-related performance on backward 
inhibition can be drawn, backward inhibition effects in young and old adults should be 
replicated. The present study investigates the global shifting and backward inhibition 
abilities of a large group of young and old adults.  
Method 
Participant, task, and data processing details are thoroughly described in the 
method chapter (Chapter 3). Additionally, background tasks assessing differences 
between the young and old adults samples are described and reported in Chapter 4. The 
present chapter discusses results from the three-task shifting task, which includes both 
pure and mixed task blocks; this task is reviewed briefly below. RTs reflect correct 
responses, excluding RTs on trials following errors. Analyses using RTs (in ms) excluded 
extreme outliers and outliers lying beyond 2.5 standard deviations of an individual 
subject mean, for each condition. Log RTs reflect RTs that exclude extreme outliers only.  
Shifting Task  
 Subjects responded to the target based on the relevant cued task set. Targets were 
displayed one at a time in the center of the screen, and were preceded by cues that read 
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either “Number”, “Shape”, or “Size”. Subjects completed three pure blocks and three 
mixed blocks. In the pure blocks, subjects responded to either “Number, “Shape”, or 
“Size” throughout the duration of the block. In mixed blocks, subjects responded to any 
one of the three possible tasks, depending on the cue presented at the start of the trial, and 
the relevant task changed every trial. Subjects were first familiarized with the task in pure 
and mixed task practice blocks. Targets were selected pseudo-randomly with the 
constraint that no exact stimulus repetitions were allowed. Additionally, the task 
sequence of mixed blocks was restricted such that a) all three tasks occurred equally 
often, b) there were neither direct task repetitions nor direct stimulus repetitions, c) each 
stimulus combination (size, shape, number; shape, size number; etc.) appeared equally 
often within a block, and d) there was an equal number of N-2 task switches (ABC) and 
N-2 task repetitions (ABA). The dependent variables were a) global switch costs, 
measured as the difference between mixed and pure blocks, and b) N-2 repetition costs 
(or backward inhibition), measured as the difference between N-2 repetition (ABA) and 
N-2 switch (CBA) trials (within the mixed block).  
Results 
Analyses 
 In order to take baseline task performance into account, the effects of age on the 
shifting measures were investigated with a repeated measures ANOVA with age (young, 
old) as a between-subject factor and condition (for global costs, mixed vs. pure blocks; 
for backward inhibition, N-2 repetition vs. N-2 switch trial types) as a within-subjects 
factor. Tasks were separately analyzed using log RT data and errors. Log-transformed 
RTs were used to account for the slower processing speed of the older adults; 
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additionally, where relevant, processing speed was used as a covariate in error analyses. 
For all analyses, a main effect of condition was expected, replicating standard switching 
or repetition costs. Age x condition interactions that remained significant after controlling 
for processing speed were taken as evidence for age-related performance differences.  
Global Switch Costs  
 Figure 5.1 depicts performance in mixed and pure blocks, as a function of age, for 
both standard RT (top) and log-transformed (bottom) data. Subjects were slower and 
more error prone in mixed blocks (M = 1333 ms, 4%) relative to pure blocks (M = 578, 
3%). This main effect of condition was significant for both log RT (F(1, 160) = 2006.88, 
MSE = 8.78, p < .001, η2 = .93) and errors (F(1, 160) = 33.69, MSE = 0.03, p < .001, η2 = 
.17). Additionally, the main effect of age was significant, as older adults were 
significantly slower (M = 1412) than young adults (M = 921), F(1, 160) = 135.84, MSE = 
2.25, p < .001, η2 = 46. However, the main effect of age was not significant in error rates 
(for both age groups, M = 4%), F(1, 160) = 1.24, MSE = 0.002, p = .27, η2 = .008. As 
shown in Figure 5.1 (top), older adults demonstrated larger RT switch costs than young 
adults; however, this interaction was not significant with log-transformed RTs, F(1, 160) 
= 0.33, MSE = 0.001, p = .57, η2 = .002. Additionally, the effect in errors only 
approached significance, F(1, 160) = 3.35, MSE = 0.003, p = .07, η2 = .02, and it did not 
survive the inclusion of processing speed as a covariate, F(1, 159) = 0.12, MSE < 0.001, 
p = .73, η2 = .001.  
Backward Inhibition Costs  
 Figure 5.2 depicts performance in N-2 switch (CBA) and N-2 repeat (ABA) trial 
types, as a function of age, for both standard RT (top) and log-transformed (bottom) data. 
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Subjects were slower and more error prone on N-2 repetition trials (M = 1431, 5% errors) 
relative to N-2 switch trials (M = 1364, 4%). This main effect of condition was 
significant for both log RT (F(1, 160) = 173.31, MSE = 0.04, p < .001, η2 = .52) and 
errors (F(1, 160) = 7.81, MSE = 0.002, p = .006, η2 = .05). Older adults were 
significantly slower (M = 1781) than the young adults (M = 1171), F(1, 160) = 80.68, 
MSE = 2.36, p < .001, η2 = .34. However, the two groups did not differ in error rates (for 
both, M = 4%), F(1, 160) = 0.03, MSE < 0.001, p = .85, η2 < .001). In RTs, older adults 
(M = 96 ms) showed larger backward inhibition costs than young adults (M = 49); 
however, this interaction did not survive log-transformation (F(1, 160) = .56, MSE < 
0.001, p = .46, η2 = .003), nor was it significant in error rates (F(1, 160) = 1.63, MSE < 
0.001, p = .20, η2 = .01).  
General Discussion  
 The goal of the present study was to investigate age-related performance on two 
measures of task switching, global switch costs and N-2 repetition costs. While the 
effects of age on global shifting measures appear to be mediated by the ease with which 
task sets can be differentiated (e.g., Kray et al., 2002; Mayr, 2001 ), the effects of age on 
N-2 repetition costs have not been extensively investigated. Each measure is discussed 
below, in turn. 
Global Switch Costs 
Both age groups showed large global switch costs. Although older adults 
demonstrated slower overall reaction times, they did not show exaggerated switch costs 
once general slowing was accounted for. In some ways, the present results were 
surprising – that is, a moderate-sized body of research has demonstrated exaggerated 
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global switch costs in older adults across many different shifting paradigms (e.g., Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; see also Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002, for a meta-
analysis that includes global costs as a function of age). These studies have suggested that 
older adults have difficulty in maintaining, manipulating, and selecting between multiple 
task sets, as needs to be done in mixed blocks, relative to pure blocks.  
However, other work has suggested that age effects in global shifting may be 
reduced – or even eliminated – with reductions in task uncertainty. Kray et al. (2002), for 
example, did not find age differences in global costs using a cued shifting paradigm with 
verbal targets. In line with this, Mayr (2001) identified boundary conditions for age 
effects – when targets contained features of each possible task, and response mappings 
overlapped, substantial age effects were found. However, when these task set features did 
not overlap, age differences were minimal. As a result, Mayr suggested that older adults 
have to rely more strongly on task set updating processes, given they show worse 
performance as a function of interference between task sets. In particular, Mayr raised the 
possibility that older adults have difficulties under conditions where task sets are not 
easily differentiated (see also Mayr & Liebscher, 2001), and that task set differentiation is 
more easily accomplished when there are close associations among task-relevant features 
such as possible responses, stimulus-responses mappings, etc.  
That is, the notion that older adults may show deficits in measures of global 
shifting when binding processes play a critical role in differentiating among activated 
tasks in memory is consistent research from episodic and working memory domains (e.g., 
Chapter 4; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Oberauer, 2005). In task switching, 
binding may function to create task sets, or distinct representations of what should be 
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done in the context of a given task – an attentional set that guides behavior and includes 
representations of what aspect of the target to focus on, possible responses, and stimuli-
response mappings (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). If 
binding among task features is weak (or fails), task sets may not be easily distinguishable, 
especially when task set features overlap. Thus, in global task switching settings, weak 
bindings may cause difficulty for older adults in distinguishing between relevant and 
irrelevant tasks, with failed binding mechanisms making it more difficult for older adults 
to form and/or differentiate between tasks, weak bindings increase the likelihood that the 
irrelevant task set will be inappropriately activated. Supporting the notion that older 
adults only seem to show global shifting impairments when task sets are not easily 
differentiated, Henkel et al. (1998) suggested older adults have the most difficulty in 
binding features in memory when distinct representations have some degree of overlap. 
Thus, task set binding mechanisms seem critical to task switching performance because 
shifting requires that task sets be kept apart (Mayr, 2001).  
Like Kray et al. (2002), the present study failed to find exaggerated switch costs 
in older adults. However, the present study used explicit cues that may have provided 
environmental support, allowing older adults to more easily differentiate between task 
sets. Further supporting the notion that age effects may depend in part on the ability to 
differentiate between task sets, Kray, Eber, and Karbach (2008) found that task-relevant 
strategies (such as producing the name of the upcoming task) reduced (but did not 
eliminate) age effects. Thus, the design of the present study may have reduced the effect 
of any binding impairments in older adults. Interestingly, Mayr (2001) found age effects 
with an almost identical paradigm as used herein, even with explicit cues. Using a larger 
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group of subjects, the present study questions these results, suggesting that age-related 
impairments in global shifting are not always found – at least not when task sets can be 
relatively easily disambiguated.  
Backward Inhibition  
 Replicating previous research, both young and old adults showed small but 
significant N-2 repetition costs. As with global switch costs, older adults were slower 
overall, but did not show exaggerated measures of backward inhibition once general 
slowing was accounted for. This replicates the findings of Mayr (2001), who found that 
older adults showed numerically larger backward inhibition effects, though such 
differences were not significant once log-transformed. Using a larger sample, then, the 
present study supports the notion that older adults show no impairment in their ability to 
disengage from relevant task sets using inhibitory processes (see also Oberauer, 2005).  
 In one respect, the present results are surprising given findings and theoretical 
frameworks that propose that older adults have a deficit in inhibitory control processes 
(e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988). From this account, we might have expected older adults to 
show smaller backward inhibition effects, indicative of impaired inhibitory abilities. 
Instead, like Mayr (2001), older adults did not show exaggerated costs. Thus, the present 
results suggest that older adults do not show impairments in this measure of inhibition. 
As a result, older adults cannot be said to have a deficit to all inhibitory control 
mechanisms (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988), but may instead show selective deficits to 
some in only some of these mechanisms (e.g., Chapter 4). Additionally, these results 
suggest that backward inhibition is somehow distinct from those aspects of inhibitory 
control in which older adults do show age-related declines.  
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However, Anderson and Levy (2007) have suggested that the prediction of a 
relationship between backward inhibition and inhibitory control is quite difficult. As 
Anderson and Levy point out (and in line with the assumptions of Mayr & Keele, 2000), 
inhibition has both costs and benefits. The better one is at inhibition, the better one can 
inhibit previous tasks when switching to a new task. However, the better one is at 
inhibition, the more difficult it may be to retrieve a previously inhibited task set. In the 
case of comparing performance in the experimental condition (ABA; N-2 repetition) vs. 
the control condition (CBA; N-2 switch) in backward inhibition tasks, Mayr and 
colleagues have focused on the difficulty in retrieving task A in the experimental 
condition, as this should be harder the better one is at inhibition. They have implicitly 
assumed that inhibiting task B should be of equivalent difficulty in the two conditions; as 
a result, the application of inhibition to task B should play no role in explaining 
individual differences between these conditions. However, as Anderson and Levy point 
out, this is not the case. Given the prior inhibition of task A in the experimental (ABA) 
condition, this task set will have a lower activation strength relative to that for task B, 
than is the case for task A relative to task B in the control (CBA) condition. That is, the 
more recent inhibition of task A (in the experimental ABA condition) will result in a 
larger difference in activation levels between task B and task A, requiring more inhibition 
of task B. In contrast, the less recent inhibition of task A (in the control CBA condition) 
will result in a smaller difference in activation levels between task B and task A, 
requiring less inhibition. The better one’s inhibition ability, the better one can suppress 
task B in the experimental condition with respect to task A, with this ability playing a 
lesser role in the control condition. Thus, in the experimental condition, better inhibition 
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results in more difficulty in retrieving task A but a better ability to inhibit task B. 
Consequently, it is difficult to predict what the relation should be between the size of the 
backward inhibition effect and individual differences in inhibitory control abilities.  
 In others respects, however, these findings may not be surprising. First, older 
adults do not show impairments in measures of local task switching (e.g., Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; see also Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002, for a meta-
analysis that includes local costs as a function of age), measured as the difference 
between switch and repeat trials within mixed blocks. On switch trials, one must 
disengage from the previously relevant task (i.e., “switch” tasks), whereas such 
disengagement is not necessary on repeat trials. Local costs measure the initiation and 
execution of task switches, and are thought to be a more pure measure of switching (e.g., 
Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Second, using meta-
analytic techniques, Verhaeghen and Cerella (2002) have suggested older adults show 
impairments in executive tasks that require the manipulation of multiple tasks (as with 
global switching and dual-tasking), but not on tasks that involve the “active selection of 
relevant information” (p. 856), such as with local switching and Stroop-like inhibition 
tasks. Given backward inhibition may be a mechanism for disengaging from no-longer 
relevant tasks in order to select a newly relevant task, the present findings are in line with 
this selective attention account. Backward inhibition, then, may be conceptually similar 
to selective attention tasks mechanisms, insofar as it is involved in the selection between 
multiple representations in working memory (see also Bao et al., 2006).  
 How can we reconcile these different predictions of impaired-inhibition vs. intact-
selective attention theories? The backward inhibition results fit nicely into embedded 
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process accounts of working memory (WM; e.g., Cowan, 1995, 2001; Oberauer, 2002). 
These models posit (at least) two components. The first – the focus of attention – is a 
capacity-restricted mechanism that holds a single element active; the element (item, 
representation, etc.) within the focus of attention is that which is currently being 
processed or acted upon. The second component – the activated portion of long-term 
memory (LTM) – holds currently activated LTM representations; critically, their 
activation makes these representations more easily retrievable than other (currently 
inactive) LTM representations. In looking for dissociations between these two WM 
components, Oberauer (2001, 2005) found that older adults do not have problems 
removing items from the focus of attention; this finding is consistent with the present 
backward inhibition findings, which suggest older adults successfully inhibit no-longer-
relevant task representations. In contrast, Oberauer found that older adults do have 
problems rejecting intrusions from irrelevant information in LTM, consistent with 
findings suggesting that older adults show deficits in at least some aspects of inhibition, 
such as resistance to proactive interference (e.g., Chapter 4; Hasher, Chung, May, & 
Foong, 2002; Jonides et al., 2000; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999; McCabe, Robertson, & 
Smith, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002; but see Oberauer, 2005 for an alternative 
interpretation).  
 Interestingly, these embedded process accounts of WM might also account for the 
exaggerated global switch costs that are more typically found in older results (e.g., Mayr, 
2001; counter to the results of the present study). Specifically, mixed blocks require that 
multiple task sets remain active so they are easily accessible at the point of a task switch; 
presumably, this information is being maintained in the activated portion of LTM. 
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Additionally, successful performance of a single task (in the face of interference from the 
currently irrelevant tasks) requires a strong representation of the task goal (Meiran, 
2010); as a result, the start of an individual trial may involve task retrieval or goal 
“refreshing,” regardless of whether the trial involves a task switch or task repetition 
(Altmann & Gray, 2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003; see e.g., Bryck & Mayr, 2005; 
Saeki & Saito, 2004 for evidence that some processes occur on both switch and repeat 
trials). Given older adults are more susceptible to intrusions from information in the 
activated portion of LTM (Oberauer, 2001, 2005), it may be the case that older adults 
suffer from more interference from the activated-but-irrelevant tasks, potentially even as 
a result of weakly bound task sets (Mayr, 2001). However, such interference may be 
reduced in some situations – such as that of the present experiment and Kray et al. (2002) 
– when there is less uncertainty in task selection (e.g., as might be the case with explicit 
cues; but see Wasylyshyn et al., 2011, for a meta-analysis suggesting no effect of task 
manipulations on age effects in global task switching1). This account is consistent with 
Mayr’s (2001) proposal that age effects might result from a set-updating process that 
“cleans up” (or helps the system settle on) a task representation when task ambiguity is 
present. It seems likely that this set updating process is interference-prone; however, at 
present, this account is speculative and should be closely investigated in future work.  
Summary 
                                                        
1 Although the meta-analysis of Wasylyshyn et al. (2011) investigated the contributions of 
task cueing and task predictability to the interpretation of age-related impairments in task 
switching, there was very little cross-study variance. That is, the majority of studies 
included in this meta-analysis were cued and unpredictable. Therefore, more 
experimental evidence is needed before drawing firm conclusions as to whether task 
demands affect age-related performance.  
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 To conclude, the goal of understanding cognitive decline associated with healthy 
aging has led to a large amount of research across many different domains, including 
executive function, memory, and attention. Although a preponderance of evidence has 
suggested that older adults show age-related impairments in various aspects of cognition, 
future research should bridge topic areas in order to ascertain whether the decline 
associated with healthy aging necessitates multiple accounts, or can be explained by a 
single process-specific account that is inclusive of all aspects of cognition (e.g., Chapter 
8). Such integrative accounts would inform theories of aging and executive control, and 
the interaction between the two.  
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Chapter 5 Figure Captions 
Figure 5.1. Global shifting: Means of RTs (top) and log-transformed RTs (bottom) as a 
function of block (pure, mixed) and age (young, old). Error bars indicate standard errors. 
Figure 5.2. Backward inhibition: Means of RTs (top) and log-transformed RTs (bottom) 
as a function of trial type (N-2 switch, N-2 repetition) and age (young, old). Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
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Chapter 6: Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control Mechanisms  
and Their Role in Shifting 
Working Memory and Executive Function 
Multiple accounts of everyday cognition have proposed an important role for 
executive control and working memory processes in situations requiring organized and 
coordinated behavior, including planning, managing novel tasks/situations, multi-tasking, 
shifting between tasks, and resisting interference from irrelevant information (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). In particular, a great 
deal of research has focused on understanding the cognitive processes that contribute to 
both executive control and working memory (e.g., Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 
2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 
2007), with the goal of developing models of how we behave appropriately in complex, 
interference-inducing internal and external environments. Recently, researchers have 
taken an experimental approach to understand these processes (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 
2004; Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake et al., 2000; Munakata et al., 2011; Nee et al., 2012; 
Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittman, 2003, 2008; Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003), 
many of which have used factor analytic techniques such as confirmatory factor analysis 
and structural equation modeling.  
For example, a well-designed study by Oberauer and colleagues (2003) set out to 
identify the cognitive functions underlying working memory capacity. Oberauer and 
colleagues tested participants on an extensive battery of working memory (WM) and 
other tasks, in order to understand the contribution of various cognitive factors to 
working memory capacity. As a result of their measurement models, they proposed WM 
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to be best understood as two highly related factors of a) storage in the context of 
processing and b) coordination of elements into structures (later called relational 
integration, Oberauer et al., 2008). Importantly, these two factors were strongly related to 
performance on complex WM tasks (e.g., operation span). Oberauer and colleagues 
(2003) also proposed the importance of a third supervision factor, thought to reflect 
executive functions (discussed next). While still a WM function, the supervision function 
was less closely related to the other aspects of working memory capacity.  
Other researchers have proposed similar WM mechanisms, with their models also 
being based on individual differences approaches (though not necessarily factor analytic 
techniques). Unsworth and Engle (2007), for example, have proposed that individual 
differences in working memory capacity are determined by maintenance in primary 
memory and retrieval from secondary memory. More specifically, they proposed an 
attentional mechanism as being important for maintaining information in primary 
memory (similar to Oberauer et al.’s (2003) storage/processing process). Additionally, 
access to information in secondary memory is driven by cue-based retrieval that depends 
at least in part on the successful binding between content and context (similar to 
Oberauer et al.’s (2003) coordination). Thus, while not identical to the model of Oberauer 
and colleagues (2003) because of the explicitly articulated need for retrieval mechanisms, 
these two models do have overlapping features. Regardless, these two WM models 
illustrate a number of possible WM functions that can contribute to task performance.  
In addition to WM models, researchers have also posited models for elucidating 
executive function (EF) processes. For example, a very influential study used factor 
analytic methods to examine the factor loadings of three a priori identified executive 
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functions, those of shifting (also referred to as task switching; the ability to flexibly 
switch between tasks or mental sets), inhibition (the ability to suppress dominant or 
automatic responses), and updating (the ability to monitor and refresh the contents of 
working memory as old information is deemed irrelevant and new information becomes 
relevant (Miyake et al., 2000). In this study, Miyake and colleagues asked whether 
factoring out common variance among tasks hypothesized to measure each of these EF 
mechanisms resulted in a single or multiple EF factors. Their answer to this question was 
a strong “yes”, supporting both single and multiple factors. While there was evidence that 
the three aspects of EF were distinct, as indicated by their loadings on separate factors, 
Miyake et al. also found moderate inter-correlations between the three factors, suggesting 
some shared variance. Presumably, the diversity of EFs represents distinct abilities 
associated with each EF measure, while the unity represents a common mechanism.  
More specifically, Miyake et al. (2000) raised two possibilities as to what the 
mechanism underlying unity might reflect. One possibility was a working memory 
mechanism such as goal maintenance or a controlled attention process (see also Friedman 
et al., 2008; Kane et al., 2007), which functions to keep task relevant information in an 
accessible state. The second possibility proposed by Miyake et al. was an inhibitory 
control mechanism. Recently, Munakata et al. (2011) have linked these two hypotheses, 
suggesting that the maintenance of a goal leads to both direct and indirect inhibition of 
responses or representations. Given the possible central role of inhibition in executive 
function, the present study investigates the organization of inhibitory control 
mechanisms, and whether these or other working memory mechanisms contribute to our 
ability to flexibly switch between tasks in a goal directed fashion. 
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Task Switching 
The ability to flexibly switch between tasks is measured in task switching 
paradigms. In these paradigms, subjects typically complete two types of blocks. In single 
task (or pure) blocks, only a single task is relevant whereas in mixed task blocks, multiple 
tasks are relevant throughout the duration of the block, though only a single task is 
performed on a given trial (as specified by some sort of task cue). In such task switching 
paradigms, switch costs are observed.  Performance in terms of reaction times and error 
rates declines when switching between tasks is required, relative to when the same task 
repeats. 
Theories of task switching have proposed a critical role for inhibitory control 
processes (or likewise, interference resolution) in shifting. (Note that at this point in the 
discussion, I use inhibitory processes as an umbrella term including processes such as the 
inhibition of irrelevant information and the ability to resist interference from previously 
relevant information in memory; see Friedman & Miyake, 2004, for evidence of this 
distinction.) From early studies onward, Allport and colleagues (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 
1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000) have suggested that at least some 
aspects of switch costs can be attributed to the need to resolve interference. More 
specifically, this literature suggests that switch costs result from proactive interference 
from a previously relevant task. This account assumes that there is continued priming 
from previously activated tasks. When tasks repeat, this activation is beneficial; in 
contrast, when tasks must be switched, this activation results in interference in choosing 
the appropriate task. Likewise, it has been proposed that the cognitive system overcomes 
the high activation of no-longer relevant tasks via inhibition of the inappropriate task 
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when a task switch is required (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Thus, inhibitory control over 
previously relevant tasks plays an important role in overcoming residual activation (i.e., 
interference) and allowing for successful switching.  
Empirical evidence for the contribution of proactive interference to shifting comes 
from findings of asymmetrical switch costs, found when one task is more dominant than 
another (e.g., Allport et al., 1994). Allport et al. embedded a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in 
their shifting paradigm, such that subjects had to switch between the two tasks of color 
naming (while ignoring the written word) and word naming (while ignoring the stimulus’ 
ink color). Because word reading is a highly familiar, well practiced task, and thus 
involves more automatic processes, word reading is the easier, more dominant task with a 
stronger baseline activation. In contrast, color naming is less practiced task and thus a 
more difficult task, arguably with a weaker baseline activation. Allport and colleagues 
found larger switch costs when switching to the dominant task of word reading, relative 
to switching to the less dominant (more difficult) task of color naming (see Meuter & 
Allport, 1999, for similar results in language switching studies). As a result, Allport and 
colleagues (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Meuter & Allport, 1999) have 
proposed that asymmetrical switch costs result from the both proactive interference from 
the most recently performed task and persisting inhibition of the dominant task. More 
specifically, because the baseline activation of the dominant task is higher, more 
inhibition is needed to overcome its activation, with the temporal persistence of this 
applied inhibition being one source of switch costs. In contrast, the lower baseline 
activation of the less dominant task means less inhibition is required to override the 
activation of that task. Because less inhibition is needed to suppress this task, there is less 
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persisting inhibition to overcome when switching back to this task on future trials (i.e., 
smaller switch costs). Task switching, then, at least in part measures the time cost 
associated with managing interference from multiple tasks in working memory.  
Further evidence supporting the notion that inhibition plays a role in task 
switching comes from a modified shifting paradigm using three tasks (tasks A, B, and C; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000). Mayr and Keele compared conditions in which a task had been 
more recently inhibited (task sequence ABA) to conditions in which a task was less 
recently inhibited (task sequence CBA). If inhibition is used as a task switching 
mechanism, switching to a more recently inhibited task (ABA; N-2 repetition) should 
take longer than switching to a less recently inhibited task (CBA; N-2 switch) due to the 
persistence of previously applied inhibition. This is exactly what Mayr & Keele found. In 
accordance with the claims of Allport and colleagues, the recency of task disengagement 
via inhibition affected performance (see also Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 
2003; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008). The greater difficulty in switching back to a 
recently inhibited task is known as the N-2 repetition cost, and is thought to reflect 
backward inhibition. Mayr and Keele suggested that backward inhibition enables one to 
disengage from previously relevant tasks, with at least part of switch costs explained by 
the need to overcome this applied inhibition.  
Lastly, in an individual differences study of older adults, Hedden and Yoon 
(2006) found a positive relationship between task switching ability and resistance to 
proactive interference, as individuals with better interference resistance demonstrated 
reduced switch costs. While this finding is in line with a role for interference resolution in 
task switching, the interpretation of their result is complicated by the fact that both their 
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shifting and PI tasks consisted of complex tasks. For example, shifting was measured by 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Heaton, 1993; Milner, 1963) and Trail Making Test 
(Armitage, 1946; Reitan, 1955), and PI was measured by letter and semantic fluency 
tasks (Lezak, 1995). The use of such complex executive tasks makes it unclear what 
aspects of task switching and PI were being measured, as complex task performance 
depends on multiple executive and non-executive processes. Thus, while these results 
support the notion that inhibitory control mechanisms are involved in shifting, they do 
not clearly indicate the specific role for interference resolution in shifting.  
The above-reviewed work suggests a role for inhibition in task switching, but 
there are several clarifications that need to be made. First, task switching can be 
measured by more than one type of switch cost, with each type of switch cost presumably 
tapping different working memory processes. Global switch costs are measured as the 
difference between mixed and pure blocks and are argued to reflect the ability to 
manipulate, maintain, and select between multiple tasks in working memory (Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001). In contrast, N-2 repetition costs are measured as the 
difference between N-2 repetition and N-2 switch trials, within the mixed block and are 
argued to reflect the inhibition of recently abandoned task sets (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Mayr, 2001). Finally, local switch costs are measured as the difference between switch 
and repeat trials within with in the mixed block, and are considered a measure of the 
ability to initiate, retrieve, and execute a task set shift in the context of having just 
performed a different task (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). While a 
critical role for interference resolution has been proposed to account for local shifting and 
likely modulates the ability to manage multiple task sets in WM in global shifting, WM 
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functions (e.g., working memory capacity, retrieval) have also played a strong role in the 
theoretical description of different switch costs. As a result, working WM functions may 
also play a critical role in explaining shifting measures. For example, global costs involve 
maintaining multiple tasks in an accessible state, while local costs and N-2 repetition 
costs at least in part reflect the ability to retrieve new task sets from WM at the point of a 
task switch.  
Additionally, although inhibitory control was discussed as a unitary construct in 
the above discussion, it has been suggested that inhibition may be better represented by 
multiple constructs, including response-distractor inhibition and the resistance to 
proactive interference (PI; Chapter 4; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000). Response-
distractor inhibition measures the ability to suppress dominant responses and/or 
distractors present in the environment (cf. Hedden & Yoon, 2006), whereas resistance to 
PI measures our resistance to intrusions from previously relevant (but now irrelevant) 
information in memory. Critically, these two types of inhibition are distinguished by 
whether they involve features of the current environment (such as irrelevant stimuli on 
the screen, as with response-distractor inhibition) or features of the previously relevant 
context (such as previously memorized list of words, as with resistance to PI). Moreover, 
as discussed by Friedman and Miyake, it remains possible that there are other types of 
inhibition not captured by their two-factor model.   
In contrast to the findings of Friedman and Miyake (2004), however, others 
studies have failed to find consistent evidence for a coherent factor underlying response-
distractor inhibition. These studies have found only small correlations between tasks 
thought to measure this construct and consequently the response-distractor inhibition 
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tasks did not load on the same factor in structural equation modeling (e.g., Hedden & 
Yoon, 2005; Hull, Martin, Beier, Lane, & Hamilton, 2008; Salthouse, Atkinson, & 
Berish, 2003; Shilling, Chetwynd, & Rabbitt, 2002). Studies failing to find consistent 
response-distractor inhibition effects differed from that of Friedman and Miyake in two 
important ways: first, all of these studies included older adults, though the Salthouse et al. 
(2003) study included both young and old subjects. Secondly, unlike the work of 
Friedman and Miyake, these studies controlled for speed of processing, either by using 
log-transformed data or including a speed factor in their models. For example, Shilling 
and colleagues (2002) investigated multiple response-distractor inhibition tasks (e.g., 
arrows and color-word Stroop tasks, among others) to determine whether they could find 
consistent task performance across them. However, using log-transformed RT data, little 
cross-task consistency was found. A different study by Hedden and Yoon (2005) 
included response-distractor inhibition, resistance to PI, and processing speed measures 
(among other factors) in their structural equation models of executive function in older 
adults. In their model, response-distractor inhibition was indistinguishable from 
processing speed (r = .97!). These studies thus call into question whether response-
distractor inhibition tasks are robust measures of inhibition, or instead reflect more 
general processing speed mechanisms. Given these discrepancies, the present study 
examined measures of inhibitory control with controls for processing speed.  
Despite the caveats above regarding the unity of measures of response-distractor 
inhibition, it is clear that inhibitory processes have been claimed to play important roles 
in task switching, which begs the question of how inhibition and switching are related to 
each other. Thus, the questions addressed by the present study are as follows: first, can 
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we replicate the distinction between response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI? 
And if so, do different types of inhibition play different roles in the various measures of 
task switching? Or, might measures of switching be better understood in terms of WM 
mechanisms? Before discussing the methods and results, I first briefly review hypotheses 
for how various control processes might be (differentially) related to measures of task 
switching.  
Possible Roles for Control Processes in Task Switching 
Global switch costs. As discussed above, global switch costs measure the cost 
associated with manipulating, maintaining, and selecting among multiple task sets in 
working memory (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001). Specifically, Mayr (2001) 
attributes at least some of these costs to the need to adopt one task set among others that 
are potentially relevant, limiting the focus of working memory to “one of several 
competing mental sets” (Mayr, 2001, p. 107). Such an account emphasizes an important 
role for WM, though this role is also conceptually similar to mechanisms of PI resolution, 
which are involved in the selection of relevant information in the face of competition 
from irrelevant representations that are being held (whether intentionally or not) in WM. 
As a result, global costs may at least in part reflect the ability to maintain multiple tasks 
in WM, or alternatively, resolve interference from activated – but currently irrelevant – 
task sets (as is necessary in mixed blocks), relative to situations where only a single task 
set is activated (as in pure blocks).  
N-2 repetition costs, or backward inhibition. By inhibiting no longer relevant 
(and therefore competing) representations, backward inhibition facilitates task selection 
(e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). However, little work has investigated whether backward 
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inhibition is functionally similar to other traditional measures of inhibition, such as 
response-distractor inhibition or resistance to PI. On this issue, theorists have mixed 
opinions. Koch, Gade, Schuch, and Philipp (2010), for example, have suggested that 
backward inhibition is “invoked by a conflict-monitoring mechanism similar to the one 
postulated in the study of response conflict in single-task conflicts” (p. 11). Under this 
view, backward inhibition may be used as a mechanism for overcoming conflict in some 
aspects of task switching, suggesting a possible relationship with response-distractor 
inhibition in order to overcome interference from irrelevant representations. Additionally, 
some studies have suggested right inferior frontal cortex involvement in both response 
inhibition and backward inhibition (see Koch et al., 2010 for a discussion), suggesting 
similar or overlapping neural mechanisms (but see Dreher & Berman, 2002, for an 
alternative interpretation).  
However, backward inhibition is conceptually similar to the deletion function 
proposed by Hasher, Zacks, and May (1999), which serves to remove no longer relevant 
information from attentional focus, enabling the focus of attention to be updated with 
currently relevant information. According to May, Hasher, and Kane (1999), deletion 
plays an important role in resisting interference. Given that backward inhibition functions 
to resolve competition between relevant and irrelevant task sets, it seems possible that 
backward inhibition will show a relationship to resistance to PI measures. That is, 
conceptually, both resistance to PI and backward inhibition involve overcoming 
interference from previously relevant – but now irrelevant – information in memory.  
In contrast to these views assuming controlled inhibitory processes, other 
researchers have suggested that backward inhibition involves instead a low-level, 
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automatic process, instantiated by mechanisms such as lateral inhibition (e.g., Koch et al., 
2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & 
Verbruggen, 2010). From these accounts, backward inhibition is simply the downstream 
effect of selecting new representations, as this active selection of a task may result in the 
lateral inhibition of competing tasks (Mayr & Keele, 2000; see Munakata et al., 2011, for 
a similar account of inhibition). If backward inhibition is best understood as a more 
automatic process, we might not expect a relationship between backward inhibition and 
more common measures of inhibition (i.e., response-distractor inhibition resistance to PI).  
Complicating things further, Anderson and Levy (2007) have suggested that the 
prediction of a relationship between backward inhibition and inhibitory control is quite 
difficult.  As Anderson and Levy point out (and in line with the assumptions of Mayr & 
Keele, 2000), inhibition has both costs and benefits. The better one is at inhibition, the 
better one can inhibit previous tasks when switching to a new task. Additionally, the 
better one is at inhibition, the more difficult it may be to retrieve a previously inhibited 
task set. In the case of comparing performance in the experimental condition (ABA; N-2 
repetition) vs. the control condition (CBA; N-2 switch) in backward inhibition tasks, 
Mayr and colleagues have focused on the difficulty in retrieving task A in the 
experimental condition, as this should be harder the better one is at inhibition. They have 
implicitly assumed that inhibiting task B should be of equivalent difficulty in the two 
conditions; as a result, the application of inhibition to task B should play no role in 
explaining individual differences between these conditions. However, as Anderson and 
Levy point out, this is not the case. Given the prior inhibition of task A in the 
experimental condition, this task set will have a lower activation strength relative to that 
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for task B, than is the case for task A relative to task B in the control condition. That is, 
the more recent inhibition of task A (in the experimental ABA condition) will result in a 
larger difference in activation levels between task B and task A (when task A again 
becomes relevant on trial N) requiring more inhibition of task B. In contrast, the less 
recent inhibition of task A (in the control CBA condition) will result in a smaller 
difference in activation levels between task B and task A, requiring less inhibition (see 
Figure 6.3). The better one’s inhibition, the better one can suppress task B in the 
experimental condition with respect to task A, with this ability playing a lesser role in the 
control condition. Thus, in the experimental condition, better inhibition results in more 
difficulty in retrieving task A but a better ability to inhibit task B. Consequently, it is 
difficult to predict what the relation should be between the size of the backward 
inhibition effect and individual differences in other inhibitory control mechanisms.  
Local switch costs. Lastly, local costs are thought to be a measure of the ability 
to retrieve and update new task sets in order to switch between tasks (Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), with no influence from the 
requirement to maintain multiple task sets in mind (which is the same for switch and 
repeat trials). Such accounts assume a role for retrieval mechanisms in local switch costs, 
as task set retrieval is paramount to accurate switch trial performance (e.g., Altmann & 
Gray, 2008; Sohn & Anderson, 2001). While little work has investigated the relationship 
between inhibition constructs and measures of global switch costs and N-2 costs, 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) found that response-distractor inhibition provided a 
significant path to local switch costs in structural equation modeling. Friedman and 
Miyake suggested that response-distractor inhibition functions to filter out information 
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from the irrelevant task, once a new task set has been established (i.e., at a point of a task 
switch). As switch trials represent the first implementation of the newly relevant task set, 
response-distractor inhibition may play a stronger role in enabling one to overcome 
residual activation of the now-irrelevant stimulus features, in order to firmly establish the 
new task in working memory. Consistent with this hypothesis, a meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies found overlapping inferior frontal junction activation in both local 
shifting and the Stroop task (a measure of response-distractor inhibition; Derfuss, Brass, 
Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). Derfuss et al. suggested that this region plays an 
important role in updating task representations in the face of interference in both tasks 
(but see Nee et al., 2012, for an alternative interpretation).  
In contrast, Friedman and Miyake (2004) did not find a relationship between local 
switch costs and resistance to PI, with this lack of relationship being surprising based on 
some theories of task switching. As discussed above, Allport and colleagues (e.g., Allport 
et al., 1994) have proposed a critical role for PI as the source of local switch costs, as 
selecting between tasks involves resolving interference from recently activated task sets. 
This theory clearly predicts a relationship between local costs and resistance to PI.  
Goals of the Present Study  
The present study uses factor analytic techniques – specifically confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) – to achieve several goals. First, previous work has not consistently 
replicated the loadings and distinctions between inhibition factors, as found by Friedman 
and Miyake (2004). However, other research does support the notion that these factors 
are in some way distinct from each other; for example, inhibition factors make 
differential contributions to performance on other cognitive tasks (e.g., Friedman & 
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Miyake, 2004) and they show different patterns of decline with age (e.g., Chapter 4). The 
first goal, then, is to determine whether the results of Friedman and Miyake can be 
replicated in a different sample. Second, as discussed above, a fair amount of work 
suggests a critical role for interference resolution in task switching, though not much 
research has investigated whether individual differences in different types of inhibition 
and other WM functions relate to various aspects of task switching. Not only is this an 
important issue for understanding the mechanisms that allow us to switch between tasks, 
but the findings may show that inhibition constructs may be dissociated in how they 
relate to the shifting component of executive function. The second goal, then, is to 
develop a better understanding of the mechanisms that allow us to flexibly switch 
between tasks by investigating how inhibitory and WM control processes differentially 
contribute to global switch costs, N-2 repetition costs, and local switch costs.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 162 individuals from two age groups: 102 young adults between 
the age of 18 and 32 (M = 21, SD = 3.08) and 60 older adults between the age of 64 and 
87 (M = 71, SD = 4.96). As described in Chapter 3, older adults were screened for both 
neurological disorders and cognitive impairment using the Mini-Mental State 
Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975; Folstein, Folstein, McHugh, 
& Fanjiang, 2001). Performance on background measures (e.g., WM, vocabulary, and 
processing speed) was reviewed in Chapter 4, and will not be repeated here.  
Materials 
All task details are thoroughly reviewed in the Method Chapter (Chapter 3). 
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However, the tasks relevant to the present work – and their dependent variables – are 
briefly summarized below.  
Response-Distractor Inhibition Tasks 
Picture-word interference task (PWI). In the PWI task (e.g., Lupker, 1979; 
Schriefers, Meyer & Levelt, 2002), subjects named a presented picture while ignoring the 
super-imposed distractor word. Pictures were seen in semantically related (i.e., 
interference) and semantically unrelated (i.e., no interference) conditions. The dependent 
variable was the semantic interference effect, measured as the log RT difference between 
semantically related and semantically unrelated trials. 
Nonverbal Stroop task. In the nonverbal Stroop task (Hamilton & Martin, 2005), 
subjects pressed a button to indicate the direction an arrow was pointing (right, left), 
while ignoring the arrow’s spatial location on the screen (right, central, left). The 
dependent variable was the log RT Stroop effect, measured as the difference between 
incongruent and neutral trials.  
Stroop task. In the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), subjects saw a colored word or 
string of asterisks and their task was to name the color of the ink while ignoring the 
written text. The dependent variable was the log RT Stroop effect, measured as the 
difference between incongruent and neutral trials.  
Flanker task. In the Flanker task (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; adapted from 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004), subjects saw a string of 7 letters; they responded to the 
central letter (e.g., KKKHKKK). The dependent variable was the log RT difference 
between incongruent and neutral trials. 
Resistance to Proactive Interference Tasks   
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One issue with resistance to PI tasks is that they typically involve recall, with a 
single trial oftentimes consisting of multiple memory lists (as in the release from PI and 
cued recall tasks discussed below). As a result, it is generally not possible to collect data 
on a large number of trials, given each trial takes a long time (relative to a single trial in 
the Stroop task, for example). As a result, these tasks’ difference scores do not yield good 
reliability (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004), as not many trials go into the reliability 
calculation (essentially exaggerating the difficulties associated with low reliabilities of 
difference scores; Cronbach & Furby, 1970). For example, the resistance to PI tasks used 
by Friedman and Miyake (2004) showed unacceptably low reliability (M = .10). 
Friedman and Miyake opted to overcome this reliability issue by using residuals as their 
PI measure. Because all of their PI tasks were recall tasks, they created a resistance to PI 
model that contained two latent variables. The “Recall” latent variable tapped 
performance on non-PI inducing trials, and the “PI” latent variable tapped performance 
on conditions eliciting PI. Friedman and Miyake then used the “Recall” latent variable 
(no-PI conditions) to predict the “PI” latent variable, reasoning that the leftover variance 
reflected “a combination of PI and measurement error” (p. 112).  
Given similar issues with difference score reliability on the two resistance to PI 
recall tasks used here (discussed below), the present study circumvented this reliability 
issue in a similar way as Friedman and Miyake (2004). As described below, performance 
on the two recall tasks (release from PI and cued recall tasks) was measured with 
standardized regression residuals, predicting performance on the interference condition 
from performance on the no-interference condition. However, unlike Friedman and 
Miyake, I did not develop “Recall” and “PI” latent variables.  
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Recent negatives task. In the recent negatives task probe task (e.g., Monsell, 
1978), subjects heard a list of three words followed by a probe word, and subjects 
indicated whether the probe word was in the previous list. This task contained three trial 
types: positive trials (probe word was in the list), non-recent negative trials (probe word 
was not in any recent lists), and recent negative trials (probe word was not presented in 
the most recent list (list n), but it was presented in the previous trial (list n-1)) The 
dependent variable was the accuracy difference between recent and non-recent negative 
trials, demonstrating a subject’s susceptibility to interference from previously presented 
(but now irrelevant) information.  
Release from proactive interference (PI) task. In the release from PI task 
(Peterson & Peterson, 1959; similar to Friedman & Miyake, 2004), subjects read lists of 8 
words that they recalled after a filler task. This task was administered in 10 blocks, with 
each block containing 4 lists. The first three lists were composed of items from the same 
semantic category to buildup interference; the fourth list was composed of items from a 
different semantic category, serving as the release from PI. For each list, proportion of 
correct recall was calculated. Given the small number of trials, and to circumvent the low 
reliability of difference scores, the dependent variable was the standardized residual 
predicting list 2 recall from list 1 recall.  
Cued recall task. In the cued recall task (Tolan & Tehan, 1999; similar to 
Friedman & Miyake, 2004), subjects saw either one or two lists of 4 words; following a 
filler task, subjects saw a category and were instructed to recall the most recently 
presented exemplar from the cued category. In one-block trials, the most recently 
presented exemplar (the target) was in the single presented list; in two-block trials, the 
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target was always in the second list. However, half of the two-block trials were 
interference trials, where both the first and second lists contained an exemplar from the 
cued category; the category exemplar in the first list was a lure. For each trial type, 
proportion correct was calculated. Given the small number of trials, and to circumvent 
the low reliability of difference scores, the dependent variable was the standardized 
residual predicting two-block control trials from one-block trials. 
Shifting Tasks  
Global switch costs and N-2 repetition costs. In the three-task shifting task (e.g., 
Mayr & Keele, 2000), subjects respond to a target based on the relevant cued task 
(“Number”, “Shape”, or “Size”). Subjects completed pure (or single task) and mixed 
blocks. This task design allowed for the measurement of two shifting DVs. Global switch 
costs were measured as the log RT difference between mixed and pure blocks. N-2 
repetition costs were measured as the log RT difference between N-2 repetition and N-2 
switch trials within the mixed block.  
Local switch costs. A subset of young adults (n = 92 of 102) was tested on a 
short two-task shifting task that allowed for the measurement local switch costs. As with 
the other shifting task, subjects responded to a target based on the relevant cue. Subjects 
completed 3 mixed blocks, and in each block, subjects responded to one of two possible 
tasks (i.e., within a given block, only two tasks could possibly be relevant). This task 
design allowed for the measurement of local switch costs: log RT difference between 
switch and repeat trials.  
Retrieval Task 
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A retrieval task was included to measure the ability to retrieve task relevant 
information residing outside the focus of attention.  
Sternberg recognition task. In the Sternberg recognition task (McElree & 
Dosher, 1989; Nee & Jonides, 2008), participants saw a list of five serially presented 
words. The last word was masked, then followed by a probe to which participants 
indicated whether the probe word was in the most recently presented list. Researchers 
have hypothesized that the most recent item (serial position 5) remains in the focus of 
attention and does not require retrieval; in contrast, earlier list items (serial positions 1-4) 
do require retrieval (e.g., McElree & Dosher, 1989). As a result, the dependent variable 
was a standardized residual predicting accuracy on trials requiring retrieval (i.e., ‘yes’ 
trials for which the probe matches a word in the middle serial positions) from accuracy 
on trials requiring no retrieval (i.e., ‘yes’ trials for which the probe matches the word in 
the final serial position, within the focus of attention). The difference between these 
conditions measures one’s ability to disengage from information and retrieve new 
information into the focus of attention (McElree & Dosher, 1989; Oberauer, 2002). 
Goal 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Inhibitory Control Constructs 
Data Processing 
Preliminary data processing for log RTs is described in Chapter 3. Two subjects 
were missing data on a single task due to experimenter error (1 on the PWI task, 1 on the 
Flanker task); additionally, one other subject was missing data on the Stroop task due to 
color blindness. To avoid excluding these three subjects, missing values were predicted 
using multiple imputation in SPSS. Given these were all response-distractor inhibition 
tasks, missing values were predicted with a regression algorithm including the 
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incongruent and neutral trials of the other response-distractor inhibition tasks. From these 
predicted values, difference scores were calculated. Additionally, because the sample 
includes both young and older adults, age was included in this imputation model as a 
categorical variable.  
Transformations and Outlier Analyses 
Proportion correct measures (i.e., resistance to PI dependent variables) were 
arcsine transformed (as done by Miyake et al., 2000; see Judd & McClelland, 1989). 
Prior to any other outlier analysis, the skew and kurtosis of each dependent variable were 
first examined. If either skew or kurtosis values were unacceptable, additional 
transformations occurred. Specifically, for measures with unacceptable skew or kurtosis 
values, outliers identified as beyond three times the interquartile range were replaced 
with a value equivalent to 2.5 standard deviations beyond the overall mean. For the 
response-distractor inhibition tasks, this affected four subject log RT values (2 flanker, 1 
NV Stroop, 1 Stroop). For the resistance to PI tasks, this affected three subject values, all 
in the recent negatives task. For shifting measures, this affected one subject log RT value 
(global shifting). These transformations and outlier analyses resulted in acceptable 
distributional normality (i.e., skew and kurtosis, Table 6.1), as values less than |2| are 
considered acceptable for most purposes, and values less than |1| considered very good 
for psychometric purposes. The only exception was the kurtosis value for the Stroop task, 
though this value approached the acceptable range.  
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in Chapter 6. Descriptive 
statistics for log-transformed RT measures are shown in brackets below the RT values. 
Unless otherwise indicated, dependent variables represent difference scores. For the 
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resistance to PI and cued recall tasks, descriptive statistics are shown for the no-PI and PI 
conditions, as well as the standardized residual that was used in the model. 
 DV M SD Range Skew Kurtosis Reliability 
Response-Distractor Inhibition       
PWI RT 45 41 (-81, 161) 0.31 1.2 0.45 
 Log RT [.02] [.01] [-.03, .06] [-.24] [.90] [.26] 
NV Stroop RT 55 34 (-40, 152) 0.38 0.96 0.62 
 Log RT [.04] [.02] [-.05, .11] [-.18] [1.0] [.53] 
Stroop RT 194 115 (33, 640) 1.4 2.5 0.96 
 Log RT [.09] [.04] [.02, .23] [.85] [1.4] [.88] 
Flanker RT 75 44 (-52, 211) 0.21 1.2 0.5 
 Log RT [.04] [.02] [-.01, .13] [.32] [1.2] [.26] 
Resistance to Proactive Interference       
Recent negatives Accuracy .06 .08 (-.13, .30) 0.85 0.77 0.67 
Release from PI No PI (1-block) .92 .30 (.00, 1.57) 0.22 -0.05  
 PI (2-blocks) .75 .38 (.00, 1.57) 0.28 -0.54  
 Residual 0 1.0 (-2.8, 2.8) 0.16 0.19 0.31 
Cued recall No PI (List 1) .62 .18 (.11, 1.06) -0.02 -0.24  
 PI (List 2) .48 .16 (.14, .87) 0.22 -0.51  
 Residual 0 1.0 (-2.3, 2.9) 0.19 -0.03 0.59 
Task switching       
Global RT 743 363 (-72, 1805) 1.2 1.3 0.99 
 Log RT [.34] [.09] [.12, .68] [.28] [1.2] [.98] 
N-2 repetition RT 66 81 (-128, 366) 0.61 1.2 0.33 
 Log RT [.02] [.02] [-.03, .09] [.32] [.32] [.28] 
Local (n = 92) RT 82 94 (-249, 278) -0.27 1 0.56 
 Log RT [.05] [.04] [-.05, .17] [.23] [.39] [.54] 
 
Model Estimation 
CFA models were estimated in R (R Development Core Team, 2010), using the 
Lavaan (latent variable analysis) package (Rosseel, 2010). For each model reported 
below, model fit was evaluated via multiple fit indices, similar to Friedman and Miyake 
(2004) and as recommended by Hu and Bentler (1998). The chi-square goodness-of-fit 
statistic tests model fit by assessing the “discrepancy between the sample and fitted 
covariance matrices” (Hu & Bentler, 1998, p. 426); for this index, a small, non-
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significant value indicates good fit (that is, a large, significant value indicates badness-of-
fit). In addition to this dichotomous fit index, other continuous fit indices were also 
evaluated. The standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) is an absolute fit index, 
measuring a model’s ability to fit sample data; SRMR measures the averaged squared 
residuals, with lower values (< .05) indicating good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Bentler’s 
comparative fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit index with range of 0-1; this index 
compares the fitted model to a restricted baseline model, with higher values indicating 
better fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Blunch (2008) maintains that CFI values >.95 indicate 
good fit.  
Additionally, two-factor models were compared to one-factor models using 
change in chi-square values across models. To do so, the chi-square value for the fuller 
model (that with fewer degrees of freedom; the two-factor model) was subtracted from 
the chi-square value for the one-factor model. A significant chi-square difference 
indicates that the one-factor model provides a worse fit than the two-factor model, given 
the loss in degrees of freedom. If multiple models provided good fit, and these models 
did not different statistically in cross-model chi-square comparisons, the principle of 
parsimony dictates that the simplest model is to be preferred, until alternative evidence is 
presented. All model factor loadings and other statistical analyses reported below use an 
alpha level of .05.  
Given the inclusion of both young and old adults, and previous inconsistencies in 
finding an response-distractor inhibition factors when processing speed was controlled 
for (e.g., Hedden & Yoon, 2005; Hull et al., 2008; Salthouse et al., 2003; Shilling et al., 
2002), models were estimated using log RT data for response-distractor inhibition tasks. 
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Use of log RTs controls for differences in processing speed on RT tasks, allowing for the 
investigation of task loadings independent of speed. For correlational analyses, factor 
loadings, and composite scores, all difference scores were multiplied by -1 so that 
positive values reflect better performance.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the seven inhibition and three shifting measures are 
shown in Table 6.1, for both RTs and log-transformed RTs (though analyses used log-
transformed RTs). For each task, internal reliability estimates were calculated using a 
split-half correlation, adjusted by the Spearman-Brown formula (see Table 6.1). 
Reliabilities were variable, with some being unacceptably low (e.g., PWI, flanker, release 
from PI, local switch costs, N-2 repetition costs), others being excellent (e.g., Stroop, 
global shifting), and everything else falling somewhere in between. These relatively low 
to moderate reliabilities are consistent with other executive function work (e.g., Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Rabbitt, 1997). Of note, the residual recall 
measures selected as dependent variables for the release from PI and cued recall tasks 
showed better reliabilities than difference scores based on correct recall between PI- and 
non-PI lists. For the release from PI task, the difference score (list 2 - list 1) had a 
reliability of .20 (vs. .31 for the residual). In the cued recall task, the difference score 
(two-block control trials - one-block trials) had a reliability of .47 (vs. .59 for the 
residual). Also of note, the residual measures were significantly correlated with the 
difference scores. For both tasks, these correlations were greater than .90 (release from PI 
task, r = -.95; cued recall task, r = -.94). Thus, these scores reflect very similar measures, 
though use of the residuals allowed for a gain in reliability.  
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Zero-order correlations between all inhibition and shifting tasks are shown in 
Appendix A for RT measures and Appendix B for log-transformed RT measures. 
Consistent with previous work examining individual differences in executive function 
(Borella et al., 2008; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000), RT correlations 
tended to be low to moderate. As seen in Appendix A, tasks hypothesized to tap a single 
inhibition construct (e.g., response-distractor inhibition) tended to correlate with each 
other, though some cross-construct correlations were also significant. One exception is 
the flanker task; the Flanker task failed to show even small correlations with any of the 
other tasks (correlations ≤ |.09|). As a result, this task was excluded from further 
consideration. As seen in Appendix B, in contrast, the log-transformed response-
distractor inhibition task correlations showed almost no tendency to correlate with one 
another, suggesting that previously reported RT correlations may reflect – at least to 
some degree – differences in overall processing speed. Despite these relatively low zero-
order correlations across tasks, it should be noted that, as done by Friedman and Miyake, 
this work goes beyond looking at simple correlations, instead investigating factor 
structures that fit the data and relations between cognitive control constructs and 
measures of task switching.  
Results 
Given that prior work has not found consistent evidence for a coherent factor 
underlying response-distractor inhibition (e.g., Hedden & Yoon, 2005; Hull et al., 2008), 
it was an open question as to whether a two-factor model inhibition model would provide 
the best fit of data, as found by Friedman and Miyake (2004). The two- and one-factor 
models for log RTs are illustrated in Figure 6.1. In all pictorial representations of the 
models, the number next to the double-headed arrows indicates the correlation between 
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the two inhibition latent variables. The numbers next to the left-pointing single headed 
arrows indicate standardized factor loadings of manifest variables on latent variables. The 
numbers next to the right-pointing single-headed arrows indicate residual error variance; 
according to Miyake et al. (2000), the square of these values provides an “estimate of the 
unexplained variance for each task, which could be attributed to idiosyncratic task 
demands and measurement error” (p. 70). Fit indices are summarized in Table 6.2.  
 The two-factor model is shown in Figure 6.1 (top). As shown in Table 6.2, the fit 
indices indicated good model fit. The chi-square statistic was far from significant (χ2(8) = 
1.56), indicating goodness of fit. Additionally, the SRMR (0.020) and CFI (1.00) indices 
indicated excellent model fit. However, the response-distractor inhibition factors (PWI, 
NV Stroop, Stroop) failed to load significantly on the response-distractor inhibition latent 
variable. While the correlation between the two latent variables was strong, it was 
nonsignificant (r = .75, p = .12).  
 
Table 6.2. Fit indices for confirmatory factor analysis models. The model providing the 
best fit is indicated in bold.  
Model df c2 SRMR CFI 
 Two-factor model 8 1.56 0.020 1.00 
 Single-factor model 9 1.78 0.021 1.00 
 
The two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model in which the 
correlation between the two inhibition latent variables was constrained to 1.0, indicating 
that the response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI inhibition factors are 
equivalent. (Using a correlation of 1.0 is equivalent to running a model in which all 
inhibition tasks (response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI tasks alike) load on a 
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single latent variable, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, bottom). This model, shown in Figure 
6.1 (bottom), also demonstrated good fit (Table 6.2). To determine whether the one-factor 
model provided an equivalent fit to the data, I calculated a cross-model chi-square test. 
This cross-model chi-square test was not significant (χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .64), indicating 
that the one-factor model provided an equivalent fit to the data. While this model fails to 
replicate the findings of Friedman and Miyake (2004), it is consistent with studies that 
have failed to find response-distractor inhibition factors when taking processing speed 
into account (e.g., Hedden & Yoon, 2005; Hull et al., 2008). 
 Concern might arise from the use of difference scores for measuring some variables 
(the three response-distractor inhibition tasks, the recent negatives probe task), and 
residuals for others (the cued recall and release from PI tasks). To ameliorate these 
concerns, I ran an additional model that used residual dependent variables for all tasks. 
The dependent variables for the cued recall and release from PI tasks were the same 
residuals as used in the above model. In contrast, the dependent variable used for the 
remaining four tasks was a RT and accuracy residual composite. For each of these tasks, I 
calculated residual effects for both the log RT and accuracy data, then averaged these two 
values. Thus, the dependent variable for these four tasks reflected both response time and 
accuracy. This model is shown in Appendix C. The patterns of factor loadings and model 
fits were essentially equivalent to the model just presented. Both the two-factor model 
(Appendix C, top; (χ2(8) = 7.903, p = .44; SRMR = 0.042; CFI = 1.00) and the one-factor 
models (Appendix C, bottom; χ2(9) = 7.904, p = .54; SRMR = 0.042; CFI = 1.00) 
provided a good fit to the data. As with the model discussed above, the one- and two-
factor models provided an equivalent fit to the data, as indicated by a non-significant 
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cross-model chi-square test (χ2(1) = 0.001, p = .97); thus, the one-factor model was 
preferred. Importantly, the pattern of task loadings for the preferred model is equivalent 
to that of the model discussed above (compare Appendix C, bottom to Figure 6.1, 
bottom).  
 An important point to take from the log RT model is the pattern of task loadings in 
the single-factor model. With processing speed taken into account, one of the response-
distractor inhibition tasks – Stroop – loads significantly with the other resistance to PI 
factors. Additionally, the existence of a single factor model, as well as the loading of the 
Stroop task on this factor, raises the question what mechanisms are common among the 
tasks loading on this single factor model. Possible explanations for this pattern of results 
will be explored in the General Discussion.  
Goal 2: Do Inhibition Factors Differentially Relate to Measures of Task Switching? 
There is strong evidence supporting the notion that inhibition and WM resources 
are involved in task switching, though task switching abilities can be measured by an 
assortment of different variables. The second goal of this study is to make progress in 
determining the role for inhibitory control and WM mechanisms in task switching. To do 
so, I investigated whether individual differences in the inhibition factor (as identified 
above) and WM predict shifting measures (global switch costs, N-2 repetition costs, and 
local switch costs).  
Results 
Variables and analyses. The relationships between inhibitory control, working 
memory functions, and task switching measures were assessed using multiple 
regressions. Regressions were run on log-transformed RT data. Above, it was determined 
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that inhibitory control is best reflected by a single factor model. As a result, inhibitory 
control was measured by a single inhibition composite score, computed by averaging the 
z-scores of the manifest variables loading on the single factor model (Figure 6.2, bottom). 
Composite scores were used because very little is lost in using these to estimate latent 
variable factors, even relative to factor scores (e.g., Alwin, 1973).2 Two WM measures 
were also included in order to investigate the contribution of WM variables to measures 
of shifting, as switch costs theoretically reflect some WM mechanisms (described in 
more detail below). Working memory capacity was measured by a WM composite, 
consisting of a z-transformed average of scores from the backwards span and operation 
span tasks. Additionally, retrieval was measured by a Sternberg recognition task residual, 
created by predicting accuracy on memory retrieval conditions from non-memory 
retrieval conditions. The correlations among the inhibition and WM composite scores, the 
retrieval residual, and switch costs are shown in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3. Correlations among the inhibition and WM composite scores, the retrieval 
residual, and task switching dependent variables used in the regression analyses. 
Correlations with task switching variables use difference scores (though difference scores 
are not used in the regression analyses). Asterisks indicate significant correlations (p < 
.05); asterisks within parentheses indicate marginally significant correlations (p < .10).  
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Single ‘inhibition’ factor - - - - - 
2 WM composite .49* - - - - 
3 Retrieval residual  .14(*) .24* - - -                                                         
2 Given I have the factor loadings of for each of the manifest variables, I also ran these 
same regression analyses using factor scores. The overall pattern of results was no 
different from those reported above for the composite scores.  
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4 Global switch costs .04 -.16* .004 - - 
5 N-2 repetition costs .07 .05 -.005 -.08 - 
6 Local switch costs (young only) 
-.12 -.09 -.04 .30* -.02 
 
Given the difficulties associated with difference score reliability (Cronbach & 
Furby, 1970), shifting variables were predicted by regressing the difficult shifting 
condition on the simple shifting condition, inhibition composite, and WM processes. 
Additionally, because this sample included both young and old adults, regression 
analyses also included age as a predictor (unless otherwise indicated), as well as the 
interactions between the age, inhibition, and WM variables. Overall, these regressions 
allowed the examination of whether inhibition and WM contribute to various aspects of 
shifting, as a function of age. Regression results are shown in Table 6.4.  
Global switch costs. Global shifting is measured as the difference between mixed 
and pure task blocks, and is considered a measure of the ability to coordinate, update, and 
select and single tasks among multiple in working memory (WM; Kray & Lindenberger, 
2000; Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001). Given that global switch costs measure the 
ability to successfully maintain and manipulate multiple task sets in WM, I also 
investigated the possibility that WM would make a significant contribution to the 
prediction of global switch costs. To address the contributions of these variables to global 
shifting, I regressed mixed block performance on pure block performance, inhibition, 
WM, age, age x inhibition, age x WM, and inhibition x age. Of these variables, only pure 
block performance (β = .64, p < .001) and the age x WM interaction (β = -.41, p = .02; 
see Table 6.4) made significant contributions to the prediction of mixed block 
performance. In contrast, neither age, inhibition, nor any of the remaining interactions 
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were significant. Additionally, these same predictors remained significant when the non-
significant interactions were excluded from the regression analysis (Table 6.5).  
To get a sense of the form of the significant age x WM interaction, I used the 
simpler regression model (excluding non-significant interactions, as shown in Table 6.5) 
and plugged in values for the predictors. The WM value was varied as 1 (reflecting good 
WM) and -1 (reflecting poor WM); similarly, age was varied as 21 (the mean age for 
young adults) and 71 (the mean age for old adults). To get realistic values for predicted 
mixed block performance, I inserted the mean for each age group on the inhibition 
composite and on pure block performance. Using these values in the regression equation 
allows for a visualization of how the varying levels of WM (good, poor) affect global 
shifting for the two age groups. As can be seen in Figure 6.2 (top), for both age groups, 
good WM is associated with faster (i.e., better) performance on mixed blocks. This 
suggests that individuals with better WM capacities perform better on global shifting. 
This main effect of WM was confirmed in a simpler regression, regressing mixed block 
performance on pure block performance, age, inhibition, and WM. There were significant 
main effects of pure block performance (ß = .85, p < .001) and WM (ß = -.20, p = .01), 
but not age or inhibition. Note that while the WM predictor does not receive a significant 
weight in the equation shown in Table 6.5 when the age x WM interaction is included, 
the values for the individual predictors going into the interaction are uninterpretable when 
the interaction term is included (Aiken & West, 1991; Dallal, n.d.).  
The interaction, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that WM 
decreases are more detrimental for older adults; older adults with poor WM (relative to 
good WM) demonstrate a greater slowing in mixed block log RTs, relative to young 
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adults with poor WM. This indicates that decreases in WM span have a larger effect on 
the global shifting abilities of older adults, compared to young adults.  
The role for WM is in line with previous descriptions of global switch costs (Kray 
& Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001), which propose an important role for maintaining 
and coordinating multiple tasks. Those who are better able to manipulate multiple tasks in 
WM respond more quickly on mixed blocks. The benefit can likely be attributed to the 
level of task uncertainty in mixed blocks, resulting in the need to keep multiple tasks in 
an activated state. 
 
Table 6.4. Regression results for the prediction of shifting variables from age (where 
relevant) inhibitory control, working memory measures, and the interactions among these 
variables. Asterisks indicate significant predictors (p < .05); asterisks within parentheses 
indicate marginally significant predictors (p < .10).  
Global costs: Mixed block  
 B SE B β 
Pure block 0.85 0.10 .64* 
Age 0.000 0.001 -.03 
Inhibition factor -0.03 0.06 -.08 
Working memory 0.02 0.03 .10 
Age x inhibition 0.002 0.001 .21 
Age x WM -0.001 0.001 -.41* 
Inhibition x WM -0.008 0.04 -.02 
    
Backward inhibition: N-2 repeat trials 
 B SE B β 
N-2 switch trials 0.95 0.02 .97* 
Age 0.00 0.000 .02 
Inhibition factor 0.04 0.01 .09* 
Working memory 0.01 0.006 .06(*) 
Age x inhibition  -0.001 0.000 -.09* 
Age x WM 0.000 0.000 -.07(*) 
Inhibition x WM -0.01 0.009 -.03 
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Local costs: Switch trials (young only) 
 B SE B β 
Repeat trials 0.81 0.06 .83* 
Inhibition factor -0.02 0.02 -.07 
Working memory -0.01 0.008 -.08 
Retrieval -0.007 0.006 -.08 
Inhibition x WM 0.002 0.02 .008 
Inhibition x retrieval 0.002 0.02 .006 
WM x retrieval 0.009 0.008 .09 
 
Table 6.5. Regression results for the prediction of shifting variables using simplified 
regression models. Asterisks indicate significant predictors (p < .05); asterisks within 
parentheses indicate marginally significant predictors (p < .10).  
Global costs: Mixed block  
 B SE B β 
Pure block 0.82 0.10 .62* 
Age 0.000 0.001 -.06 
Inhibition factor 0.03 0.02 .07 
WM 0.008 0.02 .05 
Age x WM -0.001 0.001 -.35* 
    
Backward inhibition: N-2 repeat trials 
 B SE B β 
N-2 switch trials 0.96 0.02 .97* 
Age 0.000 0.000 .04 
Inhibition factor 0.02 0.01 .06* 
WM 0.001 0.003 .005 
Age x inhibition 0.000 0.000 -.06* 
    
Local costs: Switch trials (young only) 
 B SE B β 
Repeat trials 0.80 0.06 .82* 
Inhibition factor -0.02 0.01 -.06 
WM -0.01 0.007 -.11(*) 
Retrieval -0.002 0.005 -.03 
 
N-2 repetition costs. N-2 repetition costs, also referred to as backward inhibition, 
reflect the degree to which previously relevant tasks are inhibited when deemed no longer 
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relevant. While researchers have taken N-2 repetition costs as a measure of inhibition in 
shifting, no work has looked at whether this type of inhibition reflects other inhibitory 
mechanisms, or WM mechanisms more generally. To address these questions for N-2 
repetition costs, I regressed N-2 repeat trial performance on switch trial performance, 
inhibition, WM, age, age x inhibition, age x WM, and inhibition x age. Of these 
variables, only N-2 switch trial performance (ß = .97, p < .001), inhibition (ß = .09, p = 
.01), and the age x inhibition interaction (ß = -.09, p = .03) made significant contributions 
to the prediction of N-2 repeat trial performance (Table 6.4). In contrast, none of the 
other variables were significant. Additionally, these same predictors remained significant 
when the non-significant interactions were excluded from the regression analysis (Table 
6.5).  
Although the inhibition predictor received a significant weight in the equation 
shown in Table 6.5 when the inhibition x age interaction term is included, the values for 
the individual predictors going into the interaction are uninterpretable when the 
interaction term is included (Aiken & West, 1991; Dallal, n.d.). When the interaction 
term is not included in the regression equation, there is a main effect of N-2 switch trial 
performance (ß = .97, p < .001) and age (ß = .05, p = .009), but the effect of inhibition is 
non-significant (ß = .02, p = .14). 
To understand the significant age x inhibition predictor, I again plugged in values 
for the predictors into the simpler regression model shown in Table 6.5. Inhibition was 
varied as 1 (reflecting good inhibition) and -1 (reflecting poor inhibition), and age was 
varied as 21 (young) and 71 (old). The predictor values of the other variables (pure block 
performance, WM) were fixed with each age group’s mean. As discussed above, 
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plugging these values into the regression equation provides predicted values that allows 
for a visualization of how varying levels of inhibition (good, poor) affect N-2 repeat trial 
performance as a function of age. As can be seen in Figure 6.2 (bottom), for both age 
groups, better performance was associated with good rather than poor inhibition abilities, 
though the difference was larger for the older subjects. That is, for young adults, 
inhibitory ability had little effect on N-2 repeat trial performance, whereas individual 
differences in inhibitory ability did effect older adults. Interestingly, this is the opposite 
direction than predicted by Mayr (2001), who hypothesized that older adults – 
presumably with poorer inhibition – would be faster on N-2 repetition trials (i.e., the 
ABA sequence) because poorer inhibition of the first instance of task A on trial N-2 
would make this task easier to retrieve when it again becomes relevant, on trial N. This 
point will be further discussed in the General Discussion.  
Local switch costs. Local shifting is measured by comparing performance 
between switch and repeat trials, within the mixed block. In previous work, Friedman and 
Miyake (2004) found response-distractor inhibition contributed to the prediction of local 
switch costs. The authors argued that switch trials require one to establish a new task set 
and in doing so, one must also establish what stimulus features to focus on (which in the 
present study, could be number, shape, or size). Filtering out irrelevant stimulus features 
is the key mechanism thought to be involved in response-distractor inhibition. However, 
switch trials also reflect the need to change task set (whereas this is not necessary on 
repeat trials), and as a result local costs are thought to measure the ability to retrieve and 
implement a new task at the point of a task switch. Given this, I also included a measure 
of retrieval reflecting the ability to retrieve memory representations into the focus of 
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attention (the Sternberg recognition task). This allowed me to examine the possibility that 
retrieval would make a significant contribution to local shifting. For local costs, then, 
switch trial performance was regressed on repeat trial performance, inhibition, WM, 
retrieval, inhibition x WM, inhibition x retrieval, and WM x retrieval; age was not 
included, as only a subset of young adults were analyzed.3 
In the full model (Table 6.4), only repeat trial performance contributed to the 
prediction of switch trial performance (β = .83, p < .001). None of the other variables, nor 
the interactions among them, approached significance (all ps > .20). Because the non-
significant interactions render uninterpretable the weights of the individual predictors 
going into the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991; Dallal, n.d.), I ran a simplified model 
including inhibition, WM, and retrieval – but excluding the interactions (Table 6.5). In 
addition to repeat trial performance (β = .82, p < .001), the contribution of the WM 
composite was marginal (β = -.11, p = .06). In contrast, neither the inhibition composite 
nor the retrieval measure significantly contributed to the prediction of local shifting. In 
contrast to some theories of local switch costs, which maintain that local costs result from 
the persistence of no-longer relevant task sets (Allport et al., 1994; see also Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004), the data from the present study failed to support a role for inhibition in 
local shifting. Additionally, these results fail to provide evidence for a role for retrieval in 
local shifting; however, the retrieval results should be interpreted with caution. These 
regressions included only a single retrieval measure, whereas the inhibition and WM 
composites were both measured by multiple tasks.  
Summary. In sum, the present results suggest that various factors contribute to                                                         
3 As discussed in the Method chapter (Chapter 3), only a subset of young adults (N = 93) 
completed this task because it was only administered if time permitted.  
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different aspects of task switching. I initially set out to investigate the contribution of 
multiple inhibitory control mechanisms to various measures of task switching. However, 
the present data suggest that these inhibition tasks are best represented by a single 
“inhibition” factor, and that individual differences in this inhibition factor make 
significant contributions to only one aspect of task switching, backward inhibition. In 
contrast, general WM capacity contributed to the other two aspects of task switching, 
including both global and local switch costs (though this later effect was only marginal). 
These findings will be further discussed below.  
General Discussion 
The present study had two goals. First, aspects of inhibitory cognitive control 
have oftentimes been discussed under the blanket term of “inhibition”, though response-
distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference do not necessary represent 
the same construct (e.g., Chapter 4; Friedman & Miyake, 2004). A question addressed 
here was whether previous psychometric distinctions between inhibitory processes could 
be replicated. Results of the present study suggest that this is not the case, as a two-factor 
model did not provide the best fit to the data, when controlling for processing speed in 
response-distractor inhibition tasks. Additionally, one of the supposed response-distractor 
inhibition tasks loaded significantly with the three resistance to PI tasks, raising questions 
as to what this individual “inhibition” factor actually measures, a point which is discussed 
below.  
Second, given that some theories propose a critical role for interference resolution 
in task switching, I asked whether various measures of shifting could be predicted from 
the measure of inhibitory control obtained herein. The goal was to better understand the 
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role for aspects of executive control and working memory processes in measures of task 
switching. The results showed that inhibition only contributed to a single aspect of task 
switching (backward inhibition), with working memory capacity playing a larger role in 
predicting other aspects of task switching.  
The Unity of Inhibitory Control Tasks 
In their seminal study designed to understand the organization of central 
executive processes, Miyake and colleagues (2000) found that the executive control 
processes of inhibition, updating, and shifting were both unitary and diverse in nature. In 
other words, Miyake et al. found evidence that these processes were distinct, in that tasks 
designed to measure individual aspects of executive control loaded on their appropriate 
latent variables; this suggests that these control processes likely measure processes 
distinct to each function (cf., Nee et al., 2012). Importantly, however, these executive 
control processes also showed some degree of unity insofar as there were moderate 
correlations between the three latent variables. Such unity raises the possibility that the 
executive functions share an underlying mechanism. The above point is highly relevant to 
the first goal of this study, designed to investigate whether inhibitory control processes 
are best represented by a one- or two-factor model of inhibition. Inconsistent with the 
findings of Friedman and Miyake (2004), a two-factor model did not provide the best fit 
of the data. Instead, only a subset of the interference resolution tasks loaded on the 
inhibition variable, suggesting inhibitory unity – that there is an underlying mechanism(s) 
that is common to these tasks. What might this unitary mechanism be? 
One possibility is that this common mechanism is the need for goal maintenance. 
For example, controlled attention accounts of working memory (e.g., Kane, Bleckley, 
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Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; Kane & Engle, 2002; see also Hasher & 
Zacks, 1988 and Munakata et al., 2011, for a similar view) maintain that WM capacity is 
determined by the ability to keep goal-relevant information active in order to maintain 
internal representations and avoid distraction/interference (see Friedman & Miyake, 
2004, for a similar discussion). However, the goal maintenance hypothesis has difficulty 
accounting for the pattern of factor loadings found herein. Specifically, it is difficult to 
imagine no role for goal maintenance in the nonverbal Strop and picture-word 
interference tasks. Both would likely require maintaining the task goal in the face of 
interference. In other words, the goal maintenance account does not as easily 
accommodate inhibitory diversity. When controlling for processing speed, only a subset 
of tasks load on the inhibition factor. In addition, inhibitory control processes do show 
evidence of dissociations in healthy aging, as older adults show relatively selective 
impairments on resistance to PI (but not response-distractor inhibition) tasks (e.g., 
Chapter 4).  
Recent executive control accounts provide a nice reconciliation of the patterns of 
task loadings found in the present study. Nee and colleagues (2012) proposed that 
executive processes may be best described as selection mechanisms acting on specific 
types of content (e.g., identity vs. location information), as opposed to being described by 
the functions they perform (e.g., response-distractor inhibition, resistance to PI, etc.). 
Evidence for this account, as well as the corresponding theory (Dual Selection ++), 
comes from a meta-analysis of neuroimaging research in which the authors found that 
executive tasks acting on the same type of content consistently activated distinct cortical 
regions. In contrast, there was much less evidence that tasks tapping the same executive 
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function activated consistent cortical areas. Nee et al., therefore, suggest that executive 
control processes may be organized similar to the ventral/what-dorsal/where stream 
distinction in posterior cortices (Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982). Under this account, 
executive processes are best represented by two selection mechanisms which serve to 
select information based either on a) its identity, corresponding to the “what” stream 
(e.g., identity, verbal/meaning) or b) its location, corresponding to the “where” stream 
(e.g., spatial location). These distinct selection mechanisms are thought to provide top-
down biasing to their respective posterior processing streams, essentially assigning 
attentional priority to representations that warrant further processing as a function of 
goal-relevance. And, in addition to the dual selection mechanisms just described, Nee and 
colleagues’ Dual Selection ++ model of executive control also includes additional 
mechanisms for the maintenance of context/rules and goals (the ++ of ‘Dual Selection 
++’), thought to reside in more anterior prefrontal regions.  
So how does the Dual Selection ++ model fit into the above discussion of 
inhibitory processing? Remember that response-distractor inhibition measures the ability 
to resist interference from information that is currently present in the environment. 
According to the Dual Selection ++ model, response-distractor inhibition tasks may tend 
to rely on selective spatial attention – that is, top-down biasing to spatial location, 
enabling one to quickly and selectively process information in the presence of other 
concurrent, contextual distractors. In contrast, resistance to PI measures the ability to 
resist memory intrusions from information that was previously – but is no longer – 
relevant. This inhibitory control mechanism is typically measured by verbal/memory 
tasks, and may therefore rely much more heavily on the selection of identity information. 
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In line with this account, Munakata and colleagues (2011) have also recently suggested 
that inhibition can be best understood as a prefrontal biasing mechanism (see also 
Friedman et al., 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
From a theoretical standpoint, there are other ways in which response-distractor 
inhibition and resistance to PI differ. For example, response-distractor inhibition and 
resistance to PI may differ to the extent that they rely on goal maintenance versus other 
working memory mechanisms. In response-distractor inhibition tasks, goal maintenance 
may play a stronger role in guiding selection mechanisms in the face of interference from 
irrelevant information (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). In contrast, 
goal maintenance may not be the most-demanded resource for recall or recognition tasks. 
Instead, resistance to PI may rely more heavily on binding mechanisms that allow for 
successful retrieval (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Oberauer, 2005). In recall tasks, 
binding mechanisms enable memory items to be distinguished from one another via the 
binding of to-be-remembered information to its context, such as other list items, serial 
position, or the list it was in. Such bindings play an important role in recall, especially 
when multiple items interfere across list contexts (as with the resistance to PI tasks used 
here); during retrieval (or identity selection, according to the Dual Selection ++ account 
of Nee et al., 2012), binding mechanisms would function to enable item discrimination 
based on context.  
Why, then, does the Stoop load with these identity selection/binding tasks? The 
answer to this question may lie in the role for binding, with binding providing a possible 
mechanism uniting the manifest variables. Specifically, all of tasks that load on the 
inhibition factor may rely on binding mechanisms. While the role for binding in PI tasks 
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was discussed above, the role for binding mechanisms in the Stroop task needs to be 
further elaborated. Specifically, Stroop targets and distractors overlap in space, making 
spatial selection mechanisms ineffective. As a result, identity selection must be used on 
this task. Beyond selection mechanisms, however, the Stroop task may also involve 
binding mechanisms that function to create a strong association between the task goal and 
stimulus attributes (Kimberg & Farah, 1993). When these bindings are weak, subjects are 
less able to select the relevant identity information, given the co-activation of the target 
color and distractor color word in incongruent trials. Supporting the notion that the 
Stroop task involves similar binding mechanisms as resistance to PI tasks, Kimberg and 
Farah (1993) successfully modeled various frontal/executive deficits using a reduction in 
the association among elements in working memory. And critically, damage to this single 
binding mechanism was able to account for impaired performance on the Stroop task as 
well as a memory for context task. 
One strength of the above account is that it can also accommodate dissociations in 
aging. As discussed above, recent evidence has suggested that older adults show 
exaggerated interference in resistance to PI tasks, whereas consistent impairments on 
response-distractor inhibition tasks are not evident (Chapter 4; see also Verhaeghen & 
Cerella, 2002). However, as found in Chapter 4, older adults did show impairments on 
the Stroop task. Accordingly, it may be that selection mechanisms show little to no 
deterioration with age (e.g., Persson et al., 2004), but that older adults show impairments 
in binding mechanisms. In fact, Oberauer (2005; see also Hedden & Park, 2003 for a 
similar account) suggested that age effects in PI tasks may be better interpreted as 
binding deficits, as opposed to inhibition deficits (see also Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; 
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Dennis et al., 2008; Howard, Kahana, & Wingfield 2006; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, Mather, & D'Esposito, 2000). Specifically, 
Oberauer found that older adults showed impaired performance on recognition tasks that 
required resistance to PI and content-context binding, but also on tasks that required only 
binding. As discussed above, binding may play a minimal role in response-distractor 
inhibition tasks whose stimuli allow for the use of spatial selection mechanisms, versus a 
more critical role in tasks that necessitate a strong association between content and 
context.  
This hypothesis makes the clear prediction that older adults should not show 
deficits in identity selection tasks that do not require binding mechanisms. Consistent 
with this prediction, older adults did not show impaired performance on a verb generation 
task, in which subjects are presented with a noun and are asked to produce an associated 
verb. The critical contrast is between high selection nouns, which have many associated 
verbs (e.g., map: open, close, read, draw, etc.; example from Martin & Cheng, 2006), and 
low selection conditions (scissors: cut; example from Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004) in 
which a single verb is highly associated with the target noun. Behaviorally, Persson et al. 
found that older adults showed no performance differences from young adults (though 
older adults did differ in patterns of neural recruitment). Clearly further work is required 
to test this account. However, this account suggests that intact selection mechanisms 
enable appropriate and correct retrieval of relevant information under some conditions, 
whereas failed binding mechanisms increase the likelihood that this retrieval mechanism 
will fail when there is a need to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information 
in memory, thus resulting in exaggerated PI. 
  130 
An additional question concerns the role for inhibition in “inhibition tasks”; that 
is, do selection/biasing-type accounts (Munakata et al., 2011; Nee et al., 2012) mean 
inhibition-type tasks do not use inhibitory functions – only selective attention? Not 
necessarily. Munakata and colleagues (see also Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001) suggest that while prefrontal regions do provide top-down biasing, 
functioning to enhance the activation of goal-relevant representations in posterior 
cortices, such biased activation results in indirect competition between representations. 
According to these types of accounts, the activation of task-relevant representations 
results in lateral inhibition of competing representations to facilitate selection. Thus, it is 
possible for “inhibition” tasks to still involve inhibition – though according to these sorts 
of accounts, inhibition is simply a by-product of selective attention (cf. Munakata et al.’s 
(2011) account of ‘directed global inhibition’ for an discussion of other aspects of 
inhibition).  
In summary, the first goal of this study was to investigate whether inhibition can 
be best represented by multiple inhibition constructs, as suggested by Friedman and 
Miyake (2004). The present study failed to replicate their results, as a single factor model 
provided the best fit to the data. To summarize the above, I have suggested that all of the 
so-called inhibitory control tasks involve selective attention mechanisms. In addition to 
this, however, a subset of the tasks also involve binding mechanisms, accounting for the 
emergence of a one-factor model. Note that this interpretation does not rely on 
executively controlled/frontally mediated inhibition mechanisms. Instead, this 
interpretation banks on frameworks that suggest a top-down, frontal biasing or selection 
mechanism acting on posterior regions, reducing the notion of executively controlled 
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inhibition to selection mechanisms that result in automatic, lateral inhibition (e.g., 
Munakata et al., 2011). 
The Role for Control Processes in Shifting  
The initial goal was to investigate the role for inhibitory control mechanisms in 
shifting, given that theories of task switching propose a critical role for interference 
resolution in switching between tasks. Under such theories, it makes sense to ask whether 
different types of inhibitory control mechanisms make different contributions to measures 
of task switching. However, as just discussed, there was little support for multiple 
inhibitory control mechanisms in the present study (cf. Chapter 4; Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). Because only one factor was obtained, regression analyses were used to assess the 
relationship of the single inhibitory control factor and WM measures with global shifting, 
N-2 repetition effects, and local shifting. Each shifting measure will be discussed below.  
Role for working memory mechanisms in shifting. In task switching 
paradigms, switch costs are only found when the stimuli are bivalent and therefore elicit 
multiple possible tasks (Jersild, 1927; Spector & Biederman, 1976). For example, 
switching between producing an antonym of a word and subtracting three from a number 
results in no switch costs, whereas switching between adding and subtracting three from a 
list of numbers does result in switch costs. Switch costs, then, are only found when both 
tasks are performed on the same set of stimuli. As a result, switch costs depend, at least in 
part, on overlapping task features, which have the potential to result in task uncertainty 
and task set interference. Given this, researchers have proposed that individuals adopt 
task sets, which are “mental representations that enable the person to act in accordance to 
task requirements” (Kiesel et al., 2010). Such task sets are thought to consist of an 
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association or binding between multiple internal control templates, including the task 
goal and possible task-relevant responses as well as their corresponding stimulus-
response (S-R) mappings. Critically, task sets should be instantiated at trial onset, 
maintained through the trial, and changed or updated whenever a new task becomes 
relevant; at the point of a task switch, task sets must be retrieved or reconfigured. 
In particular, an influential theory of task switching has proposed that switch costs 
are at least in part determined by proactive interference from the irrelevant task set(s) 
(Allport et al., 1994). The logic of this theory maintains that when a task is to be 
performed on trial N-1, one activates a task set, allowing attention to be focused on 
specific stimulus features and the response to be made. When a switch in tasks is 
required, this now-irrelevant task set must be removed from attentional focus so the 
newly-relevant task set can be retrieved and take center stage. However, while the now-
irrelevant task may be removed from attentional focus, it is still maintained in an above-
baseline state, as it is likely to become relevant again within a short period; as a result, 
some aspects of the now-irrelevant task’s activation persists, and this persistence results 
in proactive interference (e.g., Allport et al., 1994), which is resolved via backward 
inhibition (e.g., Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000). This inhibitory process acts to delete 
the now-irrelevant task representations from attentional focus, enabling the instantiation 
of the newly-relevant task. However, this applied inhibition persists over time, making 
subjects slower to retrieve this task set when it again becomes relevant.  
The findings from the present work were inconsistent with this interference 
resolution theory, as the single inhibition factor failed to make a significant contribution 
to the prediction of global or local switch costs. This point will be further discussed 
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below. However, the present findings are consistent with the notion that aspects of 
working memory contribute to global and local task switching. Instead of interference 
resolution, working memory capacity made either significant and marginal contributions 
to global and local switch costs (respectively).  
As discussed previously, global shifting is measured as the performance 
difference between mixed and pure blocks. In mixed blocks, multiple tasks need to be 
maintained in an accessible state, as tasks change often. This is in marked contrast to pure 
task blocks, throughout which only a single task is relevant. Relative to pure blocks, 
mixed blocks require “sustained processes, responsible for maintaining [multiple] tasks in 
working memory, and updating and maintaining activation of the currently relevant task 
set” (p. 253, Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005). Consistent with this notion, it was found that 
global shifting was best predicted by an age x working memory interaction, reflecting 
individual differences in working memory capacity. WM made a negative contribution to 
global shifting – those with larger WM capacities demonstrated reduced global shift 
costs, which implies more efficient (i.e., faster) global shifting. This is consistent with 
views of WM which posit that working memory capacity reflects “attentional processes 
that allow for goal-directed behavior by maintaining relevant information in an active, 
easily accessible state outside of conscious focus” (Kane et al., 2007, p. 23). In order to 
easily switch between tasks, one must keep multiple task sets in an activated, easily 
accessible state – a function performed by WM, and measured by working memory 
capacity.  
Interestingly, the contribution of WM capacity to global switch costs interacted 
with age, insofar as decreases in WM capacity had a greater effect on the global shifting 
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abilities of older adults, relative to young adults. This finding is consistent with Mayr’s 
(2001) proposal that older adults have difficulty “in establishing and maintaining the 
relevant set” (p. 100). The present results suggest that this difficulty for older adults may 
be at least in part a function of WM capacity; lower capacity older adults have greater 
difficulty in maintaining multiple task sets in WM, relative to higher capacity older 
adults.  
Additionally, several models of WM pose a critical role for binding in 
determining working memory capacity (e.g., Oberauer, 2005; Oberauer et al., 2003, 
2008; Unsworth & Engle, 2007), raising the possibility that the relationship between 
global costs and WM reflects the ability to bind task information into coherent task sets. 
Mayr (2001) has suggested that a critical component of managing multiple tasks in WM 
is the ability to keep task sets separate from each other by having coherently bound task 
representations (i.e., task sets). While the present study cannot distinguish between a 
storage capacity vs. binding account, Oberauer and colleagues (2003) have suggested that 
these processes are closely related. Thus, global costs may reflect both. Interestingly, 
such a hypothesis is also consistent with the significant age x WM interaction predictor 
for global costs, as age differences in binding mechanisms (e.g., Howard, Kahana, & 
Wingfield, 2006; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, Mather, & D’Esposito, 2000; Oberauer, 2005) 
could also contribute to global shifting performance. However, again, the present study 
cannot distinguish between capacity and binding accounts.  
It was surprising to find that working memory capacity also made a significant 
contribution to the prediction of local switch costs, whereas the inhibition factor and 
retrieval measure played insubstantial roles. This was surprising because theories of local 
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shifting propose that switch trials reflect the need to retrieve and update the focus of 
attention with the newly relevant task set (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000), and in addition, 
such processes are likely interference-prone (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; discussed next). 
Thus, a role for retrieval would have been consistent with such theories. However, the 
lack of a role for retrieval can be interpreted within other theories of local switch costs 
that propose that retrieval mechanisms are equally involved on both switch and repeat 
trials (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Schuch & Koch, 2003, 2005; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 
2003). While retrieval may be more difficult or time consuming on switch trials because 
of the additional need to update WM with a new task set, the use of retrieval on repeat 
trials would not predict to independent contribution of retrieval mechanisms to switch 
trials (i.e., independent of repeat trials). Nonetheless, given the present study only 
included a single measure of retrieval, future work should investigate whether a retrieval 
composite would do a better job at predicting switch trial performance. 
It was also surprising to find no significant independent contribution of 
interference resolution to prediction of local shifting, given that some accounts propose a 
critical role for interference resolution in shifting (e.g., Allport et al., 1994). More 
specifically, it seems reasonable to assume that the requirement to sustain the activation 
of and retrieve multiple task sets would increase the likelihood of interference, especially 
given that task sets overlap with each other (e.g., targets elicit features of each task, 
stimulus-response mappings overlap, etc.). However, it might be the case that 
interference resolution did not make a significant contribution to the prediction of shifting 
measures because of the task design used in this shifting paradigm. In the present 
experiment, relevant tasks were explicitly cued by a word. Emerson and Miyake (2003) 
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have argued that explicit cues directly identify the task to be performed (e.g., the word 
“Shape” to indicate that subjects should respond to the shape of the stimulus), and 
therefore automatically trigger the relevant task set and allow it to be established in WM. 
This is in contrast to what occurs for implicit cues (e.g., the symbols “%%%%” to 
indicate the shape task) that only identify the task through a learned association of the cue 
with the task, and are therefore only indirectly associated with a meaningful verbal label 
(i.e., the task label “Shape”; Logan & Schneider, 2006) that would be retrieved when the 
cue is presented. In the present work, the use of such an explicit cue may have enabled 
the relevant task set to receive a boost in activation, thus facilitating the retrieval of that 
task set into the focus of attention. As a result of this facilitated retrieval, competition 
between task sets during retrieval may have been reduced. Such a hypothesis raises the 
possibility that both interference resolution and retrieval would play a greater role in 
shifting under less explicitly cued contexts – such as those using implicit cues or 
requiring that subjects use their memory resources to keep track of the relevant task (e.g., 
remembering to shift on every fourth trial). 
Instead, I found that the WM composite made a marginal contribution to the 
prediction of local shifting. While not explicitly consistent with the retrieval and 
interference hypotheses discussed above, it is in line with the idea that switch trials 
require that WM be updated with the just retrieved, newly relevant task set – whereas 
repeat trials involve task set repetition and therefore less (or no) role for updating. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies found 
overlapping inferior frontal junction activation in both local shifting and the Stroop task, 
and as a result, Derfuss et al. suggested that this region plays an important role in 
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updating task representations in the face of interference. Additionally, such a role for the 
executive process of updating is consistent with Oberauer et al.’s (2003) model of 
working memory, which proposes that “supervision” (along with storage in the context of 
processing and binding) is a distinct working memory function. Although Oberauer and 
colleagues opted to measure supervision as shifting in their 2003 study, they maintain 
that the executive functions of updating and inhibition identified by Miyake and 
colleagues (2000) also serve similar supervisory roles. In line with the role for such 
supervision processes in measures of working memory, Miyake et al. found that updating 
(but not inhibition or shifting) provided a significant path for predicting performance on 
the operation span – one of the WM tasks used herein. Thus, while slightly different from 
the interpretation discussed for global costs, the contribution of WM to local costs may 
reflect the ability to update the contents of WM at the point of a task switch. Consistent 
with this, Miyake and colleagues found a significant correlation (r = .56) between their 
updating and shifting latent variables, suggesting commonality between these supervision 
mechanisms. Additionally, while speculative, the notion that global and local switch costs 
reflect different aspects of working memory is consistent with research suggesting that 
these costs reflect distinct executive control measures (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; 
Mayr, 2001), though future work should include more process pure measures of these 
aspects of WM processes in order to explicitly test the above accounts.  
Inhibition in task switching. Authors have taken N-2 inhibition costs – or 
backward inhibition – as evidence that inhibition is applied to previously relevant task 
sets (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). And, while N-2 repetition costs have been replicated 
across a variety of shifting paradigms (e.g., Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 
  138 
2003; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008), little work has investigated whether N-2 
repetition costs reflect a specific type of behavioral inhibition. Interestingly, the results of 
the present study suggest that N-2 repetition costs are related to individual differences in 
interference resolution as a function of age, as measured by the inhibition composite 
derived from the confirmatory factor analysis in the first part of this study. More 
specifically, backward inhibition was best predicted by an age x inhibition interaction. I 
will first discuss inhibition and age alone, followed by the age x inhibition interaction.  
As discussed above, while it appears that individuals with better inhibition 
performed better on N-2 trials than did those with poor inhibition abilities, the main 
effect of inhibition was not significant. In contrast, the main effect of age was significant, 
with older adults demonstrating significantly slower performance on N-2 repetition trials, 
relative to young adults. This finding is in contrast to the original predictions of Mayr 
(2001), who hypothesized that individuals with poor inhibition (e.g., older adults) would 
show a smaller N-2 repetition costs. Mayr’s logic was that poorer inhibition of task A in 
the ABA sequence would make this task easier to retrieve when it again became relevant 
on trial N, resulting in faster RTs. To account for older adults’ dissociations between 
inhibitory deficits in some domains (e.g., Chapter 4; Hasher & Zacks, 1988), but not 
backward inhibition, Mayr proposed that “backward inhibition during sequential 
selection of mental sets is functionally dissociated from inhibition that is used to keep 
task-irrelevant information from interfering with task-appropriate settings” (p. 100), with 
the later type of inhibition being that which older adults show age-related deficits. 
However, the significant age x inhibition interaction questions this conclusion: the age x 
inhibition interaction in the context of a main effect of age suggests that individual 
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differences in inhibition have a larger effect on the backward inhibition of older adults, 
compared to young adults. While this finding does not establish that older adults are 
overall worse at inhibition than younger adults, it does show that relative inhibition 
ability plays a greater role in their performance than it does for younger adults, and that 
these two inhibitory mechanisms are not necessarily dissociable. 
One possible explanation for these results is that everyone (regardless of 
individual differences in inhibition) inhibits previously relevant tasks to some degree, but 
what is being measured here is the ability to overcome such inhibition via retrieval – with 
retrieval abilities being worse for some older adults. That is, even though the previously 
relevant task inhibited, individual differences in retrieval ability could compensate for 
what would have otherwise been slowed reaction times. To test this possibility, I 
regressed N-2 repeat trial performance on N-2 switch trials, age, inhibition, retrieval, and 
the interactions between these variables. With all of these factors included in the model, 
the contribution of N-2 switch trials was significant (ß = .97, p < .001), and the age x 
inhibition interaction was marginal (ß = -.05, p = .07). When the non-significant 
interactions were excluded, the age x inhibition interaction remained significant (ß = -.06, 
p = .04), whereas retrieval never served as a significant predictor. These results question 
this retrieval explanation, though again, they should be interpreted with caution as 
retrieval was measured by only a single task (as opposed to a composite).  
In contrast, a more likely possibility was raised by the concerns of Anderson and 
Levy (2007) in their discussion of the costs and benefits of inhibition. They pointed out 
that while both the N-2 repeat (ABA; the experimental condition) and N-2 switch (CBA; 
the control condition) trials involve inhibition of task B, the amount of inhibition required 
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across these two conditions is not equivalent. Because task A was less recently inhibited 
in the CBA (control) condition, the relative difference in activation between task B and 
task A is small (Figure 6.3). In contrast, because task A (trial N-2) was more recently 
inhibited in the ABA (experimental) condition, the relative difference in activation 
between task A (on trial N) and task B is large (i.e., larger than that of the control 
condition). Therefore, more inhibition needs to be applied to overcome the activation of 
task B in the ABA (experimental) condition, relative to the CBA (control) condition. In 
fact, the present results are consistent with this idea – at least for older adults. Older 
adults who are better at inhibition show faster performance on N-2 repeat trials, 
indicating that they can more quickly inhibit task B. Equivalently, older adults with poor 
inhibition are slowed in the ABA (experimental) condition because they are slower to (or 
less effectively) inhibit task B. Again, this finding suggests individual differences in 
inhibition mechanisms play a role in task switching as a function of age, while also 
providing experimental evidence for the idea raised by Anderson and Levy – that the 
experimental and control condition are not, in fact, equally matched.  
The finding that individual differences in inhibition were related to backward 
inhibition for older adults is interesting from a theoretical standpoint, as some authors 
have hypothesized that backward inhibition reflects the suppression of competitors during 
episodic memory retrieval (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003, p. 370) or the inhibition of items 
within WM that should no longer occupy the focus of attention (e.g., Bao, Li, Chen, & 
Zhang, 2006). For example, May and colleagues (May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999) have 
hypothesized that the deletion function (functionally similar to backward inhibition) 
works to delete no longer relevant information from the contents of working memory, 
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and is important for resisting proactive interference. As a result of this hypothesized 
function, we might have expected a main effect of inhibition in predicting N-2 repetition 
costs: those better at inhibition would also be better able to overcome interference from 
previously relevant tasks (or information in WM). While it is unclear whether individual 
differences in inhibition only affect the backward inhibition abilities of older adults, this 
relationship does raise the possibility that inhibitory control (as measured by the 
inhibition composite) and backward inhibition are somehow related. As suggested by 
Mayr and Kliegl (2003), “it is tempting to speculate that task-set inhibition and 
suppression of competitors during episodic memory retrieval may be identical or at least 
highly related processes” (p. 370).  
However, from the present results, one cannot determine whether these inhibitory 
processes are controlled, or instead reflect a more automatic form of inhibition such as 
lateral inhibition within local networks (e.g., e.g., Hübner, Driesbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 
2003; Koch et al., 2010; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Philipp & Koch, 2006; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010; see also 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Munakata et al., 2011). Such theories 
propose that inhibition is not under cognitive control, but instead, is a downstream 
consequence of selective attention mechanisms. Similarly, in task switching, “the idea of 
lateral inhibition in task switching suggests that task inhibition is a direct byproduct of 
task activation” (p. 636, Philipp & Koch, 2006). Importantly, such a mechanism is 
consistent with the account discussed in reference to inhibition, above, in which measures 
of inhibition reflect by-products of selective attention (Munakata et al., 2011) to spatial 
locations or identify information in memory (Nee et al., 2012). Thus, selective attention 
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to any WM item could result in lateral inhibition of competitors. While speculative, a 
recent study has provided evidence for the role for backward inhibition in switching 
attention between items within WM (Bao et al., 2006). However, whether backward 
inhibition is the mechanism used to clear the contents of WM should be further 
investigated in future work.  
Summary 
The goal of this work was to gain a better understanding of two aspects of 
executive control: inhibition and task switching. In doing so, another goal was to develop 
a clearer picture of the contribution of so-called inhibitory control processes to task 
switching. To summarize the findings, there was no evidence that the inhibitory control 
processes of response-distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference load 
on separate latent variables. Instead, only some of these inhibitory control tasks loaded on 
a single factor. The unity among these inhibitory control mechanisms was explained 
under the Dual Selection ++ model (Nee et al., 2012), which suggests that these 
inhibitory control processes involve selection mechanisms that are applied to different 
types of information (spatial vs. content). However, this is not to say that inhibition tasks 
do not involve inhibition, because the consequence of the application of such selection 
mechanisms is likely the automatic (or lateral) inhibition of competing representations 
(e.g., Munakata et al., 2011). Separate from selection mechanisms, what remained was a 
single factor model that included tasks for which binding plays a critical role. Thus, some 
interference resolution mechanisms involve not only selection, but also binding 
processes.  
This inhibitory control mechanism underlying the single factor played little role in 
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predicting global and local task switching performance, though other aspects of working 
memory performance predict these measures of shifting. In particular, individuals with 
larger working memory capacities were better able to manage multiple tasks sets in WM, 
which benefitted global shifting. Additionally, those who could more efficiently update 
WM with information from the activated portion of LTM (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000) were 
also better able to switch from one task to another on switch trials. In contrast, individual 
differences in inhibition related to backward inhibition; those better able to inhibit 
previously relevant tasks demonstrated faster performance on N-2 repetition trials, with 
effect being greater for older adults. In summary, these findings are consistent with the 
notion that working memory and executive control processes contribute to cognitive 
stability and flexibility, providing empirical evidence for the contribution of these 
processes in different measures of shifting.  
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Chapter 6 Figure Captions 
Figure 6.1. Confirmatory factor analysis models for inhibitory control mechanisms. The 
two-factor model is shown on the top, and the single-factor model is shown on the 
bottom. Significant values (p < .05) are indicated in bold. Values next to left pointing 
arrows indicate factor loadings. Values next to double-headed errors indicate correlations 
between latent variables. Values next to right pointing arrows indicate residual error 
variance.  
Figure 6.2. Graphical depiction of the significant interactions that predict mixed block 
performance (top) and N-2 repeat trial performance (bottom). The top graph depicts the 
interaction between age and WM, and its contribution to predicting mixed block 
performance. The bottom graph depicts the interaction between age and inhibition, and its 
contribution to predicting performance on N-2 repetition trials. 
Figure 6.3. Hypothetical activation levels of task sets as a function of condition (control 
condition CBA, experimental condition ABA), as discussed by Anderson and Levy 
(2007). 
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Chapter 7: Inhibition and Shifting:  
An Examination of Two Cases with Frontal vs. Non-Frontal Damage 
The notion that the frontal lobes play an important role in executive control has a 
long history in neuropsychological literature, as frontal lobe damage causes disruptions in 
various aspects of controlled processing. More specifically, as discussed below, a fair 
amount of evidence has suggested a critical role for frontal regions in aspects of both 
inhibition and task switching. The association between these two aspects of executive 
control and their similar localization in frontal regions provides a mechanism by which 
these two processes may interact. Specifically, given the role for interference resolution 
in task switching, damage to inhibitory mechanisms may affect performance on both 
inhibition tasks and shifting tasks. Thus, the present study investigates whether 
impairments to particular interference resolution mechanisms (response-distractor 
inhibition, resistance to proactive interference) are associated with impairments in task 
switching performance.  
Localization of Inhibitory Control and Shifting Mechanisms  
As discussed in previous chapters, inhibition is not a unitary construct, and may 
instead be better represented by (at least) two inhibitory control mechanisms: response-
distractor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference (PI). In particular, several 
independent research methods have provided evidence that these two mechanisms are 
distinct, including individual differences approaches using structural equation analyses 
(e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004), dissociations in healthy aging (Chapter 4), and 
neuroimaging studies (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007; Nee, Wager, 
& Jonides, 2007). As the first of these two distinctions has been discussed in previous 
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chapters, I will not belabor those points here. However, neuroimaging work has also 
provided converging evidence on this point, as these two types of inhibition involve 
different frontal regions. Response-distractor inhibition-type tasks such as the Stroop task 
tend to activate regions of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as well as right 
inferior frontal regions (see Nee et al., 2007, for a meta-analysis). The left DLPFC 
regions are thought to be involved in the resolution of stimulus conflict, perhaps via 
selective attention mechanisms, whereas right frontal regions are thought to play a more 
general role in response selection4. In contrast, Jonides, Nee, and colleagues (e.g., Jonides 
& Nee, 2006; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007) have implicated the ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC) in the resolution of interference in resistance to PI-type tasks. In 
particular, Jonides and Nee (2006) proposed that this region is involved in biasing 
memory representations that match an attentional template.  
More recent work by Nee and colleagues (2012) tells a slightly different story in 
the dissociation between response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI. Based on the 
results of a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, Nee and colleague propose that 
executive control (including inhibitory control mechanisms) may be better understood as 
two selection mechanisms that act according to task goals. More specifically, these two 
selection mechanisms are distinguished based on the type of information on which they 
act. While one selection mechanism primarily reflects selective spatial attention, the other 
primarily reflects the selection of identity information (analogous to the “what”/“where” 
distinction in posterior processing streams, e.g., Mishkin & Ungerleider, 1982). Nee and                                                         
4 It is important to note that although Friedman and Miyake (2004) were unable to find a psychometric 
distinction between response inhibition and distractor inhibition, there is evidence for neural dissociations. 
Whereas distractor inhibition tends to rely most heavily on left frontal regions, response inhibition (as 
measured by go/no-go or stop signal paradigms, for example) appears to rely more heavily on right frontal 
regions (Nee et al., 2007).  
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colleagues raised the possibility that response-distractor inhibition tasks tend to tap the 
selection of spatial information, while resistance to PI tasks tend to tap the selection of 
identity information. However, as with the above inhibition-based distinction between 
these two mechanisms, Nee and colleagues proposed that both of these selection 
mechanisms are localized to left frontal regions, again maintaining a critical role for this 
area in cognitive control.  
The role for frontal regions in executive control has relevance to research on 
patients with aphasia, some of whom have left frontal damage resulting from stroke. In 
particular, recent work in the Brain and Language Lab has focused on the executive 
control abilities of aphasic patients with short-term memory (STM) deficits (e.g., 
Hamilton & Martin, 2005, 2007), and the consequences of such STM deficits on 
performance on both executive control (Allen, 2010; Allen, Martin, & N. Martin, 2011) 
and language production and comprehension (Freedman & Martin, 2001; Hanten & 
Martin, 2001; Martin, 2005; Martin & He, 2004). In addition to their STM deficits, some 
of these patients also demonstrate impairments in inhibitory control mechanisms (e.g., 
Allen, Vuong, & Martin, 2010; Hamilton & Martin, 2005, 2007). For example, in one 
study, Allen et al. (2010) tested three patients with aphasia on measures of inhibitory 
control, including two response-distractor inhibition tasks and one resistance to PI task. 
Critically, only the patients whose brain damage included left frontal regions (EV, ML) 
demonstrated exaggerated interference (relative to controls) across these interference 
resolution tasks. In contrast, the patient (MB), whose lesion was restricted to posterior 
brain regions, showed interference effects that did not differ from age-matched controls. 
Thus, this dissociation between the performance of frontal and posterior patients supports 
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the notion that left frontal lobes play a critical role in interference resolution.  
Interestingly, however, EV and ML’s impaired performance on interference 
resolution tasks was found on both of the response-distractor inhibition tasks, as well as 
the single resistance to PI task included in the Allen et al. study. Similarly, in earlier work 
(Hamilton & Martin, 2005), patient ML was tested a resistance to PI task and three 
response-distractor inhibition tasks. Interestingly, he showed a deficit on the resistance to 
PI task as well as one response-distractor inhibition task (Stroop task), but not on the 
other two response-distractor inhibition tasks (nonverbal Stroop and anti-saccade tasks). 
That is, ML’s inhibitory control deficit was constrained to tasks that contained verbal 
stimuli. Such deficits across these different types of inhibitory control tasks fail to 
support the distinction between response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI, as the 
patients included in both of the previous studies have not shown consistent patterns of 
impairments across tasks tapping a single type of inhibitory control  (resistance to PI, 
response-distractor inhibition). However, both of these previous studies only included 
one measure of resistance to PI, and therefore one can ask whether these patients would 
have shown consistent deficits on other resistance to PI tasks, had additional tasks been 
administered. This question is addressed in the present study, as multiple response-
distractor inhibition and resistance to PI tasks were administered to two of the patients 
initially reported in the Allen et al. (2010) study.  
Some task switching mechanisms have also been localized to left frontal regions 
(e.g., Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Crone, Wandelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 
2006; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000), including both left 
(Braver et al., 2003) and bilateral (Dove et al., 2000) prefrontal regions. Similarly, patient 
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studies have also converged on the idea that left frontal regions are involved in task 
switching (e.g., Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Keele & Rafal, 2000; 
Mecklinger, von Cramon, Springer, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1999; Rogers et al., 1998; 
Shallice, Stuss, Picton, Alexander, & Gillingham, 2008), though some have hypothesized 
an additional role for right frontal inhibitory task switching mechanisms (e.g., Aron et al., 
2004; Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry & Keele, 2006). In particular, neuropsychological studies 
suggest that the switching and inhibition components of shifting are dissociable. Left 
hemisphere patients – and in particular, left lateral frontal patients (Shallice et al., 2008) – 
have difficulty in endogenously representing the relevant task set (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; 
Mayr et al., 2006). Task set representation seems to be particularly exaggerated under 
conditions of task set ambiguity, such as when the stimulus is bivalent, has the potential 
to activate multiple task sets, and the cue does not explicitly indicate which task is 
relevant on a given trial (e.g., Rogers et al., 1998). As a result, Rogers and colleagues 
have suggested that left frontal regions are involved in establishing the relevant task set in 
the face of interference from other tasks. More specifically, Rogers et al. state that left 
frontal regions “play an important role in the control of competing task set activity in the 
context of reconfiguring task set” (p. 837). It is important to note that this conclusion is 
conceptually similar to the hypothesized role for left frontal regions in interference 
resolution.  
In contrast, the right frontal regions may support the inhibition mechanisms used 
to suppress inappropriate responses or task sets (Aron et al., 2004; Mayr et al., 2006; 
Mecklinger et al., 1999). Aside from the possible neural association, what differentiates 
these two types of inhibition from those discussed above is the need to resolve 
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interference from an already-prepared representation. In response inhibition, for example, 
one must deliberately suppress a prepared response, for example, the suppression of a 
button press when a “no-go” signal is heard in the go/no-go task. Similarly, the inhibition 
of task sets – or backward inhibition – is thought to involve the inhibition of previously 
relevant, but not irrelevant, task representations. That is, backward inhibition is thought 
to be executed when task sets change, functioning to inhibit previously relevant (but now 
irrelevant) task sets (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). In contrast, resisting proactive 
interference and response-distractor inhibition both involve the selection of 
representations in the face of distractors, either in memory or in the external environment 
(respectively).  
For example, Mayr and colleagues (2006) have suggested that right frontal 
regions support backward inhibition, with the most convincing evidence coming from 
right frontal patients who showed decreased N-2 repetition costs, as would be predicted 
of individuals with inhibition deficits (Mayr, 2001; see also Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & 
von Cramon, 2005, for a similar suggestion; cf. Anderson & Levy, 2007). However, the 
findings across these right frontal patients were not consistent, and other authors have 
provided alternative interpretations for the role of these right frontal regions, such as 
overcoming persisting inhibition (Dreher & Berman, 2002) or providing performance 
monitoring processes in noticing when switches should occur (Shallice et al., 2008). 
But, while the interference resolution mechanisms of resistance to PI, response-
distractor inhibition, and backward inhibition can be distinguished from each other, 
several accounts propose a specific commonality among these mechanisms. Specifically, 
various accounts propose that these inhibitory control mechanisms result from selective 
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attention to relevant information, resulting in lateral inhibition of competing 
representations. For example, Nee and colleagues (2012; see also Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Munakata et al., 2011) propose that executive processes function through selective 
attention mechanisms acting on posterior cortices. When a representation is selected for 
processing, its competitors are inhibited. Thus, although the neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging literatures provide a possible dissociation between these inhibitory control 
mechanisms, theoretical accounts posit that similar mechanisms underlie each.  
In summary, the work discussed above suggests that left frontal regions may be 
involved in response-distractor inhibition, resistance to PI, and establishing a task set 
representation in the face of interference, whereas right frontal regions may be 
responsible for backward inhibition. Given this, it may be possible to find an association 
between inhibition and shifting impairments in patients with left frontal damage, though 
left frontal damage may not affect performance on measures of backward inhibition.  
Study Goals 
In summary, the goals of the present study are twofold. First, given we have 
access to a patient who has previously shown evidence of an inhibition deficit, is it 
possible to dissociate the inhibitory control mechanisms of response-distractor inhibition 
and resistance to PI? Along similar lines, given inhibitory control mechanisms primarily 
involve left frontal regions, we might expect to see inhibitory deficits present only in the 
patient with a left frontal – but not left posterior – lesion. Additionally, given the role for 
interference resolution in task switching – and in particular, a critical role for PI 
resistance (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) – we predict an association between 
impaired PI resistance and impaired shifting performance (or equivalently, an association 
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between intact PI resistance and intact shifting performance). To address these questions, 
two patients were tested on a number of response-distractor inhibition and resistance to 
PI, and also on a shifting task. The present study takes a neuropsychological perspective 
to investigate shifting by assessing patient shifting performance, and how it relates to the 
presence or lack of inhibition deficits. 
Method 
Patient Background 
Patients were selected for this study based on their previous performance on 
inhibition tasks (Allen et al., 2010); as discussed above, patient EV demonstrated 
exaggerated interference effects across a number of inhibitory control tasks, whereas 
patient MB’s performance did not significantly differ from age-matched controls.  
Patient EV. Patient EV is a 55-year-old right-handed female with a left-
hemisphere lesion incurred from a CVA in 2000. She completed 16 years of school, 
receiving her bachelor's degree in Accounting and was employed as a bank manager prior 
to her stroke. EV has a left frontal lobe lesion, including BA 44 and 45, with some 
extension into the middle frontal gyrus. Some insular damage is also present. EV's speech 
is relatively fluent, with some word-finding difficulties. 
Patient MB. Patient MB is a 64-year-old right-handed male with a left-
hemisphere lesion incurred from a CVA in 2004. He completed 13 years of school, and 
was employed as consultant/business owner both prior to, and on and off several years 
following his stroke. MB's lesion includes left parietal and superior temporal regions, 
posterior insula, and small subcortical infarcts of the right posterior lateral parietal lobe. 
MB's speech is relatively fluent, with a tendency for phonological errors, especially with 
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increases in word length. 
Both patients have been previously diagnosed with aphasia. Patients were tested 
on various background assessment measures, including single word-picture matching and 
auditory discrimination to measure speech perception, reading measures from the 
Psycholinguistic Assessments of Language Processing in Aphasia (PALPA; Kay, Lesser, 
& Coltheart, 1996), and short-term memory (STM) measures. These data are shown in 
Table 7.1. In the single picture-word matching task, patients saw a picture and were 
asked “Is this a ___?” (54 items; shortened version of that used in Martin, Lesch, & 
Bartha, 1999); patients indicated yes or no as to whether the spoken word matched the 
presented picture. In the auditory discrimination task, patients heard pairs of stimuli that 
were the same or different (N. Martin, Schwartz, & Kohen, 2006). Of the 40 items, half 
of the pairs were words and half were nonwords; non-matching pairs differed by one 
phoneme (e.g., for nonwords, /mErd/-/mErg/). In the various PALPA tasks (Kay et al., 
1996), patients saw a list of words that they were asked to read aloud, one at a time. 
Lastly, three measures of STM are reported: the word span task (Martin et al., 1999), the 
category probe task, and the rhyme probe task (both probe tasks, Martin et al., 1994). In 
the word span task, patients heard lists of one-syllable, three letter words that they were 
asked to repeat in serial order; testing started at a list length of one-item and continued 
until recall accuracy dropped below 50%. The category and rhyme probe tasks were 
designed to measure the short-term retention of semantic and phonological information, 
respectively. In both probe tasks, patients heard a list of words, followed by a probe 
word. Testing began at one-item lists and continued until accuracy dropped below 75%. 
In the category probe task, patients indicated whether the probe word was in the same 
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category as any of the previous list items. In the rhyme probe task, patients indicated 
whether the probe word rhymed with any of the previous list items. For all STM 
measures, spans were calculated via linear interpolation. For the word span task, I 
estimated the point at which accuracy would be 50%. For the probe tasks, I estimated the 
point at which accuracy would be 75%. 
As shown in Table 7.1, both patients demonstrate good performance on the 
assessment tasks of speech perception and reading measures. In contrast, both patients 
show reduced STM capacities. Given intact speech perception and reading abilities, 
deficits cannot be attributed to these aspects. Additionally, Glosser and Goodglass (1990) 
have suggested that patients with aphasia can show executive function impairments that 
are independent of their language disorders. Also, it is important to note that the two 
patients cannot be easily distinguished based on their performance on these assessment 
tasks; however, they can be distinguished on their lesion location, as EV’s lesion is 
restricted to left frontal regions whereas MB’s lesion is restricted to parietal regions 
(Figure 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1. Patient performance on background assessment tasks including speech 
perception, reading, and short-term memory. With the exception of the short-term 
memory task, all values indicate accuracy; short-term memory value is an estimate of 
memory span. Control means and variability are shown in the right column; unless 
otherwise indicated, values in parentheses indicate control range.  
  Patient EV Patient MB Controls a 
Speech Perception  
 Picture-word matching 95% 98% - 
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 Auditory discrimination 100% 100% 94.8% 
(SD = 5.7) 
Reading (PALPA)  
 30: Syllable length reading 100% 92% 98.9% 
(SD ≈ 0.23) 
 31: Imageability & frequency 
reading 
86% 91% 99.3% 
(SD ≈ 0.25) 
 32: Grammatical class reading  96% 91% 99.7% 
(SD ≈ .29) 
Short-Term Memory  
 Word span 3.0 2.6 4.8  
(4 – 5.2) 
 Category probe span 1.8 2.45 5.4  
(3.4 – 7) 
 Rhyme probe span 3.34 5.0 7.0 
(5.8 – 9) 
a Unless otherwise indicated, control data are from the reference cited with the task 
description. Martin et al. (1999) did not administer the picture-word matching task to 
controls, as they assumed controls would obtain perfect accuracy. Word span control data 
is from Freeman and Martin (2001). For PALPA measures, standard deviations are 
estimates; they were calculated by averaging the standard deviations across stimuli types 
within each test. 
 
Another concern might stem from the implications of STM impairments for 
performance on executive control tasks. For example, Allen and colleagues (Allen & 
Martin, in preparation; Allen, Martin, & N. Martin, 2011) have suggested a critical role 
for STM resources in supporting some aspects of executive control. This role for STM 
resources includes a contribution to shifting performance, but only with the use of 
symbolic (i.e., non-explicit) cues; in contrast, there was found to be little role for STM 
resources with explicit cues (Allen & Martin, in preparation). As a result, the memory 
demands of the shifting paradigm used herein are of little concern, given the explicit 
nature of the cue. Therefore, shifting impairments cannot be attributed to the task’s short-
term memory demands. And, while STM deficits may hinder overall recall levels in 
resistance to PI tasks, patient performance is not assessed as the amount of information 
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recalled, but the amount of interference demonstrated. It seems reasonable to assume that 
STM deficits would affect baseline and interference conditions equally.  
Procedure 
With two exceptions, patients were tested on unmodified forms the response-
distractor inhibition, resistance to PI, and shifting tasks discussed in Chapter 3 (and see 
Table 7.2). All response-distractor inhibition and shifting tasks were production or 
button-press, and these patients had previously shown a good ability to make these kind 
of responses (Allen et al., 2010). In addition, the recent negatives task given to healthy 
subjects only consisted of lists of 3 words, which was close to the span level of these 
patients. Thus, the response-distractor inhibition, recent negatives, and shifting tasks were 
tested on patients as described in Chapter 3. The two exceptions to using the methods 
reported previously for healthy subjects were for the two resistance to PI tasks that 
involved recall (cued recall directed forgetting and release from PI). Because of their 
reduced STM capacities, new versions of these tasks were developed for patient testing 
(described below); adapted versions contained shorted list lengths. For unmodified tasks, 
patient performance was compared to the older adults discussed in earlier chapters; for 
the adapted recall tasks, patient performance was compared to 5 new age-matched 
controls who had not previously been tested in this body of work (M age = 68; M 
education = 17.2 years). Patient testing took place over 3-4 one-hour sessions, with 
approximately one week between sessions. 
Cued recall, directed forgetting task adaptation. The original cued recall task 
contained lists of four words and a 8 second filler task that involved making magnitude 
judgments, indicating whether sequentially presented numbers were smaller or larger 
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than 50. The patient adaptation was similarly designed, with only a few changes. Patients 
were given additional practice with the task, totaling seven practice trials. List lengths 
were reduced to three words, with individual list items remaining on the screen for three 
seconds. Additionally, the filler task was changed to a sequential counting task, and the 
amount of time granted for recall was not time constrained. Otherwise, the same targets, 
list items, and probes were used as in the original version.   
 Release from PI task adaptation. The original release from PI task contained 
lists of eight words and a 16 second filler task that involved counting by both letter and 
number (for example, if a subject saw H-39, they would say “H-39, I-40, J-41…”) until 
cued to recall. In the patient adaptation, list lengths were reduced from eight to four 
items. More specifically, each eight item list was split into two four-item lists, with half 
of the lists tested in one session and the other half of the lists tested in a second session 
(lists from the same category were not presented in the same session). Additionally, 
individual list items remained on the screen for 2500ms, the filler task was changed to a 
sequential counting task, and the amount of time given for recall was not time 
constrained. Otherwise, the same targets and list items were used, as in the original 
version.  
Results 
Analyses 
To determine whether patient performance differed from that of controls, patient 
performance was compared to controls using a modified t-test argued to be appropriate 
for testing whether single cases differ from a control group (Crawford & Howell, 1998). 
Using this procedure, the standard deviation of a small sample was taken as an estimate 
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of the population standard deviation, and the individual (patient) was treated as a sample 
of N = 1. Patients and control data were then entered into a t-test formula to determine 
whether individual cases were beyond the 95th percentile for the control group. Crawford 
and Howell (1998) have shown this test appropriate for small sample sizes and 
neuropsychological research. For the present experiments, only patient effects (i.e., 
difference scores – not patient performance in each condition) were compared to controls. 
All t-tests were two-tailed, and all RT measures were analyzed on and reported as log-
transformed RTs. Inhibitory control deficits were indicated by significantly exaggerated 
interference effects (i.e., difference scores) or intrusion errors, relative to controls. Table 
7.2 includes a task list and descriptive statistics for controls and patients on all of the 
tasks described below; RT descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix D. Additionally, 
patient and control interference effects on response-distractor inhibition tasks are shown 
in Figure 7.2; interference effects on resistance to PI tasks are shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
Table 7.2. Patient and control performance on response-distractor inhibition, resistance to 
proactive interference, and shifting tasks. Italicized rows indicate the DV for which 
patients were compared to controls. Bolded values indicate patient values that were 
significantly different than controls (Crawford & Howell, 1998, p < .05). See also Figures 
7.2 and 7.3. 
 Dependent 
Variable 
 EV MB Controls 
M 
Controls 
SD  
Response-Distractor Inhibition  
Picture-word 
interference 
Log RT  
(error rate) 
Interference  
[semantically related] 
3.26  
(.08) 
3.15  
(.03) 
3.04  
(.03) 
.06 
(.03) 
  No interference  
[semantically unrelated] 
3.28  
(.03) 
3.13  
(.06) 
3.02  
(.03) 
.06 
(.02) 
  Effect -0.03  0.01  0.02  .01 
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(.05) (-.04) (.001) (.02) 
Nonverbal  
Stroop 
Log RT  
(error rate) Incongruent 
3.27  
(.22) 
2.85  
(0) 
2.84  
(.03) 
.07 
(.03) 
  Neutral 3.11  (.20) 
2.83  
(0) 
2.8  
(.01) 
.07 
(.02) 
  Effect 0.16  (.02) 
0.03  
(0) 
0.04  
(.02) 
.03 
(.03) 
Stroop Log RT  
(error rate) Incongruent 
3.36  
(.28) 
3.30  
(.11) 
3.07  
(.09) 
.08 
(.08) 
  Neutral 3.10  (.17) 
3.07  
(.01) 
2.95  
(.04) 
.07 
(.05) 
  Effect 0.26  (.11) 
0.22  
(.09) 
0.12  
(.05) 
.04 
(.07) 
Resistance to PI  
Recent  
negatives 
Log RT  
(error rate) 
Positive (yes) trials 3.20 
(.02) 
3.02 
(.08) 
3.09 
(.04) 
.11 
(.07) 
  Interference  
[recent negative] 
3.39  
(.08) 
3.13  
(.46) 
3.16  
(.12) 
.14 
(.10) 
  No interference  
[non-recent negative] 
3.22  
(0) 
3.10  
(.04) 
3.10  
(.03) 
.13 
(.05) 
  Effect  0.16  (.08) 
0.03  
(.42) 
0.05  
(.09) 
.05 
(.10) 
Cued  
recall 
Recall 
proportion 
Interference  
[2-block interference] 0.69 0.38 0.71 .13 
  No interference  
[2-block control] 0.77 0.69 0.91 .17 
  
 Effect 0.08 0.31 0.20 .12 
 Intrusions Intrusions  
[list 1 lure recall] 0.15 0.38 0.25 .10 
Release  
from PI 
Items 
recalled 
Interference  
[list 2 recall) 2.55 1.5 3.04 .78 
  No interference  
[list 1 recall] 3.25 2.85 3.68 .21 
  
 Effect 0.7 1.35 0.64 .61 
 Intrusions Intrusions  
[list 1 intrusions] 0.3 0.5 0.41 .33 
Shifting  
Global  
shifting 
Log RT  
(error rate) 
Mixed block 3.45  
(.01) 
3.20 
(0) 
3.19  
(.04) 
.16 
(.06) 
  Pure block 3.07  
(0) 
2.92 
(.03) 
2.85  
(.02) 
.09 
(.02) 
  Global switch cost .38  
(.01) 
.28 
(-.03) 
.35  
(.03) 
.12 
(.06) 
Backward Log RT  N-2 repetition 3.47  3.23  3.21  .16 
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inhibition (error rate) (.01) (0) (.05) (.06) 
  N-2 switch 3.44  
(0) 
3.17  
(0) 
3.18  
(.04) 
.16 
(.06) 
  N-2 repetition cost 0.03 
(.01) 
0.06  
(0) 
0.02  
(.008) 
.02 
(.02) 
 
Response-Distractor Inhibition Tasks 
Picture-word interference task. Control performance was worse on semantically 
related relative to semantically unrelated trials, indicating interference effects that were 
significant in log RTs (M = .02, SD = .01; t(59) = 11.95, p < .001), but not error rates (M 
= .001, SD = .02; t(59) = .36, p = .72). Patient EV’s error interference effects were 
significantly greater than those of controls; while her log RT effect was also significantly 
different than controls, the effect was the reverse of that shown by controls, as she 
demonstrated worse performance on the no interference condition. MB’s interference 
effects did not differ significantly from controls (Figure 7.2). 
Nonverbal Stroop task. Control performance was worse on incongruent relative 
to neutral trials, indicating interference effects that were significant in both log RTs (M = 
.04, SD = .03; t(59) = 11.41, p < .001) and error rates (M = .02, SD = .03; t(59) = 4.79, p 
< .001). Patient EV’s interference effects were significantly greater than controls in log 
RTs, but not error rates; however, it is notable that her error rates were very large across 
conditions (M ≈ .21), relative to controls (M ≈ .02). In contrast, MB showed no evidence 
of exaggerated interference effects or inflated error rates (Figure 7.2).  
Stroop task. Control performance was worse on incongruent relative to neutral 
trials, indicating interference effects that were significant in both log RTs (M = .12, SD = 
.04; t(58) = 22.20, p < .001) and error rates (M = 05, SD = 07; t(58) = 6.30, p < .001). In 
log RTs, both patients demonstrated significantly exaggerated interference effects relative 
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to controls. While neither of the patients’ effects were significant in error rates, patient 
EV made substantially more errors across both incongruent and neutral conditions (M ≈ 
.23), relative to controls (M ≈ .07), see Figure 7.2. 
Summary of response-distractor inhibition effects. Across all three response-
distractor inhibition tasks, patient EV demonstrated significantly exaggerated interference 
effects in either log RTs or errors, relative to age-matched controls. Additionally, on two 
of the inhibitory control tasks, patient EV’s error rates were substantially larger than the 
error rates for controls. In contrast, patient MB demonstrated significant interference 
effects on only one task, and his errors were minimal.  
Resistance to PI Tasks 
Recent negatives. Control performance was worse on interference (recent 
negative) relative to no interference (non-recent negative) trials, indicating interference 
effects that were significant in both log RTs (M = .05, SD = .05; t(59) = 8.17, p < .001) 
and error rates (M = .08, SD = .10; t(59) = 6.75, p < .001). Patient EV’s interference 
effect was significantly greater than controls in log-RTs, but not error rates; in contrast, 
patient MB’s interference effect was significantly greater than controls in error rates, but 
not log-RTs (Figure 7.3, though log RT effects not shown).  
Cued recall, directed forgetting. Control performance was worse on 2-block 
interference trials relative 2-block control trials, indicating significant PI (M = .20, SD = 
.12), t(4) = 3.83, p = .02. Neither of the patients showed significantly greater interference 
effects than controls (Figure 7.3), nor did they make significantly more intrusions of list 1 
lure items on 2-block interference trials. 
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Release from PI. Controls recalled fewer words on list 2 relative to list 1 (M = 
.64, SD = .61), and this PI effect was marginally significant, t(4) = 2.37, p = .08. Neither 
of the patients showed significantly greater interference effects than controls (Figure 7.3), 
nor did they make significantly more list 1 intrusions during list 2 recall.  
Summary of resistance to PI effects. Unlike the results for the response-
distractor inhibition tasks, neither of the patients demonstrated consistent evidence of 
exaggerated interference effects across the resistance to PI tasks tested herein.  
Task Switching 
Global shifting. Control performance was worse on mixed blocks relative to pure 
blocks, indicating significant global switch costs in log RTs (M = .36, SD = .12; t(59) = 
22.11, p < .001) and errors (M = .03, SD = .06; t(59) = 3.73, p < .001). Neither of the 
patients demonstrated significantly exaggerated global costs, in log RTs or error rates.  
Backward inhibition. Control performance was worse on N-2 repetition trials 
relative to N-2 switch trials, indicating significant N-2 repetition costs in log RTs (M = 
.02, SD = .02; t(59) = 9.79, p < .001) and errors (M = .008, SD = .02; t(59) = 2.71, p = 
.009). Neither of the patients demonstrated significantly exaggerated N-2 repetition costs, 
in log RTs or error rates. 
Summary of task switching effects. Neither of the patients demonstrated 
significantly exaggerated measures of task switching, relative to controls.  
General Discussion 
The goals of the present study were twofold. First, given the localization of 
inhibitory control mechanisms in the left frontal lobe, the present study investigated 
whether dissociations on inhibition tasks could be found across two patients – one whose 
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lesion included let frontal lesions (patient EV), and one whose lesion did not (patient 
MB). Second, given the hypothesized role for inhibition in task switching (see Chapter 2 
for a review), and more specifically the role for resistance to PI mechanisms in task 
switching (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; see Chapter 2 for a review), an association between 
impairments in PI resistance and shifting performance would be predicted, while an 
association between response-distractor inhibition impairments and shifting would not be 
predicted. The findings pertaining to these two goals will be discussed in turn.  
Patient EV, whose lesion included left frontal regions, showed evidence of 
consistently exaggerated interference across all of the response-distractor inhibition tasks 
assessed herein, whereas she only exhibited exaggerated proactive interference on one of 
the resistance to PI measures (the recent negatives task). In contrast, patient MB showed 
no evidence of consistent impairments across any of the inhibitory control tasks. These 
results demonstrate three interesting dissociations. First, looking only at patient EV, the 
dissociation between response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI tasks supports the 
notion that inhibitory control is not a unitary construct, and might instead be better 
represented by distinct inhibition factors, as suggested by psychometric studies 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004) and healthy aging (Chapter 4). Additionally, while there was 
no evidence for consistent resistance to PI deficits in the patients included herein, other 
work has found exaggerated PI. For example, patients with Korsakoff’s amnesia tend to 
show exaggerated proactive interference, suggesting that processes related to the 
resistance to PI can become impaired (e.g., Cermak & Butters, 1972; Mayes, Pickering, 
& Fairbairn, 1987). Additionally, Smith, Leonard, Crane, and Milner (1995) found that 
patients with frontal lesions (though not necessarily unilaterally left frontal) demonstrated 
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exaggerated proactive interference relative to patients with posterior lesions. In summary, 
then, neuropsychological evidence suggests that response-distractor inhibition and 
resistance to PI can be separately impaired (see also Chapter 4), and therefore care should 
be taken to distinguish among these inhibitory control processes, as opposed to using the 
broad umbrella term ‘inhibition’.  
The second interesting dissociation relates to the neural correlates of inhibitory 
control mechanisms. Only patient EV – with a left frontal lesion – demonstrated an 
inhibition deficit. In contrast, patient MB, whose lesion was more posterior and non-
frontal, did not demonstrate an inhibition deficit. At the very least, these results support 
prior neuroimaging studies that have suggested a critical role for left frontal regions in the 
resolution of interference in response-distractor inhibition-type tasks (Nee et al., 2007). 
With respect to lesion localization, patient EV’s left frontal lesion extended into middle 
frontal gyrus and insular regions, raising the possibility of damage to DLPFC regions, as 
implicated in response-distractor inhibition. Along these same lines, it is interesting to 
note that patient EV did not show a deficit across resistance to PI tasks, given that her 
lesion includes BA 44/45, which are ventral regions, and VLPFC regions are thought to 
be involved in PI resistance (Jonides & Nee, 2006; Nee et al., 2007; cf. Nee et al., 2012).  
Of note, the results of the present work cannot differentiate between accounts that 
distinguish between two inhibitory control mechanisms (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004; 
Hasher & Zacks, 1988) versus two selection mechanisms (e.g., Nee et al., 2012). Given 
many response-distractor inhibition tasks tend to depend on the selection of spatial 
information (i.e., the target’s location, irrespective of the interfering context), EV’s 
deficit on these types of tasks could indicate impaired selective spatial attention. The 
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distinction between these two accounts could be tested in future work by including 
multiple response-distractor inhibition, some of which depend on the selection of spatial 
information and others which depend on the selection of identity information.  
Lastly, the third interesting dissociation relates to patient EV’s performance on 
the three resistance to PI tasks. It is interesting to note that EV’s overall recall on the cued 
recall and release from PI tasks was within the range of controls, despite the fact that she 
has a STM deficit (Table 7.1). Additionally, she did not demonstrate exaggerated 
interference effects on these tasks, while she did show exaggerated interference on the 
recent negatives task. What differentiates these tasks is the presence or absence of filler 
tasks. Both the cued recall and release from PI tasks included long filler tasks between 
list presentation and recall (8 and 16 seconds, respectively), while the recent negatives 
task did not. Given this lengthy distraction, one might posit that these two tasks involve 
the resistance of PI from information in long-term memory (LTM). In contrast, the use of 
an immediately presented probe in the recent negatives assessed resistance to PI in STM. 
For EV, at least, her performance distinction on these PI tasks suggests impaired STM 
(see Table 7.1), but intact LTM. This posthoc dissociation should be interpreted with 
caution, as this only allows for STM/LTM comparisons across three tasks; therefore, this 
should be further explored in future research. However, it provides converging 
neuropsychological evidence for impaired STM in the presence of intact LTM, in line 
with other patient work (e.g., Warrington & Shallice, 1969; Shallice & Warrington, 
1970).  
The second goal of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
inhibitory control mechanisms and task switching abilities. To this end, if inhibitory 
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control mechanisms play a critical role in our ability to switch between tasks (e.g., 
Allport et al., 1994; Mayr & Keele, 2000), we would expect to find an association 
between deficits in inhibition and task switching. More specifically, theories of task 
switching have posited a critical role for interference resolution, as switching between 
tasks requires one to overcome the activation of the previously executed task. This theory 
of switch costs suggests a critical role for resistance to PI in measures of task switching, 
as both task switching and PI resistance involve overcoming interference from irrelevant 
information in memory. In contrast, the role for response-distractor inhibition in task 
switching is less evident (cf. Friedman & Miyake, 2004), given all trials require one to 
overcome interference from irrelevant stimulus attributes. Consistent with this notion, 
both patients showed shifting performance that was within the range of controls. While 
not particularly telling for the patient with parietal damage (patient MB), it is interesting 
to note that there was no association between patient EV’s deficit in response-distractor 
inhibition and shifting performance. Although this finding for EV is a null result that 
should be interpreted with caution, the result supports the notion that response-distractor 
inhibition does not play a critical role in measures of global shifting or backward 
inhibition. Future research should seek a patient with deficits to resistance to PI inhibitory 
control mechanisms, to see if those deficits are associated with shifting impairments.  
Summary 
In summary, the present study investigated the inhibitory control and task 
switching abilities in two patients – one with a left frontal lesion and one with posterior 
lesions. Supporting the notion that inhibition is not a unitary construct, but that at least 
some aspects of inhibition can be localized to left frontal regions, the left frontal patient – 
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patient EV – demonstrated a dissociation between inhibitory control mechanisms, 
showing a deficit across multiple response-distractor inhibition tasks, but no consistent 
impairment across resistance to PI tasks. As expected, patient EV’s inhibition deficit was 
not associated with impairments in task switching, consistent with the notion that 
response-distractor inhibition plays little role in global shifting or backward inhibition.  
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Chapter 7 Figure Captions 
Figure 7.1. Patient lesion montages. Patient EV is shown on the left, and MB on the 
right.  
Figure 7.2. Patient and control interference effects on response-distractor inhibition tasks, 
for both log RT (top) and errors (bottom). Error bars indicate 2.5 standard deviations 
beyond the mean of controls. Asterisks indicate patient effects that differ significantly 
from controls. 
Figure 7.3. Patient and control interference effects on resistance to PI tasks. Error bars 
indicate 2.5 standard deviations beyond the mean of controls. Asterisks indicate patient 
effects that differ significantly from controls. 
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 Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions 
Overview of Goals and Summary of Results  
Executive control allows for goal-directed behavior by enabling us to overcome 
interference from irrelevant information and switch between tasks in a flexible, yet 
organized fashion. While executive control processes are thought to include distinct 
mechanisms, they also demonstrate some degree of unity. To this end, my dissertation 
explored a) the organization of inhibitory control mechanisms and b) the relationship of 
these inhibitory control mechanisms with task switching. I will briefly discuss and 
summarize the results of each point in turn.  
Theoretically, inhibitory control is oftentimes consumed under the single term 
‘inhibition’. However, theoretical (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Kok, 1999; Nigg, 2000) 
and individual differences work (Friedman & Miyake, 2004) has suggested that it 
actually consists of multiple constructs. For example, Friedman and Miyake (2004) have 
distinguished between the inhibitory control processes of response-distractor inhibition 
(our ability to respond appropriate even when there are distractors in the environment) 
and resistance to proactive interference (our ability to resist interference from no-longer-
relevant information in memory). In contrast, others have attributed some aspects of 
inhibition – such as response-distractor inhibition – to nothing more than speed of 
processing (e.g., Hedden & Yoon, 2006; Salthouse, 1994) or selection mechanisms (e.g., 
Friedman et al., 2008; Munakata et al., 2011). Given this debate in the literature, I 
investigated the diversity of these inhibitory mechanisms using three methodologies: 
aging, individual differences, and neuropsychology. The evidence from aging and 
neuropsychology converged on the idea that inhibitory control processes do, in fact, 
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dissociate; however, the individual differences work suggested that from a measurement 
standpoint, some clarification is warranted. In aging (Chapter 4), healthy older adults 
showed consistent age-related cognitive declines on resistance to proactive interference 
(PI) tasks, but not on response-distractor inhibition tasks. Age-related impairments on 
resistance to PI tasks were interpreted in terms of failed binding mechanisms. 
Interestingly, the opposite dissociation was found in the neuropsychological work 
(Chapter 7), which tested two patients with left hemisphere brain damage. One patient 
showed a consistent impairment in response-distractor inhibition tasks, but not resistance 
to PI tasks. Importantly, these selective impairments (in aging, neuropsychology) to a 
single inhibitory control mechanism suggest that these mechanisms are not, necessarily, 
measuring the same thing. These results replicate the distinction between these inhibitory 
control mechanisms (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004), and provide converging evidence 
across a variety of methodologies.  
However, other considerations must also be made. In the individual differences 
work (Chapter 6), I found that the two inhibition constructs were strongly correlated, and 
in fact a one-factor model provided an equivalent fit of the data, with only a subset of the 
‘inhibition’ tasks showing significant factor loadings. To account for this model, I 
suggested that binding serves as the common mechanism uniting these tasks. That is, the 
Stroop task and all resistance to PI tasks require strong content-context bindings for 
effective selection to occur, given the need to retrieve information from both relevant and 
irrelevant information in memory.  
To account for the inconsistencies between methodologies, I propose that all of 
the interference resolution tasks involve selection mechanisms. Prefrontal biasing or 
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selection mechanisms function to enhance the activation of representations in posterior 
processing regions, effectively bias posterior representations to enable the selection of 
goal-relevant information. Additionally, these selection mechanisms result in lateral 
inhibition of competing representations (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Munakata et al., 2011; Nee et al., 2012). What allows for dissociations 
among response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI tasks is the difference in 
selection mechanisms used. In a recent model, Nee and colleagues (2012) have proposed 
that executive control mechanisms can be best described as selection mechanisms that act 
on different types of information, either spatial (location) or identity (what) information. 
Accordingly, they proposed that response-distractor inhibition tasks tend to rely on 
spatial selection, while resistance to PI tasks tend to rely on identity selection. 
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 6, several of the identity selection tasks also 
required binding mechanisms. As a result, this model provides lines along which 
response-distractor inhibition and resistance to PI tasks can be dissociated, while still 
allowing for some degree of unity.  
The second goal was to investigate the relationship between task switching and 
the inhibitory control processes discussed above. Various theories of task switching have 
suggested that switching between tasks requires one to overcome interference from the 
previously relevant task, suggesting a mechanism conceptually similar to that involved in 
PI resolution. Accordingly, some support was found for this hypothesis, as an interaction 
between age and the inhibition factor served as significant predictors for performance on 
N-2 repetition trials, in measuring backward inhibition. Potential explanations for this 
result were discussed in Chapter 6. In contrast, I found that working memory (WM) 
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processes contributed to both global and local switch costs, though future research should 
investigate the role for various WM mechanisms with more process-pure tasks.  
Given these findings, and the interpretations discussed therein, below I discuss an 
integrated model of working memory (WM) that is able to accommodate selection, 
binding, and inhibition mechanisms – while also being able to account for age-related 
declines across multiple domains of executive control. This model is predominantly 
influenced by – and a blending of – the WM models of Oberauer (2002; see also Cowan, 
1995) and Unsworth and Engle (2007), but includes the dual selection mechanisms 
discussed by Nee et al. (2012). 
Integrated Model of Working Memory  
The model discussed below is based on embedded-process accounts of WM, as 
exemplified by Cowan (1995) and Oberauer (2002). These models maintain that two 
general ‘regions’ contribute to WM: a focus of attention and an activated portion of long-
term memory (LTM). The focus of attention is a limited capacity system that holds 
information that is currently being processed, and according the Unsworth and Engle 
(2007), the focus is relatively flexible insofar as its content can be adapted according to 
task demands. Sometimes the focus of attention may hold a single goal, while other times 
it may hold multiple to-be-remembered items. The activated portion of LTM is a system 
that contains representations that are activated above baseline, either because they may 
soon be relevant to current processing, or because they were recently activated by task 
demands. These activated representations are thought to decay over time. In contrast to 
this, representations in LTM are at baseline – accessible, but not as easily accessible as 
representations in the activated portion of LTM. As task demands/stimuli change, 
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information can be moved in and out of the focus of attention via selective attention or 
retrieval mechanisms, which function to bias task-relevant representations. And, 
importantly, selection or retrieval is required to move information into the focus of 
attention. But, because of its limited capacity, older information must be displaced or 
cleared from the focus of attention. While some researchers have raised the possibility 
that backward inhibition may be used to clear the contents of WM (or the focus of 
attention; e.g., Bao, Li, Chen, & Zhang; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), this point is a question for 
future work. 
As suggested by Nee and colleagues (2012), selective attention mechanisms may 
be organized by the content on which they act, with there being two separate selection 
mechanisms (that likely function in similar ways): the first allows for the selection of 
spatial information, and the second for the selection of content/identity information. 
While the first of these mechanisms biases parietal regions in the selection of relevant 
spatial locations, the second may bias temporal regions in selecting among 
representations in memory. For both, lateral inhibition may serve as a consequence of 
these selective attention mechanisms, serving to overcome competition from competing 
representations (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Munakata et al., 2011). Similar to Nee and 
colleagues (see also Unsworth & Engle, 2007), I propose that these selection mechanisms 
are guided by the maintenance of a task goal. Goal maintenance includes a representation 
of task-relevant goals that serve to bias the representations on which selection 
mechanisms act.  
Critically, unlike selection of spatial information, selection (or retrieval) from 
memory is particularly error prone because it requires that one distinguish among 
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multiple irrelevant representations in the activated portion of LTM. Unsworth and Engle 
(2007) have suggested that this is a cue-dependent search process, by which task-relevant 
cues are used to restrain the search process. However, this successful search relies not 
only on goal maintenance (i.e., knowing what one is doing on this experimental trial), but 
also on binding mechanisms (as proposed by both Oberauer, 2002 and Unsworth & 
Engle, 2007). Specifically, the focus of attention may be used to bind object features 
together (e.g., content-context bindings), allowing these bound representations to be 
retrieved for future use. Such bindings are important because they allow for successful 
cue-based retrieval: when representations are well bound, retrieval will be easier because 
the cues will better distinguish among activated representations. In contrast, when 
representations are not coherently bound, cues may match multiple representations, and 
cause interference. Impaired or failed binding, then, may result in excessive proactive 
interference (e.g., Oberauer, 2005). Along similar lines, Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, and 
Wittman (2003) have suggested that working memory capacity reflects two processes, 
including binding and one’s ability to store information while engaging in ongoing 
processing. This model provides a possible link between the model described above and 
more general uses of the term “working memory capacity”.  
Advantages to This Model 
One advantage to the integrated WM model described in the previous section is 
that it has clear applications to a variety of WM and executive control tasks. Additionally, 
I believe it can clearly explain various patterns of spared and impaired age-related 
performance across different domains of executive control. That is, a preponderance of 
evidence has suggested that older adults show impaired performance on executive control 
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tasks, including measures resistance to proactive interference (e.g., Hasher, Chung, May, 
& Foong, 2002; Jonides et al., 2000; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999; McCabe, Robertson, & 
Smith, 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002) and global task switching (e.g., Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; Meiran, Gotler, & Perlman, 
2001; Reimers & Maylor, 2005; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Wasylyshyn, Verhaeghen, 
& Sliwinski, 2011). In contrast, there is less consistent evidence for impairments in 
selective attention-type executive tasks, such as response-distractor inhibition (Chapter 4; 
Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002) and local task switching (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; 
Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). As indicated by 
Verhaeghen and Cerella (2002), these two classes of executive processes differ in the 
extent that they involve the activation or maintenance of multiple mental 
sets/representations (resistance to PI tasks, global shifting) versus the active selection 
among simultaneously presented information. While such an account is likely accurate, it 
does not explain how age differences emerge, given that resistance to PI and global 
shifting may also involve selection mechanisms (see Chapter 6). In short, if all of these 
executive tasks involve similar selection mechanisms, what differentiates them in order to 
produce age-related impairments in some, but not others? I propose that binding is the 
critical factor that differentiates these two classes of tasks. Similar to the account put 
forth by Mayr (2001; among others, e.g., Dennis et al., 2008; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; 
Oberauer, 2005), I propose that older adults are impaired when successful performance 
requires selection among bound representations, but not those that require only selective 
attention. 
For example, across inhibitory control tasks, older adults perform normally on 
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(most) response-distractor inhibition tasks (Chapter 4) because these tasks rely on spatial 
selection mechanisms. Beyond age-related slowing (e.g., Salthouse, 1994), selection 
mechanisms are not impaired (see also Connelly & Hasher, 1993). While resistance to PI 
tasks also rely on identity selection mechanisms that slow with age, the tasks tested 
herein also necessitate binding mechanisms, which may become impaired with advancing 
age (e.g., Howard, Kahana, & Wingfield, 2006; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, Mather, & 
D’Esposito, 2000; Li & Lindenberger, 2005; Oberauer, 2005). Thus, older adults show 
exaggerated interference on PI tasks because they do not form strong content-context 
associations between items and their list contexts. If representations are not clearly 
associated with a context, performance is more interference prone. Additionally, once 
processing speed is accounted for, the residual need for binding among WM elements in 
the Stroop task (e.g., Kimberg & Farah, 1993) may explain why older adults oftentimes 
also show exaggerated interference effects on this measure of response-distractor 
inhibition, like their performance on resistance to PI tasks (e.g., Chapter 4). More 
specifically, given that the Stroop task’s distractor is a well-practiced response, one must 
maintain a strong association (i.e., binding) between the task goal and task-relevant 
stimuli because without this, the dominant reading behavior prevails. Such an account 
allows us to explain different types of interference resolution using a single mechanism 
that acts on different types of information.  
Additionally, similar logic can be used to explain seemingly contradictory 
patterns of age-related impairments on global shifting tasks: age effects are typically 
found when task contexts do not clearly indicate a relevant task (e.g., Kray & 
Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001), but are less consistent when this task ambiguity is 
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reduced (e.g., Chapter 5; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008; Kray, Li, Lindenberger, 2002; 
Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). The above model can account for these different effects by again 
calling on age-related impairments in binding mechanisms. 
According to Mayr (2001), a critical factor that determines global shifting is the 
ability to differentiate between task sets, with such differentiation being particularly 
difficult in mixed blocks, when the task environment is more ambiguous. That is, age-
related impairments are present when task sets cannot be easily differentiated, and 
therefore interfere with each other, because failed binding mechanisms make it more 
difficult for older adults to form and/or differentiate between task sets. Such failed 
bindings increase the likelihood that the irrelevant task set will be inappropriately 
activated due to cue-based retrieval finding matches within multiple task sets (i.e., 
involuntary retrieval). In contrast, when task set ambiguity is minimized, task set 
differentiation is facilitated, and age-related impairments are reduced, making binding 
failures less detrimental. In support of this binding hypothesis, Henkel, Johnson, and De 
Leonardis (1998) have suggested that older adults have the most difficulty in binding 
features in memory when distinct representations have some degree of overlap. In 
shifting contexts, bindings are needed to distinguish possible task sets to enable flexible 
behavior, as successful shifting performance requires that task sets be kept apart (Mayr, 
2001).  
Interestingly, the above model can also explain the lack of age-related impairment 
on local shifting tasks. That is, given the need to differentiate among and select task sets 
on switch (but not repeat) trials, why are age-related impairments not also found on local 
shifting tasks (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001; Mayr & Liebscher, 2001; 
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Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002)? In short, these ideas can be reconciled by assuming that 
switch and repeat trials involve similar processes. In particular, both trial types may 
involve the retrieval of relevant task sets into WM (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Koch, 
2003, 2005; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003). However, this retrieval process is more time 
consuming on switch trials due to the need to overcome PI from a recently performed 
task (Yeung & Monsell, 2003) as well as the need to overcome backward inhibition of 
the now-relevant task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Extending this logic to binding accounts of 
aging, young adults have less difficulty overcoming the PI that is present on switch 
because they have well-established (i.e., strongly bound) task sets; once they have 
established this task set in WM, they can relatively easily apply it on repeat trials. Older 
adults, in contrast, have weakly bound task sets; although they can establish retrieved 
task sets in WM (i.e., they can update the contents of WM when new task sets become 
relevant), the weak bindings result in more competition between sets, and similarly, a 
greater likelihood that the inappropriate task will interfere with performance. And, 
critically, weak bindings affect both switch and repeat trials equally. That is, older adults 
do not necessarily have problems in selecting among mental sets, but this selection 
process is made more difficult because of weak bindings. This account is consistent with 
Kray and Lindenberger’s (2000) account of age-related impairments in global costs, 
which proposed that “impairments of older adults are more strongly related to the 
organization of cognitive processing within working memory than to the specific 
dynamics of activating and inhibiting irrelevant stimulus-response sets” (p. 142).  
Lastly, the integrated WM account discussed above may also be able to explain 
the lack of age-related impairments in backward inhibition (as measured by N-2 
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repetition costs; see also Mary, 2001). If backward inhibition represents a form of lateral 
inhibition that is a down-stream consequence of selection mechanisms (e.g., Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Munakata et al., 2011), we might suggest that it represents an ‘automatic’ 
or neural inhibition mechanism, given controlled inhibitory mechanisms are not involved. 
As a result, we have no a priori reason to expect older adults to demonstrate exaggerated 
backward inhibition effects. In line with this, I have suggested that older adults do not 
show impaired selection mechanisms. If backward inhibition is a consequence of 
selection mechanisms, used to clear the focus of attention and/or resolve competition 
between activated representations, age-related impairments would not be expected if 
selection mechanisms are intact. Although speculative and worthy of future research, 
such an account is consistent with other findings. For example, Oberauer (2001, 2005) 
found that older adults are impaired at keeping information from intruding back into 
WM, but not in removing information from the focus of attention. Consistent with this, 
older adults tend to show impaired performance when information in memory interferes 
with current processing, but not on selective attention tasks (Chapter 4) or backward 
inhibition measures (Chapter 5).  
In summary, this binding account of age-related cognitive decline provides a 
unitary mechanism for explaining age-related performance impairments across a multiple 
cognitive domains, including memory and executive control. It integrates nicely with 
theories of age-related impairments in memory, such as binding impairments in source 
monitoring (e.g., Henkel et al., 1998). Additionally, it provides a way to account for age-
related slowing in processing speed, while not attributing all age-related impairments to 
the processing speed factor. This is especially important because some authors have 
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argued that processing speed-only theories of aging are too underspecified to account for 
the variety of age deficits found across memory domains (e.g., Balota, Dolan, & Duchek, 
2000).  
In summary, the above account proposes similar selection mechanisms for 
multiple executive function abilities, such as those measured by both inhibition and task 
switching. And, although I have argued that selection mechanisms can be used for 
selecting relevant information across a variety of executive tasks, error-proof selection 
requires that one be able to differentiate relevant from irrelevant information. Critically, 
such differentiation might be particularly difficult in the presence of loosely-bound 
representations. In such situations, active but irrelevant representations have the potential 
to be incorrectly retrieved and therefore result in interference. Thus, when binding 
mechanisms are successful, interference is reduced because representations can be clearly 
distinguished from one another. This account cleanly relates executive control processes 
– and age-related executive control declines – to theories of memory (e.g., Cowan, 1995; 
Oberauer, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2007) and attentional selection (e.g., Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
Future Directions  
There are multiple directions in which future research can proceed, though I only 
describe a few here. The first, and most obvious, is to conduct a similar study as done 
here, but include binding-only tasks (e.g., Oberauer, 2005) to verify that older adults are 
impaired on these tasks, and determine whether these impairments can account for age 
effects in resistance to PI and shifting tasks. The above account makes the clear 
prediction that individual differences in binding should be related to performances on PI, 
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Stroop, and shifting tasks. Consistent with this hypothesis, recent work by Guo (2012) 
using individual differences in young adults found that both inhibition and binding play a 
role in PI resolution. Along these same lines, given the proposed importance of binding 
mechanisms in explaining age-related cognitive decline, and important question for 
future work is whether binding mechanisms are amenable to interventions or training.  
Additionally, while I have used the term “response-distractor” inhibition 
throughout this body of work, a clarification must be made. I used this term because 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) initially classified the Stroop task as a response inhibition 
task (as opposed to a distractor inhibition task), along with the anti-saccade task and a 
stop-signal task. However, these response inhibition tasks were not distinguishable from 
their distractor inhibition tasks (hence the term response-distractor inhibition). However, 
none of my response-distractor inhibition measured the inhibition of an overtly prepared 
motor response, as in stop signal and go/no-go tasks. And, while Friedman and Miyake 
(2004) have suggested this type of inhibition to be indistinguishable from distractor 
inhibition, it is important to note that they did not control for processing speed – which 
might make a strong contribution to these tasks loading on a single factor. Along these 
lines, Munakata and colleagues (2011) have suggested that response inhibition may 
involve entirely different mechanisms than distractor inhibition. Therefore, it would be 
prudent for future research to control for processing speed in investigating possible 
dissociations between response and distractor inhibition.  
Lastly, from a neuropsychological standpoint, it would be fascinating to find the 
other side to the dissociation described in Chapter 7 – that is, a patient showing a deficit 
on resistance to PI tasks, but not response-distractor inhibition tasks. Such a double 
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dissociation would provide nice evidence for the distinction between inhibitory control 
processes (or selective attention mechanisms), as found in a meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies (Nee et al., 2012).  
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Appendix A 
Correlation coefficients for response-distractor inhibition (RT), release from proactive 
interference, and shifting tasks. Significant correlations are indicated in bold. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Response-Distractor Inhibition            
 1. PWI - - - - - - - - - 
 2. NV Stroop 0.13 - - - - - - - - 
 3. Stroop 0.24 .32 - - - - - - - 
 4. Flanker -0.05 -.08 .007 - - - - - - 
Resistance to Proactive Interference              
 5. Recent negatives 0.07 .02 .22 -.09 - - - - - 
 6. Release from PI 0.12 .18 .28 -.08 .10 - - - - 
 7. Cued recall .16 .11 .22 -.09 .13 .16 - - - 
Task Switching                   
 8. Global costs .09 .25 .48 -.08 .27 .11 .22 - - 
 9. N-2 repetition costs -.09 .18 .09 -.03 .01 .05 .09 .13 - 
 10. Local costs (young) -.02 -.04 -.05 .02 .02 .06 .23 .29 -.10 
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Appendix B 
Correlation coefficients for response-distractor inhibition (log RT), release from proactive 
interference, and shifting tasks. Significant correlations are indicated in bold. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Response-Distractor Inhibition              
 1. PWI - - - - - - - - - 
 2. NV Stroop .03 - - - - - - - - 
 3. Stroop .07 .07 - - - - - - - 
 4. Flanker -.01 -.002 -.04 - - - - - - 
Resistance to Proactive Interference              
 5. Recent negatives -.01 -.04 .16 -.12 - - - - - 
 6. Release from PI .07 .04 .26 -.11 .05 - - - - 
 7. Cued recall .04 .009 .14 -.16 .13 .16 - - - 
Task Switching                   
 8. Global costs -.13 .13 .05 -.03 .09 -.07 .002 - - 
 9. N-2 repetition costs -.01 .12 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.06 -.08 - 
 10. Local costs (young) -.16 -.03 -.03 -.06 .002 .01 .16 .30 -.02 
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Appendix C 
Confirmatory factor analysis models for inhibitory control mechanisms using residuals 
for all dependent variables. Of note, the preferred model’s pattern of task loadings are the 
same as those presented Figure 6.1 (bottom).  
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Appendix D 
Patient and control performance on response-distractor inhibition, resistance to proactive 
interference, and shifting tasks. With the exception of response time dependent variables, 
all values are the same as Table 7.2. The below table shows RT descriptive statistics, 
whereas Table 7.2 shows log RTs. RT patient measures were not compared to controls.  
 Dependent 
Variable 
 EV MB Controls 
M 
Controls 
SD  
Response-Distractor Inhibition  
Picture-word 
interference 
RT  
(error rate) 
Interference  
[semantically related] 
1935 
(.08) 
1368 
(.03) 
1101  
(.03) 
153 
(.03) 
  No interference  
[semantically unrelated] 
1971 
(.03) 
1336 
(.06) 
1045  
(.03) 
138 
(.02) 
  Effect -36  (.05) 
32  
(-.04) 
57  
(.001) 
40 
(.02) 
Nonverbal  
Stroop 
RT  
(error rate) Incongruent 
2191 
(.22) 
714 
(0) 
702  
(.03) 
116 
(.03) 
  Neutral 1299 (.20) 
674  
(0) 
636 
(.01) 
118 
(.02) 
  Effect 892 (.02) 
40  
(0) 
66 
(.02) 
52 
(.03) 
Stroop RT  
(error rate) Incongruent 
2263 
(.28) 
1963 
(.11) 
1194 
(.09) 
231 
(.08) 
  Neutral 1267 (.17) 
1153  
(.01) 
907  
(.04) 
144 
(.05) 
  Effect 997 (.11) 
810 
(.09) 
286 
(.05) 
134 
(.07) 
Resistance to PI  
Recent  
negatives 
RT  
(error rate) 
Positive (yes) trials 1586 
(.02) 
1041 
(.08) 
1281 
(.04) 
331 
(.07) 
  Interference  
[recent negative] 
2672 
(.08) 
1370 
(.46) 
1562 
(.12) 
644 
(.10) 
  No interference  
[non-recent negative] 
1666 
(0) 
1241 
(.04) 
1358 
(.03) 
562 
(.05) 
  Effect  1005 (.08) 
129 
(.42) 
204  
(.09) 
284 
(.10) 
Cued  
recall 
Recall 
proportion 
Interference  
[2-block interference] 0.69 0.38 0.71 .13 
  No interference  
[2-block control] 0.77 0.69 0.91 .17 
  
 Effect 0.08 0.31 0.20 .12 
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 Intrusions Intrusions  
[list 1 lure recall] 0.15 0.38 0.25 .10 
Release  
from PI 
Items 
recalled 
Interference  
[list 2 recall) 2.55 1.5 3.04 .78 
  No interference  
[list 1 recall] 3.25 2.85 3.68 .21 
  
 Effect 0.7 1.35 0.64 .61 
 Intrusions Intrusions  
[list 1 intrusions] 0.3 0.5 0.41 .33 
Shifting  
Global  
shifting 
RT  
(error rate) 
Mixed block 2977 
(.01) 
1624 
(0) 
1715 
(.04) 
652 
(.06) 
  Pure block 1199 
(0) 
859 
(.03) 
732 
(.02) 
189 
(.02) 
  Global switch cost 1778 
(.01) 
765 
(-.03) 
983 
(.03) 
546 
(.06) 
Backward 
inhibition 
RT  
(error rate) 
N-2 repetition 3183 
(.01) 
1826 
(0) 
1830  
(.05) 
697 
(.06) 
  N-2 switch 3015 
(0) 
1579 
(0) 
1735 
(.04) 
678 
(.06) 
  N-2 repetition cost 167 
(.01) 
247 
(0) 
96  
(.008) 
97 
(.02) 
 
 
